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-PREFACE 
The original plan called. tor an exposition and critique of 
Professor Simon's entire theory of authority, thus including a 
discussion of the instruments and forms of authority, its 
transmission, and its relation to demooracy. Since this project 
, 
proved to be too ambitious, the presen't thesis has concentrated 
on a more restricted topiC, that of Simon t s philosophical theory 
of the nature and funotioM of authority and its relation to 
progress and liberty. This is a subject of fundamental importance 
in the liOrld today. 
Special. thanks are due to Professor Simon himself and to 
Reverend Panl A. Woeltl, S.J., for their understanding and 
helpfulnese. 
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CHAmR I 
In 1940 the Aristotelian SOctety of Marquette UniT8rsity invited 'bes 
SimoD, then _ociate protessor of philosophy at the University ot Notre Dame. 
to g1 ve its annual Aquinas Lecture. Thi8 address, later published b7 the 
1 Society I set forth the then current st,ate of Professor Simonts inve8tigation 
into the nature and functions ot authorityl modem attitud.ea toward author1t7 
, 
were S\lIIImtJ.riBed and the problem raised by tnem c1ear17 stated. a proY1aional 
definition was given and explained, the functions of authorit)r were then 
distinguished, analyaed. and demonstrated, and pr1nc1ples for a 8olution 
derived. This was a philosophical study of authority in general, rather than. 
ot merely political authority. st. ThOlNUl was cited trequent17, especially in 
the SuD:ma Theoloeca, and conclusions were then reached in the light of' the 
principles of ethics, epist8llolog, and rational pqchology-the whole being 
bued upon Thomiatic metaphysics. 
Eight years later, after publishing HTeral articles on the subject, 
Protesser Simon, now at the Uniwrs1ty of Chicago, gave tt. Charles R. Walgre 
1 
2 
Foundat.ion Lectures or 1948, in whioh he presented a .rurther development ot his 
theory of aut.horit,.. Thes. lecturee were published in 19S1 b7 tile Univerait,. 
'tJ.Dder the title PhilosGP& !>! Democratio GoYemme~. 2 As the title indicates J 
this work deals chien,. with d8JllOCrU7, but ita tirst chapter otters an 
expanded analysie of the tunctions of authority, together with a more complete 
treatment. at the ram1tications or the theory: the instruments am fOlWl of 
authority, its traD8ld.aion, and its relation to liberty in a democraq. 
The subject ot t.he present t.hesis is restricted t.o Preteuor Simon' s 
general theory of the nat.ure aDd functions of author.1t,. .. presented in the_ 
two basic works. Tb.ey are the chiet sourou qt the theory available at the 
present time, refentnce will be JlBde, however, to SimonIS other books and 
articlu which c1ar1.f.y hia basic po8itiODB.3 A discussion of the instruments, 
torms, and traum1.sion of authoriv w1ll be included wb.eDllftr 10heae rud.t1.ca-
tiona shed sigJdticant light on tm primary principles. Finally, a critical 
analya1a of tile theOl'7 1dll be presented • 
., 
. prot_or Ive8 ReD8 Marie Simon .. born in Cberbovg, France, in 1903, 
aDd pUrInlfId higher studi .. at. the Catholio Inatit.ute ot Paria arid the 
2nenoetorth to be known as n.tocratic GO'ferraent. 
3J:t should be noted that Professor SiJIon haa not ;yet completed hi. !me ... 
tigatiOD of authorit)". He 18 at present; .finisbiDg a aeries of twenty-one . 
treatise. on philosophical subjects, of which one is enti tle4 General Theo17 ot if .. rJf; containing Ita number of thinp which are not in P!!ffi& Ql -
Goyerment ...... FrOll a letter of Prof. SiJnon to the ar, tuTy S, 
1 9. ct. bib11ograp.b)r tor artio1es by Simon touching on the present question. 
, 
Univers1t7 of Paris from 1920 to 1929. Be taught phil08opb;y at the Catholl0 
University of Lills from 1930 to 1938, aDd then, having come to the United 
statea, at the UniTeraity ot Botre Dame trca 1938 to 1947. At preeent he 18 
protessor of pbilosopbT in the Committee on Social Thought, Uniftraity of 
Chic~o. A frequent contributor to political and philosophical joumala, 
Professor Simon i8 also tbe author or the following books. IntroduoUon ~ 
...... -----....... --1\ 
L.0nt010J!! !! Co~tre (Parls, 19)4), OntiS!! !!.!! Conna1s88Doe JIlOrale 
,. 
(Paris, 1934), !:! C~ d'lthiople !!. !! Pens .. Politique francais. (Paris, 
19)6), Troia LejCOU !!t!! Travail (Paris, 1938), !!!.!2!!..!2 ViS (New York, 
1942), March !! Liberation (HUwaukee, 1942), ~o1r !!. savo1r (Montreal, 
I 1944), 0cImluni:R: 2! ~!!'!! (New York, 1947), ad !ra1te 2 Lib" Arb1tre 
(Wge, 19S1). He contributed to Pb1l0833;.S: Mature by Jacques Mar1:talll 
(lew York, 19)1), aDd one of his _qa, "The Doctrinal Iasue Between the 
Church mi DemocraGy,. is contained in I!!!. Catholic Church !! _WGr_l_d Affairs, 
edited by 'Waldemar Gurian and M.A. Fituimm.ons (Notre Dame, 19S4). He is also 
translator, together With John J. G1ami.l1e aDd G. Donald Hol1enhorst, of The 
-
Material !51:c 2!!2!!!!!! §!. ThOSl'lU (Chicago, 19S5). 
As the tttlu of hi. books iDdieate, S11Ion is both a phUosopher and a 
care.tal obsel"ftr of modern political and social problems. A Thom1st in the 
tradition of Maritain, be is vi~ interested in both the philosophical 
fotmdationa or democracy and such problema as colonialism, expanding g0vern-
ment, and the laok of community in modern society. The gravity of these and 
other dUemmaa of our day has not on17 led Simon to carry on his 1nTestigation 
into their cauaes, but lends to his inquiry a s1pificance which aus it 
wort1\Y of st11d7. 
---
The problem of the nature and. tUDctions ot authority li •• at the root of 
many modem dil8JmQU. Colonialia ad the .fight against paternalism in Ana 
Africa, the difficulti •• at federaliaa-trapentation Te1"8U8 centralization, 
increasing governmental powers in democraci •• despite ideological tendencies 
deep4r rooted in the put, periodic revolution 11'1 maJJf republica, ad of cours 
cormmmism, which parada:d.cally promi.e. the wi ther:l.Dg away ot the State while 
imposing the most t71"&nn1cal authority-all of theM problema in the political 
sphere deri ft tram the problem ot authori t7. 'Wi thin the state, the basic 
social unit, the fam1l.)r, faces a breakdOlm ot authority which is one cause ot 
widespread j1.1'ftn11e delinquenq. World government and aP8!j':h!id could be 
added to the list of current problema which can 'be traced baek to the tuuia-
mental question ot the nature and 1'w.'lC't1ons ot author1t,'. The im'estigation 
conducted by ProtesSOl" Simon is, cODSeqUently, not only timely, but vitally 
important in the modern world. 
Oitation of the .. Taried problema dou not, however, am.ouat to the more 
fundamental desiderata: stating in euec1Dc\ tenu the buio probl_ of 
authority at the philosophical level. It is the tuk of the preeent thesis to 
state and then cr:1. ticiu Simon'. 1mrest1gat1on of the problem at this 
fundamental leYel of analysis. 
Simon approach.s the statement of the question in ... Na .... t.Ul'e ...... !!'! Functions 2.! 
Author1;tl in two different wqs, one more speculatiTe, the other more practi-
cal.. He begins with the obaerYation that almost all 80cial thinkers haft 
accepted the relation of authority aDd. liberty as CD8 of inverse proportion, 
__ ~-~-.'~ .•. ~' , _ •. _~, '~'_." • ,_ "_~ ... .,._~. _ '., ~_~>._._ •. _ •• ,~_,-_n,_ .... ____ >v-,~ .... ____ .,,, __ ~ ... _~,,,_, __ ._~,, ____ ,~_ ..... _,. .... ~ __ • ___ -._ ,,,. 
Bedioal anarch1ats excepted, no social thinker ever questioned the 
fact thBt. social bappineu 18 based upon a telici toua combination 
of authori V and libert7. HO'nV'er vague and ill-d.fined our concept8 
~ authorit,.- and liberty may be, we realize at once that authDrity 
aDd liben,.. are at the same tu. antinomic aDd compl_11tal:7 terms. 
By sa} ing that they are antinadc terms, I do not mean that their 
8JltillOldc charaoter is absolute and unqualified. I mean onl.7 that, 
in a certain sense and to some extent, those terms are undeniably 
opposed to one another. A. to the1r complementar.y character, it is 
quite clear that authorit7, when it 18 not fairly balanced b7 
l1bert7. is but t~, aDd that liberty, whep it 1s not. fairly 
balanced b.r authority, 18 but abuift lice ... 4-
liote that tor 81aon pure author! t,.- and pure liben,. are impoes1ble. 
Therefore it "unrestricted liberty aDd boundless authorit;r are fictitious 
conceptions I each of which implies ita own negation together with the ann1h:1la-
tion of soc18t7 • • • the e .. ent1al question i8 that of combining r1ghtq tJle 
toroea of authority and l1ben,. • ..5 
Baon s.,.s that in a particular case th18 t.lioi1;oo combination depeDd.. 
upon the prudence ot the bud of soct.V, b1:rt since uniftrsal .... nca aft~( 
involTlMl in the cont1.Dgenc188 of a:ietential occurrences, this head. needa . fJ 
principles to guide him. in determining tlw proportion of authori't7 to liberty 
which the given situation demaDd.. This probl.m of proportion aceordiDg to 
principle. 1. what Simon saya determined hi. reaearch: the prinCiples 
them8elvea are the object of the 1nYestigation.' 
But, he continues, the general problem Jllight be atated in a more concrete 
~. Modern political and social consciOWlnes. "erldencea an obscure belief 
>:eWe, p. 2. 
-
6xbid., p. 4. 
-
6 
that the progreS8 ot :treedom is ~ou with .ooial progress •••• _7 EYeD 
cODSel"Yativea admit this beliet t accusing liberals only ot going too tast in 
the quest tor a degree of liberty which society 18 not yet ready to as.1a11ate I 
Tbua tlwy admit, no le.s than libera18 and progressi"'., tbs baai. 
assumption that sooial p:rogress 18 identical with the progress ot 
liberty. Now this proptess 01 11be1't7 .i8 ordinarily conceived .. 
implying a decay of authOrity, so that three tenne, social progress, 
the progress ollibe1"t7, and the deoay of authorlt)", are ~
identified. liIhat are the implications and what is the value of 
theae id.enti:t1cationa1 This 18 a quution that _ shall be able to 
solve insotar as .. shall be able to point out the principles 
involved. in the noti~8n of author! ty and libert7 ae oppoa1te ud 
complementa17 forcee. 
In his later book, l'hilosOJ?!V!'!. Democratic Goye:rJJrr1ent, S1mcm. 1Daugurates 
the discussion of authority in the :t1rst cbaj,ter with the following dnelopmeJlt 
of the second approach to the problem. The Marx:lat view 01 authority is one 
which aeea ita gradual elimination as a concomitant of the march of progress, 
a view which hae reached ita apogee in the CC'aIIIWl1Bt thaor,y of tbe state. The 
state is ult1mately destined to wither awqJ it 1a not, as in the Fuciet 
conception, an absolute good, albeit caused by the enl in men. On the other 
hand, the tttotalitaria increase of the powers ot the state ia a tamporal"T 
measure necessary to bring about a social structure that will render the state 
u:nneC8SS8l7 and establish forever the brotherhood of men. ,,9 Yet, Simon pointe 
7Ibid., p. 5. 
-
8I'bid., p. 6. This was written in 1940, and subsequent references to the 
optimi'itiC v1ew ot. progress in Simon's works re1'lect the partial disillusionment 
01 the optitnists due to the outbreak ot war and the realization of modern 
barbarity. ct. ~~ot. t!!!. yeai' trans. Willard R. Truk (New York, 1947) 
pp. 84-103, 'Where '"llii !>iiIli'iitni 0 s1llusionment i8, bowYer, pushed back to 
the First ltJorld war. 
9nemocratic Government, p. 3. 
7 
oft, CCIIInuniama did not originate tb1e theory that the state. \dll d1Jtappellr whe 
erll i. finall7 td.ped out and pe_ Natored to .oc1et;t. It .. rather libe 
cJemoCl"l\CY which tiret worked out the ~. 1Ihat wU makes t.. State neOM 
Simon neall. to our m1nda the ~ ot Toa Paine: "Sooie1l" ill prod.uoed by 
va. UJd IO'ftInWb'lt; b7 our 1d.olcIdneeel tt. tOl"lm' promct.u 0Ul" bappiDNJe 
positivel)" b)r uniting our attecti01'.l8, the latter negativel,. by rutra1ldng 0Ql" 
vi.. • • • the .firet; 18 e. patl'Oft, tbe 1e.n • pun1aher. ulO 
T.b1a claM10 statement of liberal. d-.oorae: neat1J 8lBUAri_, aeoord1nc 
to S1aon.. tba tbeoJ7 that IClgemraent 18 nmdered J38018111lt7 DOt b7 ~re, but 
b¥ ctet1~ the0r7 which he calle ~ deftcd.enC7 ~ at IO"Iftw '" 
.... JJ. !hi. tlleor7.. ..,.. S1mcm, is not. to be oontueecl with the theol7' de-
eeri.b1na gfMIl'lIII8JJt .. • neeess8l"1 m.l, 81noe • Fuc18\ held. tbe state to be 
_ ab80lute pod, altboulh _de ...... rr by t_ ...u in an. Nor ie it to be 
oontused with a e:yateutlc dAttttnd.nati.OIl to prcmtnt avergonnl'l8llt baaecl on the 
'belW tut -\he ~ eoe1al happineatt reaulte :hut the operetlO!1 ot lnd1-
"f"1cba11a1Uat.1 ..... , aed CD the ~_ that theN a1.atft ... --rtnc 
tOlW in _ture which 1noonap1CMOUl.y d1recta cbaft. OCCNr'Jl9nceatward sa. 
det1n1te pal.12 1.'b18 _tura11eti. epUldsm Oft vhioh earl)' 11'bere11a tJlr1W1d, 
.,. S1mon, baa beoaae ou.taoded .. to '\be compla1t1 .. or modem l1te. The 
12 6 Iblct., p. • 
-
8 
liberal of today consequently favors more·;overnmental activity rather than 
less, on the grounds that it has become a necessity for the preservation of 
society.l) 
Simon cogently points out that in tems of the det1c1enq theory this is 
a. bewildering s1 tuation. It evil alone makes govenaerrt necessary, then "a. 
demand for increased government aotirlty means either increased evil or better 
awareness or evil or both.,.14 M the taR of the attar ia that in mazor 
cases it is pro~, especially teebnological progress, Wich aeems to call 
for more governmental actiYity. Simon wUl deftlop thill idea later on, when 
he di80U8aes essential functions at author.l.t7" and sbow:.sthat walth increues 
the choice of means, renderinl authority more necessary than ever. At present 
he is content to draw the conclusion that if progress demands more government, 
it i8 more necess81'1 than ever to check the d1aorder17 growth of the .3tate 
"by the power of clearly defined principles."lS 
Up to this potDt, the etatemeD.ta of the prGbla de'temining the nature of 
the inYeatigation have been entirely those of Protessor Simon, drawn from the 
opening sections of his two prlnc1pal works. No critical analysis has been 
given, since the final chapter of the thesu haa been reserved for that 
purpose. It would be advantageo_, b.oweYer, to sUJI'm18.rile here the state of 
the question as Simon eventually presents it, but to accoapllah this task 
13 Ibid., p. 6. 
-
15Ibld. 
-
9 
adequately it will be necessary to go beyond these opening sections and draw 
upon material "Which he presents under the consideration of the functions of 
authority. The puxpose of this briel coupectus of the irIV'est1gation, which is 
not Simon's CMl 88 regards organisation and therefore repre.sents a statement 0 
bow the writer of this thesis understands the problem, is OM of achie'9'in& 
greater clar1ty and precision in the treatment of Simon's theoJ7 as a whole. 
Simon baa said that the general problem is to find principles for the 
right combination of authority and liberty. This problem is not one which i. 
raced by the state alone, but bJ all societies. Therefore the problems which 
Simon deals with are not purel,. political, although th.,. apply pre-em1nent17 , 
most C8888 to the state. 
Since author! t7 and l1ben,., acoordiDl to SiIIIon, are at the s_ time 
ant.inomic and oomplemental)' terms, it is to be expected that two general 
principles, antinomic and complementar, in character, will emerge from his 
i:r.rteatigation. This is in fact, the conclusion of _NB._t_u_re_ !!!!. Functions 2! 
Author.l.n 111 80 I!VIlIl'lJOrda, although the same principles are not exp1icitJ.y 
repeated in PhilosGp!\! 2! Demooratic Government.16 
Again, the preblem of authority is not-and Simon sqa this very emphati-
-
cally-the problem of who shall rule. He states that "throughout the history 
- -
of pol1ti~ literature there is a tendency to identify the two following 
questions I !.> whether society needs to be governed and !!) whether it needs to 
16c.t. Democratic Government, pp. 140-141, where three principles are 
given which pSiiJ1el t& two proposed earlier. 
10 
be governed by a distinct personnel • • •• The consti tuUon of a distinct 
governing personnel has to do with the modalities of authority, not with its 
!unctions and the ground of its necessiv.,.l7 For Simon the true problem of 
authority, in the sense that it is prior am more fundamental, is whether am 
on what ground.s s~ should rule and others obey in general, not in particular 
whether there should be arJf authority at all, not whether this or that person 
or group should exercise it. This is the problem to which Simon addresses 
himself. 
S1lIon hold. that author.l ty baa substitutiorial ad e.sential functions, a 
distinction which is extrenely important to ¥-s lIbole theory. If authority 18 
substituting for a delicien., 1.e., the lack of something which should be 
present (a privation), then autherl. 't7 is not essentially playiDg its own role 
it is makiDg up tor a deficiency which in the natural, unimpeded course of 
human progress (whether in the individual, as he approaches maturity, or in t 
SOCiety, as it deY810pa the ab11i\7 for self-gOYermaent) will gradually be 
supplied by trul.7 natural. -ana. Tbws he sap I 
The inabUi ty of the minor to goyern himself, to pursue his proper 
81_ by h1maelt, is always bued upon SOII8 deficiency. This 
deficiency mq be UJlDatural am abnormal, as in the case of the 
inaane or feeble-mimed, and then it is a privation in the strongest 
88.e of the term, m evil. It may be, on the contra17, natural and 
l7Ib1d., pp. 37-38. Maritain, in his book Man and the state (Chicago, 
1951), j)iiTses Simon for this distinction: "Professor sliOn his rightq 
st:resaed the fact that the basic problem of authorit;y (as a right ot people as 
a whole) comes prior to the problem of the necessitr for having authority 
entrusted to a distinct governing personnel. "-F. 127, note 11. 
u 
normal, as in the cue of the child, and then it is no evU, but onl7 
a privat10tl in the broad Dense of the term. In any cue, the notion 
of minority alwa,'8 refers to the lack of a quality which should be 
possessed if one is to be a parsen in the full "nee of that 'Word. 
The gOV'erning reason of the father is substituted tor the reaeon of 
the child 'Which i8 not yet fully developed. and laben the worldng of 
reason is pathologically hampeftKi in an adult, an officer repree.m-
ing society subetitutu his reason for the deficient reason of t1'11s 
iraume or feeble-rd.rded person.ltJ 
The dew that authority haa only these substitutional functions 1s 
precisely the deficiency theory. 
'fbe impcrtant question which arises in connection with these two claa_ 
of functions is the problem of their limitation. Should authority 88 
exerc1eect in its aubati tutional functions s~hov provide for its 01m liquida-
tion b;: educating ita subjects out of their need lor it? Is there some 
prinCiple of autonomy ..mich postulates that man should rule M,msell it he is 
able, or that smaller cO'IIaunitiea should be free from larger units insofar as 
tbe)r are able to gOV'em theuelvu' 
'fhe other min claas of functions is called eeeential, this group i8 made 
neoeaaary by the very nnture of :man 88 such, as a contingent being, a social 
being. an intelligent being whose own knowledge is, hC1W'8Vl:lr, limited in that 
he cannot know tree .future events. Do such essential functions exist' The 
de1'ic1ency theoty would deny that there is an)' such funct1on, and would go on 
to poatula.te the gradual dec:reue of authority insofar as the deficiencies 
whioh slcme make it necea.al)' graduall)' decrease • 
• 
~ature and Func't:lons, p. 1.3. The example given refers to individuals. 
but the' sa:m.tJ wOu'rd hOld true of Q wale people in a state of minority ~'ith 
regard to the ability for detemining their own affaire. 
12 
The assumption that autbority has but substitutional functions 
bae far-reaching consequences, for if authorit7 is made necessary 
by deficiencies alone, it 'Will be deatined to disappear insotar as 
the deficiencies which make 1t necessary disappear. This UtN'lllP-
tion doee not mean that authori t7 will ever vanish complete31': 1t 
is clear that the child will never be able to accampl1ah self .. 
lovernaeut;" and that there will alwqs be feeble-minded. and v1ck:ed 
people. It neans that the amount of authority necessary in a 
society is inversely proport.ional to the perfection reached by that 
society and by the persons am the elementa17 groups which compose 
it. At the ideal term of human progress, the field of autbont, 
would be limited to the go9'8l"1'ft8nt of the youflieat dlildren. '!'hu, 
the law of progress 1IlOuld take the fODl of an uymptotic CUl'Ye at 
whose unattainable term there would be a complete elimination ot 
authority .19 
On the other hand, it there are .... ntial functiona of authority, then 
authori t7 might remain the s.e, or eYen increase, despite the elimination of , 
detic18Dcies. Notice that one can hold the gradual dieappearanoe ot authority 
wich is eubet1tutional, am at the ... tile hold that authorlty as a whole 
will increase, but OIl entirely dUferent grounds, grou.nds lIhich are 1DUmatel7 
linked to the nature of man h1.uelf, and will thU8 never decrease or disappear. 
Can a principle of authorit7 be deftloped trClll auch enential .tunctiona? 
Tbi. manner of stating the question 18 not Simon' 8, but it has two 
advantagelu that of unifying Simonis presentation and that of linking each of 
the two m.ajor d1rlsiona of functions of authority to the two antinomies and 
oomplementariti.s of libert7 and authorit)r. From the substitutional functions 
is deriYed a principle of au~ which limits them--net being justified on 
the grounds or their own essence, they have need of 11:m1 tation, !! ... ext ......... ra ... 
From the eS8ential functions is derived a principle ot authOrity which 
19~., pp. lS ... 16. 
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jUBtUi&S th ....... being based upon nature itself, they are 11m! ted. by their " 
essence. '.l'h1s would seem. to be 'Wb.at Simon set out to dO in Nature and. 
-ro . Functions 2! Authoritl aDd the same approach underlies his investigation in 
hie secoDd major work. 21 
One last consideration seems called for in this diDCU8sion of Simon. 8 
research. Han arri somety can be conceived either staticall,. or d)rnam.ically-
either with de.t:lc1encies which are a given fact, or with defi'3iencies which can 
be overcoue. Since man aa an 1nd1'f'1dual certain'17 overccnes deficiencies on 
his wa,. to adlllthood and as a social being bas certainly avercOllft many of them 
since the daTs of primitive society, Simon'a ~heor)" 18 valuable because he dou 
eonoeive maD dynamioa11,.~ He relates the qUestion of authel'1ty to the 
question of progress. 
Granted this importance of progre ......... md it is both good history and good 
metaph\Ysioa, since all beiUgs seek their per1'ection--i t follows that useful 
results can be obtained .troa considering the fUllC'tioions of autborit)r in a 
community of pertect.1,. intelligent and virtuous men.22 Here there would be 
place for essential functions onl7. This ia what st. Thomas doe. when be 
considers whether in the state of innocence man woUld have been master ewer 
man.23 His answer contains bJpl1e1tly both of the principles which Simon aeeka 
2Opp. 46-47. 
2lpp. 140-l4l. 
22Nature and Functions, p. 16. ct. Democratic Government, p. 19. where 
Simon potiiES outtlid suCh societies are ver,y rei! at tower levels. A famil7 
of this type can and dee. exist. 
~.!., I, 96, 4, quoted in Democratic GOV'emment, pp. 59-60, note 23. 
to demonstrate. The problem oould be stated in this tUhion, but s1nce modem 
secularists do not bold Or:Lginal Sin, S11n.on posits instead ot 1Jmocence an 
ideal term or busnan progress, whicb they do hold. It is an excellent 18tbod-
ology for distinguishing the authori t7 made necessary by man's deficiencies 
from the authority demanded by his nature, and for formulating prinCiples which 
take into account mants dynamic thrust toward tMt state of perteetion. 
Simon's ill'V'estigation of the nature and functions of authority, then, 18 
an inquiry into its meta~8ical grotmds 88 the anti~ and complement of 
liberty. This is his great contribution. other writers have expatiated at 
length on the origin of authority without sh~ its essential. functionaJ 
still mote have discussed the instruments ot authority and the fol"J!J8 which it 
may take in society J but very few baTe treated of the basic grounds of 
authority itself. One can search ltmg hours in vain for anything similar to 
Simon t s research, though elements of the solution are certainly in Aristotle 
and st. Thomas.2h 'l'hroughout the history ot Western politioal thought the 
de.t1cienc1e8 of _Dkind have been taken for granted as the justification of 
authon ty • But with the riae of communism. and secularistic humanism, which 
claim on the one hand to overcome man t s defioiencies by changing h1mIan nature, 
2UUSing these elements, u well as other Thomistic principles, Simon has 
oonstructed what this thesis therefore calls a "Thomistic theory of authority." 
But there is no unified theory ot authority in st. 'rbomas, just u there is no 
ttpolitica" of st. 'i'h01lla8 in the sense of a 8)"8tematic treatise. The De Re" PrinCim has little to otterJ only the tirst book and part or the 
se are cons ered authentic. The most important material is in his 
philosophical and theological works. Cf. A. P. dtEntrevea, ed., A~naat 
Seleoted Polltioal 'hi"iti!1J8, trans. J. G. Dawson (Oxford, 1948), p:tt. 
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but are forced on the otber--by their own deficiency theo1'7-into still greatex 
totalitarianism, it becomes imperative to examine more profoundly, as Professor 
Simon has dODe, the deepest roots of the nature and :functions of authorit7. 
CHAPTER n 
THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY 
Sim.on does not go deeply into the nature of anthon ty b,. wq of phenome-
« 
nologioa1 ana1)"'818~<or a1'l historical study or the tera. It is rather by way ot 
a complete analysis of its tunct1ons. he says, that a satisfactory det1n1t1on 
can result.1 Nevertheless, he gives a prov18ional definition bued upon CQllooo 
JI.OJl conceptions a.t the beg1nn1ng of h1a inquir;r in _N4_t .... u_re_ !!!!. Functiona !!! 
, 
Authoritz:_ "Authority 1s an active power, residing in a person and exercised 
through a c01mlSl1d, that is through a practical judgment to be taken as a rule 
of conduct by the tree-v.Ul of another person. ,,2 
In diecussing the elements or this def'1ni tioD, Simon does not spec1t';y wba 
he meana by an active power, but beg1na h7 ~-ing that the seat of authority 
must always be a person. Authority can DeTer take the form of an impersonal. 
necessity, as Rousseau would have it. IlWhen Rousseau urges the educator to 
have his pupU taught h7 nature rather than by men, to baTe him dependent on 
things rather than on persons, to have him led by Wlex1ble law rather than 
by the edicts of any human 'Mill, when he Sa.YS that the ehild must act b7 
2 Ib1d., p. 7. 
16 
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necessity ami not. by obedience, we realize that he establishes the formula of 
every anti-authoritarian pedagog.,.3 
A dieression on Rousseau and other adversaries ot Simon t s insistence on 
the personal source 01 authority se_ to be in order at this point, in order 
to briDe out more clearly and by way of contrast the nature of authority in 
Simon's theory. In Philosop& !! Demo~ratie Government Simon take. on his 
principal adversary to personal author11,J'. 
S1mon explains that Rousseau was determined to do away with obedience to 
persona and to find instead a tom of association in which each person, while 
uniting himself with all, mq stUl obey ~ only and remain as tree .. 
be.tore. Thi8 he .toUDd in the theory ot the General 't-.'lll, whiCh is not a 
I, 
person at all, but an impersonal being which a man may obe7 without 1 .. 8 of 
fre«tom. S1mon rejects thiB theory, of course, but savea hiB greateat oriti-
c1am far an aspect of Ro .... u.s political philoaopl'q' which va deYeloped into 
what Simon, tollowing a suggestion of one of its adherents, Paul-Lou.ia Courier, 
calls the "eoaob-dr1verlt t.heory of gove1"l'Jlll8nt. 'l'hi8 theory i8 not so o1:tt1.ous 
in Rousseau u in ethen, )'"81; "Rouaseau bas probably done more than anyOM 
elM to spread the 1dea1 of an organisation capable ot doing awq with the 
ethical substance of autbortt,. and obed1ence • .4 In briel, this theory holds 
'Ibid., ct. J. J. Rousseau, Imile, eel Flammarion (Paris, n.d.). I, 79-81, 
quoted~Simon in the note to 1#h1s section. 
~rat1e Government, p. 148. This exp'lanation of the "coach-driver" 
theor,y 18 Gken frOOI is; Chapter on 8O'f'ereignt,. in demoC1"&CJT, pp. 146-1S4. 
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that the govemment is like a coacb-driver who goes where he is told-in this 
case by the people. Insofar as the governing person is oonaidered a leader, 
his is a leadership w.1thout authority, the people obe7 th ... lves &lema. 
This doctrine, which looks 80 deceptively like a theory of sovereignty ot 
the people, seems to explain the operation not only of direct demoerac1ea like 
New England town .eU ngs, but ..... n of representative foma of government. In 
realiv, it 18 maaked anarcl\Y, for both of these forms are endowed with real 
1001 o'f authority. Even if the people do not transfer authoriv, there is 
still a qualitative d1tterenoe between 8J~ ot the oitiHDS taken u private 
indirlduals ami all of them gathered. in an ~embl)r in charge of OCMIllun1.V 
af£a1rs 8l'1d rul1Dg by majority vote. In the latter case, it 1s the b0d7, a 
moral person, which 1"'Ul.e81 authority is earciaed by this person. '1'rue, thos 
who vote 1d.th the majority u;y seem to obe7 oDly themsel ..... When tbe7 obey the 
law the7 voted for, but wbat of those in the minorit)r? Some would reply that 
they obe7 for utilitarian 1'9UODS onlT, but tbi. approach to goveft'JDJent not 
only weakens the unity of .oc1Hy--it oannot explain the universal eonriction 
that law bind in conseience. In a direct dellOOraoy 88 _11 a.a in I1t'ltT other 
s,..rtem, Simon oonolude., the nature of 800iety d8ldllda that man should obq 
JIJBIl? 
In Nature ~ Functions !?! Authoritz, Simon l'8StmleS his exposition ot the 
provisional definition with a second observation, that this insistence upon 
SIbid., p. 154. Simon points out that the "ooach-ciri'Yer" theor.Y 
influer;;t the French Revolution and its followers, particularly in Latin 
.bleriea. It is .. 11 described in Jacques Mar1tain, SCholasticism and Politics, 
(New York, 1940), p. 93. ---
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personal exercise brings out the difference between author.l:ty and law. Law 
be conceived in a state of 1mpersonal1ty-we oan speak of natural laws blnane 
in the impersonal course of wents. In a lengthy note to tb1a explanation, 
Simon expanda upon the point. Coneidering the civil law 88 the pr:llle analoga 
of a _ries of Ian (which it ii, eoad !!!), we see that thie positive law 
participates in a higher law, the natural law, found first in human reason, bu: 
onl)r because recognised u immanent in human nature. If we stopped at this 
point, nature would be an irrational ult1-.te, not itself an ordinance of 
reason; therefore we must go beyOlli and see that the natural law participates 
in the eternal law, the :ntUOD of God. Ul~te17'" IIl'Iilf!rt arrive at a person. 
But wi th authority-, on the a\ber band, Simon hold. that _ 1Jmnecliate 
reference to a personal intellect and a personal will is appare~ essential 
to the notion of authority. r .• cannot conceive authority without it, although 
we are able to conceive law without it, due to the state of impersonality 
enjoyed in nature by the natural law, one of the analogatel in the aeries. 
pr1.me analogate of law qUoad !! remainl, of course, the eternal law, which 
engratts participations of itself in created :naturel, ldlich participations are 
then recognised ~ human reuon and either promulgated al obligationa (in the 
cue at bUllUUl nature), or expressed. in scientific law (in the cue of non-ra-
tional beinga).6 
It law and authority are taken in their most lomal sense, Simon deClare. 
then they are opposed just 88 md:vereal necessities are opposed to the ccmere 
-
6Nature and Functions, pp_ so-S', note 2. Simon points out that the 
definiUon of Taw iilnn by st. ThCIWJ in S.'1'., I ... II, 90, refers properl:y to t 
law issued. b)' state society .--P. ,0. - - I 
I 
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and contingent aspects o£ the real. This is not to say that Prar.!len.ce has 
nothing to do with laws, however. In the issuance of those positi .... laws 
which are not mere deductions from the natural law (E!! modum deduction1s) 
but are positive determinations of it (Ear modUlI determtnationi!,> p1"Ud.enttal 
reasoning is certainly called for. B7 means of this two-fold derivation of 
positive law from natural, Simon contiJl\18s, st. Thomas accounts for the 
traditional. distinction between the 1_ of nations (jus ,entia) and civil law 
properly so called (~us ci"ne)~ !be former, because it can be deduced from 
natural law, is established by danonatrable sc1ent1f'ic reuoning and thus 
pertains to moral science rather than to p~ce and authortv, it authorit,. 
is to be identified with governing prudence; the latter, because it cannot. be 
deduced from natural law, is elaborated by i.nc:lemonstrable prudentt91 reuo1'l1ng 
and thus pertaine to prudence and author1 ty. '!'he law of nati ens is above 
authorit,-, the civil law is issued 'by it. 
'lima, in Simon's view, authority does have Ii place in the legislative u-
_11 8.8 the executive power. Nevertheless, he says, when taken in their mest 
typical torms, law and authority are said in contradistinction to one another" 
se1.t~ aJXl demonstrable principles (natural law md law of national 
realise more completely the ideal. notion of law than do prudential deter-
minations (civil lava); authority, on the other hand, reali ... more completel7 
the ideal. notion of social prudence when it deals with particular and concrete 
circumstances (executive decrees) than when it deale with more general and 
lasting situatione (civil laws). Thus there is almost an inverse proportion 
of law to authority u one passes trom natural law to particular e:xscuUft 
2l 
deareea. 7 
By stating that authority is exercised thro!;!&h ! command, Simon wishes to 
emphasise the distinction between authority and coercion, a distinet#ion 'Which 
is important but frequently not made. "A common mistake is to identity 
author1v with coercion, which 18 but the most conspicuous of its instruments. 
In the system of Simon, author1 t.y bas two instruments a persuuion, in which 
authority is les8 apparent but n<methelus real, alI'1 coercion, in vihich it is 
more apparent but often le8s effective. Persuasion is a moral force, a causal 
process 'Who. proper ei'tect 18 the origination ot a certain disposition in the 
will ~ persOl18J coercion i8 a physical force, a causal process whose proper 
, 
effect 1s a mechanical causality exerted. by man over man. Simon expanda upon 
the functions of coercion in a note in Natu~ !!!!. F\mctiOM, taking as his 
point or departure the articles in the S18na Tbeologica (I-II, 9S, 1 and I-II, 
91, 1) where St. 'J.'homaa discuss.s the raiaon dtetre of the State~ Simon s878 
that although st. Themae understalds the power of coercion to be the distin-
guishing feature ot state society, th1s implies neither that ethel' t;ocieties 
lack sene power of coercion, nor that this power is the .scance of the state. 
The state alone has the power of unconditional coercion, but this power is 0 
7Ibid., pp. 70-73, note 10. The reference to st. Thomas i8 to §/t", I-n, 
9$, 2.~ conclusion ot inverse proportionality is based on a statement by 
Prot. Simon in an inteJ"rlew with the writer, July 11, 19$9. 
8nemocratic Gavemment, p, 7. (The italica are in the original.) In thi 
book SliOn dtscUsses a!£ 1iilgtb several probleme related to the instruments ot 
authorit7, such 88 the borderline between them, threat, psycbieal coercion, t 
right to coerce, use of violence, and the distinct! ve stand of democracy 
regard.i.ltl the instruments. ot. pp. 108-127. These questions remain out.ide t 
scope of the present thesis. 
i 
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a characteristic property following from its essence. 
22 
The third element ot the definition, continues Simon, is that the comma.nd 
18 to be taken as a rule of conduct. Authon. t,- is not essentiall)" a principle 
----.............. , 
meant to determine a theoretical judgment in the subject, because such a. 
3udgment depends ideally upon its object as the "only sufficient principle of 
its determiDation~.,lO It tbe subject believes a proposition because of the 
autJlorit)r ot a teacher, or, in the cue ot supernatural faith. on the 
authority or God, then this authority is a substitute for tbe evidence of tbe 
truth t4 the proposition. The acceptance of this substitute 18 provisional, 
until the student or belifmtr can aet.ual17 see tor himself' the truth of the , 
propoa1tton. which aloae necessitates the intellect, he must be satiaf1ed with 
author1\y. When tM. truth is po •• eseed, howeYer, ita substitute ia no longer 
n8CeU&r1. A Iftate of perteet10 baa aucoeedecl to a state of' imperfection. 
"Faith 1s the be,1md.ng et eternal lite and it will no longer be necessary or 
possible when the eternal life will be tul17 possessed. In other words, the 
autbor:t:ty of Qed md tie Chvch, lfhich determines the faIth-assent, substitute 
here below tor the e'Y1cience of the div.1ne Truth which will beatify our 
9tiature and Functions, p. S3. Of. also Democratic Government, p. 109. 
Import.i for""Yrm'Ojii s iiGr theory ia the 'wIe ot COerCIon tor ji;di!igogical 
purposes which he thea cites from St. !homas. This, however; is not .saential 
to Simon's theory ot nature and functiOns, except insofar as hie emphasis on 
the pedagogioal character of substitutional functions influenoes his later 
statements ot tll9 relation ot authority and liberty. It. is more important to 
the problem ot authority in a democracy_ Cf. Demoor!tie GcYern1llent, pp. 115-122. . ., 
lOtwature and FUnctiOns, p. 9. Simon says here that the theoretical 
jud~.' 3ure thoroughljr determined by its object) otherwise it is not 
perfeo\. -
23 
11 intellect. in the promised vision." In the case of a reliable w.ttness, whom 
lie believe, the term authori;tiy is taken in a less rigorous sense, sinee he is 
not empowered to oblige us to be1ine him. tilt i8 clear, on the other hand, 
that this authority improperly so-called, is but substituted for the evidence . 
12 
of facts Which we are unable to s" for ourselves." 
Simon baa little more to s81 explicitly on the nature of authoriV. As 
he ha.e stated, a complete analysis of ita functions is necessary to derive a 
sstisfacrtory de.f1nition. In Democratic Govel"l!lll8ut Simon make. the statement 
that ftauthorl.ty, aocording to the diversity of its functions, calla for di-
'ftrse interpretations i.ft tenu of toundationt duration, relat10n to progress, 
aDd rel etion to freedom • .;u Since he doe. s~ this, it might be wll to list 
these functions as he pl"fJ8eD:ta them in Democratic Government. 
'l'hus the anal7811 or the functions of authority set forth in this 
chapter does net cla1m to be complete J a complete list wuld 
comprise (1.) the substitutional function exercised by authority in 
the order of theoretical truth <mansteri't; 1ft.aching authorityft) J 
(2) the substitutional fUMtion exercta8a authorit7 in the 
guidance of iJlI'IUlture aDd deficient persons or soc1et1e. toward. their 
proper good (patemal authority) J (3) the substitutional f'lmetion 
exercised by authorit7 in the unification of action for the common 
good 1ilen the :means to the common good 1s uniquely determined (so 
that there should b. unanimiV)' (4) the essential .func't1on 
exerc1aed by aiiE1iOr1ty in the unification of aotion for the common 
good when the mane to the CGJIIIOD; good i8 not uniquely determined 
(80 that there is no ground for unanim1V)n'$} the most eesential 
function uerc1sed by authori t)r in the voll tion of the O<mm1on good, 
aDd of the 1ihol. of the common good materially consideredJ (6) the 
n Ibiel., p. 11. 
-
12Ib1d 
--
l3nemocratio Gcmu"nment, p. 7. 
perfective function exerciSed
4bJr 
8uthorit} for the imprO'Vl!ll1ent of 
people ""ho nre already good.1 
Thwt Simon Btq. that authority has three substitutional functions, of 'Which 
one is in the oroer of theo~t1cal truth, two essential functions, of lI,ilich one 
1. more essential, and one perfective funct10n. 
Sinee the nature of authority ia under O1n8ideration, it is important to 
consider whether author1t7, in Simon's a,stem, is an analogous tel'Sll. !be 
etat.e!wnt that it calle tor diverse interpretatiOns in terms of toundat1on, 
dUl"ation, relation to progress, am relation to freedom, aocording to the 
diversi:,,. of its .functiona, might. seem to indicate that the use of an analog 
, 
is evident. yet this requires careful clarification, for the requirtNJnts for 
an analogotJll use Il1US't be stated.. Simon says that the criterion is vbether or 
not tta d1tterent1a is extraneous am added to the common g1"cund; it it ie, 
I 
there t.e uni'V'oc1ty, am if it 18 noto, the" 18 analogy. In his theorr, u 1t 
has been presented in vr1tten works, the question of whether authority 18 an 
artalogoua term baa not been made per£ectly clear, he admits, but it is a quea-
tion 1fhlch he is currently investigating; tor the present he 1s willing to stat. 
that there 1. certainly an analogous U88 of the term when speaking ot the two 
orders of truth, the thecret10al and the practlcal.1$ Fl'Q?l this one 'lI'l87 
cODOlude that Simon did not intend an analogous use of the tem u conring 
15Theae statements coneemins a.:.nalo~ were made by Professor Simon in an 
intel"9'1eW 'With the writer on July 11, 1959. He said turthenaore that he ,,_ 
preparing an article on analO§ tor publication in S&'V'eral monthe. 
all the functions, but rather preoc1Dded frem the question. 
The instruments of authority have been mentioned ilUJofar as they out 
light upon its nature. A word shou.l.d be said about the foma of authority tor 
the S8I18 reason. Simon says that authority can be exercised in various forms, 
but that there is a basic divi.elon ot tbeee forms into two kinds: 
I refer to the distinot,ion made by st. Thomas betweea the so-called 
dom:5n1um, ~ serv08 and the so-called dominiUlll sup!r liberos, let 
us 8.,. CioifiiIOnl ot servitude and dOldnion ot Sedam. 11il8 
distinction is taken from the ends pursued by the authorl:t7 
exerciHd by one an O¥'er anot.ber. when a JI8I1 is governed for b:le 
own good or for the oaamon .good of the society ot which he is a 
m.mer" thia man is said to be tree. On the contra17, one who 18 
governed tor the private welfare ot a master is said to be a slave.16 
Simon points out that this is not the same a' the distinction between the 
::!I!!!n Eo1i ticmm and the t;eE!!P d;e!£e!iCNmt which 119 based on a d.1!terenoe in 
efficient caual1ty, i.e., whether the subject bas the right to resist. Nor 
does the distinct10n between substitutional and essential .functions correspond 
to the distinction between the two great kinds of dominions which constitute 
17 . 
the basic divisions ot the forma of authority. This vhole quest10n 'Will be 
considered later on in the disCtl8sion of authority and liberty. 
One last consideration concerning the definition proposed by Simon should 
be mentioned. He s8J8 that autboriv 1e an active power, but be does not \18. 
the word ~, a term \18ual17 employed by Thomistic and other Scholastic 
16Jfature and Functions, pp. 33-34. ctt. Democratic Government, p. 74. 
The reference iO"'"SE. 'l'tiomas ie to S.T., I, 96, lie 
--
17Ibid., pp. 34-37. Simon questions whether Aristotle b1mself perceived 
the disl.!nction between the dominions and the regimina. Of. Nature .!!! 
Ftmctions, p. 3" and p. 74, note 12. 
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authors to denote a moral power, a legitimate claim, to exact obedience. 
yet Simon does .. d.sh to include this notion of obligation in his provisional 
defi.nit.ion, as is shown b)' his use of the words !2!!!. taken, words which show 
19 
that the command ought to be obqed.. Add! tiomU evidence for this interpre-
tation is hia stateJrtent tha.t the authority of a mere witness to some truth i8 
really only authority improperly so-called, unleS8 he baa some power to oblige 
us to believe him. 20 
Does this obligation to obeyauthori __ bird in consoience' 8imcm would 
say that it does. In Ph1losOS>& !! Democratic Gover.maent be sqs that "thinp 
talce place in civil relatiOns, not ezcepti0llll1y but regularly, as if some men 
had the power at binding the consciences of other men. The factual behavior 
of man in soeiety testifies to the regular operation of an ethical moti.,.. of 
obedience •• 21 
But, be continues .. it is not true that a man can bind the conscience of 
another man; God alone call. And 80 a paradox ari .. 8. How can we account for 
the fact of 80C1&1 life without us1llling that a an can bind the co_clence of 
18ct• Jacques Maritain, Scbolastie1sm and Politics (New York, 1940), p. 
92. "I shall mean by tauthorIt:7' t& rIiJitTo dlrect and cOlJD!ll.U1d, to be 
listened to or obqed. by others. ADd I shall mean by 'power' the force, which 
one can use ••• (to) oblige others to listen or obq." Cf. als. J. i)onat, 
8.J., Ethics. s~. (Irmsbruck, 19.34), p. 64: "Auctoritas est iue membra 
etficaii!ter in !iiii soc1etat1s dlr1gen41. 
19This statement was confirmed by Prof. Simon in an interview 1d. th the 
writer, Jul7 11, 19$9. 
20Nature and FUnctions, p. 12 • 
...... ---- -----, 
2lDemocratio Government, p. 145. 
21 
his neighbor? He then dUCU8ses the coach-driTer theory, which proposes a 
solution to the dilemma by de~ng that man' s conscience is GTer bound at all, 
only to reject it as false and ecmduc1Te to the destruction of socie. b7 
secession. The true 8l18W8r, he sqa, lie8 in the nature of man as created by 
God I "It gf1f'emment, as d.18tinO't 1'rom unamJdt,., is ade necesaa17 by the va 
nature of thingS, the obligatioft to obey has its roots in the very. nature of 
, . . .. ---.,~~- ...... 
- ~ 
things, 111 the ver,: __ ~~~~ of man and of human 8ociet7~ It The paradox is 
resol'Nd. only God can bind thecouoience of a man, but God can bind a man 
to obe',y another _n. "This he did by the oreation of the human speCies, which 
is naturally social and political, for the neoessity of gove1"!'llll8nt and obedi-
ence follows from the nature of CODIl'IlUD1ty life. ,,2) 
22Ib1d., p. 154. 
-
2.3S1m.on t s use of this pared_ led to criticism, however.. In an otherw1.se 
faYorable review of PhilOSOf& of Democratic GOTermnent published in The 
PbUosORb1oal Review LXI ( pan~2), 1,e:m, entItled NAn Amb1gu1tY"111 
PrOl:'essor menls ~08()J>l'ly of Democratic Government, tt Professor Arthur E. 
MurJ>b¥ of Cornall cteC!;u:;a:that §&(in ill s\ateieii'G a'Sout binding in CODSc1ence 
allowed of a very unf'aYorable interpretation. He thought Simon might be under-
stood to hold that God tranamits to men in toto His own power to bind con-
sciences, so that officials haft a kind or polltical authority over consciences 
which men must acknowledge on the author! ty of the officials, making it immoral 
to disagree with the governiiiint.. He seemed to doubt that Simon was avoiding 
the pitfall of delivering the source of the obligation to obey into the hands 
of thoBe to be 0'be7ed. Greater familiarity with the SCholastic tradition, 
plus a mere careful. reading of the lines quoted above (which establish natural 
law as the ground and limitation of obedience), might dispel this doubt. Yet 
Simon himself, in an interview with the writer (Jul,. 11, 1959) admitted that 
his own presentation was not entirely clear and thanked Murphy for his interest 
aDd his cr.!. tic18J11, which, he said, had set him to consider the process of the 
binding of conscience more intensely, and ask whether Ood alone can aetuate 
the spiritual faculties of nan. 
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By way of conclusion to this presentation of the nature of autborit7 
according to the theory of SiII'lon, it should be pointed out that be does not in 
'h'Orks subsequent to Nature ~ Functions !! Authori'V give any further defin1-
tion of authority or elaborate specifically upon the elements of the pradsi 
al definition which this wert contains. The student must follow Simon's word· 
of caution and derive his own complete definition from an analysis of the 
functiOns, and hope that Simon himself, when his investigations are complete, 
will provide that finished definition 1hicb it is the task of philosopbical 
research to achieve. 24 
24S1mon says that he carefully refrained from giTing a definition of 
Quthorit7 in Democratic Gove:rmnent, since he was considering it in act.u 
exercito. He QIeves i~ Getter not to give a complete definitiii unm. all 
problema have been solftd.. -- IntormatiOJ1 from an interview with the writer, 
JUT 11, 19S9. 
CHA'PTFR In 
'l'1tB SnBSn'l'UTIOIAL F'JNCTIONS OF AUTHORITY 
The substitutional lunati.ons of author1t, are thoee 'Which are _de 
neces8a17 by some detic1enc;y in man. Simon elaborates on tte concept of 
detioieDCf in ftl'i 0U8 place8 and way.. He says that the concept adm1 Us of 
degrees, but it alwq8 a1gni:tiee the lack of a perfection that a eubject 
should poues. in order to .atisfy ful.ly the dernanda of ita natul'e.l A 
, 
d.ef1ciency 1187 be an eril, as is the abno:rmal condition of a teeble-miDded 
adult, or it may not. be an evil, as the 1Dnatu:re condition of a child i. not, 
in the former ClUJ. it i8 a privation in the strict sense end in the latter a 
pr:1:rat1on only in the broad sense of the tem.2 More spec1f1ca1ly, a de1'1c1e 
C1 mq be the lack of intelligence in a ohild or student. who cannot greep the 
evidence of a demnstraUonJ.3 it mazr be the lack of maturity necessary tar 
•• It .... government in a child,h or in a 8ocd..etyJS it m&7 be a lack or intelli-
genoa, knowledge, or information, or eYeD of requ:1.site virtue in a no1"rI18l 
~ratic GoverJ'lJl8nt, p. 8. 
~ure !!!! Functions, p. 13. 
, 
Ibid., p. 10. 
-
';0 
6 person. To sum up, a deficiency 18 Ii privation either in the strict sense, 
:,hen it is an evil, or in the broad sense, when it is not. By privation, Sim 
means libat Aristotle and st. Thomas understand. by the term as it is explained 
in the Meta;e!lYsics and the Ct'llIBften:!:!I.1 
Since S11'llon's do~r1ne of the f1rn substitutional function of authority, 
the teaching function or mg!8terium, has alreaq been presented, and since 
this function dou not play an important role in his general theory, the 
follow1~ S\BII!lsr.y should suffice. Teaching authority is exercised. in the orde 
of theoretical truth when the authority of the teacher substitutes for the 
evidence of facts which the subject camot g~.up by himself, although this 
erldence of the object is the only caus. which C&Il S!. ~ure determine the as .. 
of the intellect. It is authority in an analogous senae, since it is not 
exere1sed in the order of practical truth, and it the person belierved has no 
power to oblige the subject to believe him, then his authority is onl:y 1m-
B properly so called. 
Although the teaching function does not enter into the general tbeo17 of 
authOrity of Simon, he does call attention to the connection between the mode 
struggle for liberty frOlr1 gOYernJUent and the rejection of author! ty in 
intellectual matters. He says that the "histo17 of the modem struggle for 
6tbid., p. 28. 
-
7Intol'DU'ltion from an interview with the writer given on July 11, 1959, b7 
Professor Simon. Simon rejects entirely the notion of metaphysicel evil, he 
sa;ys, ad denies it exiate. For him mere absence of a perfection cannot be a 
privation. 
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liberty is to quite a large extent made up of a rebellion against the imposi-
tion, upon the human mind, of any definite way of thinking. Modern liberalism 
is above all a claim for the freedom of thought • .,9 And yet, he continues, thi 
teaching function is constantly neoe8~ary, for the "most learned treatise of 
science contains mlatively few statements that are fully evident to the 
author: around this nucleus of personal scientific certitude'is organized a 
buge complex of statements which are simply believed on the authority of other 
minds.;O The liberal refusal to accept map.sterium may be a tribute to the 
ideal of objective evidence, but it is also a proud refusal to recognize that 
for the htDUn mind the acquisition of truth ~s a slow, progressive and alwlqs 
precarious achievement. Most of all it is a "monstrous spurning of the moat 
invaluable g1tt that the div:ine generosity could make to man, the revelation 
of the secrets cd divine life • ..11 Thus for Simon the teaching !unction is a 
necessity in this l1fe, both in mattel'B of human knowledge and of Faith. 
The second substitutional .funct1on of authority, says SilIlon, 1s paternal 
authority, that authority exercised by one person over another in the practi 
order on the ground that the latter 1s unable to rule himself .12 He continues. 
9"L1berty and Authority, ff Prooeedi§lS of the American Catholic 
Philosge!lical Association, XVI (19&0), • --
l~d., p. 101. 
-
l~ature and Functions, p. 12 • 
....... - ... - ...... ---
32 
A minor is a person supposedly unable to govern himself, that is, to 
provide for the right order to be assured in his actions, even within 
the field of his personal aims. A minor is supposed to be incapable 
of knowing what is good for h:i.m-.. th1s is why another person has to 
guide him in the very pursuit of his proper good • • •• This is 
the case wi til child ren and this is also the case wi til the insane, 
the feeble-minded, or the criminal, who are legall)" considered, as 
well as children, to be minors. • •• The inability of the minor 
to govern himself', to pursue his proper aims by himself, is always 
based on sone deficienq.13 
Note that paternal authority is exercised over a minor, and aims at the 
achievement of his E!:2P!r good, apart trom any common good which m8f be 
involved. It is bued on a defieienG7 and is therefore substitutional. 
Lastly, adds Simon, it is pedagogical and aims at its own disappearance, which 
, 
follows from ita substitutional character. ifIt is wholly good tor a child to 
be guided by a JIlature person, but the main purpose of this guidance consists 
in the attainment of the ability to exercise self-goyemment. It paternal 
authority remains neoe8sary put the earliest possible date tor its disappear-
ance, it hu failed to a degree, it it intends its own maintenance and manages 
things in such a way as not to have to disappear , it is gu1l ty of abOJ!dnable 
abuse.,.14 This pedagogical nature of paternal authority, so obrious in the 
family, extends also to ita other fields of exercise, which take their name 
from its tamilial use, "following the good. usage that extends to the whole 
genus the name of the most familiar species • .,l' 
l3Ibid., pp. 12-13. The order of sentences 1s changed.. 
-
~atic GoYermnent, p. 9. 
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Simon gives some examples of these other situations were paternal autho 
ity i8 exerc1sed. First, it used to be thought that all women were in a 
pennanent state of Jd.noriVJ consequently the law gave the husband, rather or 
guardian paternal authori t,. over them-until the feminist movement challenged 
the tradition, but mista1cen1yargued for an end to the lmabandfs essential 
authorit,,- in the man and wife communitY as wen.16 
SecoJ'ldlT, a sul1er 1000rmaental unit such .s a city may be subjected to 
the paternal authority of a larger unit, it it i. not able to govern itself. 
This illustrates Simon's statement that the 2rOE!r good of the subject to be 
achieved by paternal. authority 1s not nece88~ril,. an individual good. The 
case of territories in the United States is well known: their legal status is 
one of 11nrnatur1V. until they are ready for statehood, the federal government 
subjects them to guidance !! their ~ .. a:tf .... ;.,;;a1;;;;;;;,l"8 ... by means of patemal authority. 
The guidance is substitutional because it supplies for the defieiellC7 to which 
a new area of settlement is nomally subjected, and it is pedagogical because 
it aims at the temination of the state of minority and the confem.ng of 
statehood. once the territory has achieved DIIltur:1ty. The same principles shoul 
hold in the caae of colonies being governed. by other powers, but Simon says 
that; the extrea frequenc.r of abuse gives an appearance of dishonesty to IitJ.'1' 
interpretation of colonial rule in tenu of ethics. Yet the concept is 
intelligible, and the conditiOJUJ under which it finds expression are by no 
means fictit1ous.17 
16 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
-
:..nYOLA ) 
""j "IE" ".1 iTY 
Simon here adds that the ground. tor patemal authority have not alway8 
been _de clear in the cue of colonialism. 
,,"hen European nations, for exanple, subjected to colonial rule the 
tr:i.be, ot ECplatorial Africa, their action was rendered suspicious 
fran tbe beginning by the tact that these tribes were not, prior to 
the establish:meut; of power by conquest, contained in th.e nations. 
Pla:ialy, there is no grOtUKl tor the patemal author.lty ot ODe 
community ovel" :..,-ther unless the latter is contained in the tormer 
as Ii chUd in nis ta.mil.7. The colonization of African tribe8 by 
European nations had an ethical title it, and only it, the 
colonizers aoted as agents of the human COIIIIWlity, then entire17 
unorganized. With such attempt;s at the organization of the human 
co1lll1Un1 ty as the League of Nations and the United Nations, things 
became definiteq clearerJ the character of colonial rule 8S 
paternal a~hority was proclaimed and to SOllIe extent sanctioned. 
!he very substitution ot the words "mandate" and tttrwrte.hipft for 
the word ftcol0tJ7" signified that the juetiticat.ion tor the rule 
over primitive peoples resided in duties of paternal authori t7 to 
be discharged by mankind toward 1mmature societies .18 
It 18 interesting to note that Simon repudiates any ground tor paternal 
authority in a specific cue \U'lless the subject is contained in the rulinC 
cOlll'!1Unity as a child in his £amil7_ Here he 18 diSCUSSing the second question 
of authority, tlB que8tion ot whe shall rule and 'What his specifiC title mq 
- -
be. In the sale wq, then, OM could speak at a lather's specd.tic right to 
patemal authority OYer his children becausethq are his own progel')7. But 
this is not the same .. the jwrti1'1cation of paternal authority in general, and 
he does not descend to this secondary level very often in his il'lVes1iigation. 
Thirdly, Simon cites the ex.aDt>le of paternal author:i:tq eDrcised within a 
country by an upper group over a lower one, as in IIorth Africa, the southern 
states, and the Union of SOtl'bh Africa. This i8 usually based upon the 
as8'l.Jmption that the lower group 18 incapable of majority, and as a result it is 
l6Ibid., p. 12. 
-
contained 'Within the cODlJl1Ull1ty (ideDtified with the upper group) as a ldnd of 
permanent guest under paternal rule. lJbile this sort of authority has opera 
widely for centuries, in our time it does not work ei tller harm.onious1y or 
silently.19 'l'h1s colonial rule at home is related to the consenative the017 
of the common people, says Simon. The few men of wealth, property and educa-
tion identify themselves with the nation} the many are like an inferior race, 
and _lee up a distinct community inside the state which is gO'lerneci by the few 
t.b.ey are in a clas8 with children, the feeble-m:1Meci, felons, primitives, etc. 
This feeling of paternal responsibility by the few may be sincerely motivated 
by conoem for tm common man, as it seems t.q be in the caae of the Marxian 
theo17 of rewlutionary leadership which declares that the proletariat is not 
yet a matUl'e person: the few ma7 sincerely wish to turn out from among their 
CMl mmaber an ell te capable of gcmtrning the _S8e8 for their own good. Simon 
remarks that there is nothing particularly JO'sterioua or perver.8 about sueh 
an ideal, but it 18 not a democratio 0_.20 
ADd ;yet, baTing concluded }:de example. of' paternal authorit7, Simon s&78 
that all paternal authority i8 animated with a d7Damiam of aut.onaq--1ts very 
essence as substitutional entails ita being pedagogical and it must aim at it. 
own disappearance I 
It is impossible to posit the prinCiple of paternal authority without 
positing simultaneously a principle of autonomy. With :regard to the 
proper good either ot the individual or of the group, the possibility 
of eelt-gOYernment makes it obligatory for authority to d1aappearJ 
and the possibility of progress toward selt"goverl'lll8nt makes it 
19zbid., pp. 12-13. 
-
2Ozbid., pp. 13-llt.. 
-
o'bllgatoJ1 for authority to follow tbe ways of such progress •••• 
Insofar as goverrlWlnt &Dreis .. paternal authority, it is J.iJ,.ainly 
true 'that the best Icwernment is the,t ",'filch goYe1"D8 lea.st.21 -
Nor is this dynamifJll 0:£ al1tortolv cont1ned to democntlc gcwe1"flB8nt &lODe, in 
Simon's vi.. tIThe ann1hilat.1on of patemal authonty lnto autonam:r, wber.laver 
possible, 1s an affair of justice, not an affair of dPocl"8.07 • .,22 
The thUd subetit.u\ional functlon or BUthoritJ is the Ufli£loat1on of 
aO't1on 1'or the cc:mrnon good when the mee.na to the ooamtOn good 18 uniQUttl.7 
determined. Note tbat tbi • .t'UDat1OD a1m8 at a CflImI\!lOD goad, not the e3?!r 
good of tbe embject. In his 11m statement of the theo17 1n Nature tmd 
. -
~o~ 2! A~hor1!Z:t S1aon did not distirwuish between tb1a f'tmct1on and 
the one whiOh follaws, the urd.f1oat1cm of HUon for the ~ good 'When tile 
means 18 not unlquelf cletemine4. C<msequent17 1. t appeared as an euent1al 
-
t'\mction in thi. work. As a Nault. of a mt1c1_ by Mari:\a1n,23 b.o'we'nlr, 
S1mon :N'I1sed b1a the.,. ad 1D Pb1l!.!!2!2 !!!. Democratic ~l"J'lII8n,t made tblll 
tbbd tunot1oa fJUb8t1tut1ona1, isolated fl"OlIl it a fourth, ueent1al tunct1on. 
ad added a fUth, eII8eI'It1al tu.nct101'l which he bact degeloped in tbe ~, 
Q well as the sixtb, perfecti". fUDct1on. It reu1ns true, hoWeVer, that the 
third (substitutional) fun.c1;1on and the fourth (.asential) function remain 
closel,. oonneeted, since both haft to do with the unifica1i1on of action for t 
~t. 1nt,...., p. 10. 
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eaanon good. 
Let us suppose, 8a)'lJ Simon, a society made up of intelligent and virtuous 
persona. This 1. not a utopian fiotion it 'We restrict our view to small tS---y' 
sucb u families. Even in such a COIII'Iftr'!lt.y unity of action for the CCIfIllOn 
good cannot be taka. tor granted, it haa to be caused, and if 1t 1. to be 
ateadi.v, 1t baa to be aGorae! b7 a ateacty cause. If the members of a fM117 
cannot agree and each go their aeparate wtQ'8; CQE)rI ute ..... , at leut 
~·I there 18 no caamon aotiOlkt 24 811:\0n then CO!lt1mleat 
Now unit.y ot action de~ upon unity or judgment, and tm1t7 
of judgment can be procured either by WfJ.T of unam1m1:ty or by wfq 
of authority, no third po$Sib1l1V 18 ~vable. Either we all 
th:J..nk that _ should aot 1n a certain way, or 1t 18 uncientood 
amo1'II u that, no utter how dlwrH our preferences, WI eball 
all ~ 1;0 one judpeDt anj foll_ the line of action that it 
p~. i-,'hether thi. j~ 18 uttered by a lead:f.ng person 
or br the majority or by a majority within a leading m1nor1ty 
makes, at thi8 point, little ditt.,..... But to nbmit ... 11 to 
a judgment which does net, or at least 118.7 not, express D\V 0IIl 
v1.ew at what. .hould be done 1. to db.,. authority. Tbue authority 
18 needed to ueure unitJ of q\1or.a it, and only 1£, unanimity 18 
~. 'the quution 11 1Ihet.ber UDel'dldtJ CQ be eetabllsbecl 
1ft better tban cuual fub10u _eng the pertect17 cileYer and _11-
lntent.ioned 1Q8IIJbers of a 8OC1eV which 18, by ~1a, hee froIl 
det1e1enc1u.2S 
Simon baa thuaJ pointed out the real quest101u 1f unanirdty oonceming 
COft'll()J1 actions to be undertaken can somehow be steadUr aaured, then there 
wU1 be no need tor authorlt)r. He poe1ts a society tree from defic1enc1 .. 1n 
order to elimiMte the poa81blli\w that tmanim1ty fl11ght be pl'e'Vented by them, 
1f' the problem Can be solved in this ideal society, then tbe solution will 
. , 
~iO GoV'e:mmant, p. lS'. 
25xbid •• pp. 19--20. 
apply a fortiori to societies whoae meJJi)ers have deficiencies, 1n lihich 
--.............. 
\ll'18trl1l1 ty 1s all the more ditticu1 t. to obtain. 
Simon begins his attack on the problem by considering unan1m.i ty in 
scientific _tters. "!!!. Jure, it is always possible to necessitate wvm1m.ous 
assent to a scientific proposition, unfolding the demonstration is all that 
needs to be done. Let it be said that a gem:d.nely scieatitie proposition is, 
2! jure, communicable without 11ndta ... 26 Be adds that 2!. facto. of course 
communicabUity aq be limited 1>7 the accident that only a fn people can 
understand the tenu and tollow the demo1UJtratlon. But this limitation is not 
caused by the object of knowledge itself, si~ce "in the field of scientific 
thought, uatrlmitr 18 guarautee4, !!!. ~\U'8, by a process of ratioal camnuni-
cation whose possibUity results necusar1ly from the nature of so1ent1t1c 
objects. Faultless scientific miDis, no matter how many, would be unanimous 
with regard to scientific truth. Q27 
Does the same comrmmicabi11ty held. for practical propositions? Do they 
posse.s the power of commanding unanimous asMUt when comi tions are entirely 
normal? This is the next step is Simon's questioning, and he tums to the 
Aristotelian theory of practical cenainty and practical trnth as the next 
step toward 8Il 8.lJ8Wr. He 881s that the vexy exacting definition of science 
in the Posterior ~iC8 seems to make hopeless the case of certainty in 
26:r'bid., p. 20. 
-
27 Ibid., p. 21. On the conrnunicabUi t;,y of scientific propositions, cf. 
Nature 8i'ir""F\mctions, pp. 18 ... 20, where Simon uses the term irrtersubjectivabU. 
i'6', an~ blbilography on p_ 62. 
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practical matters. 28 IIIf t.he certainty of science dema.ndlt that the scientific 
object shou.ld possess the kind and degree of necessity that is found in 
universal essences alone, it seems that practical knowledge admits of no 
certainty, for human practice takea place in the universe of things that cam 
be otherwise than they are. ,,29 The werld in which we live is a contingent 
oneJ events constantly give the lie to our prudence. Simon's example ot this 
1s the man who care1'ully planned a trip for hie t8l!d.17. A train wreck oocurred 
and a child vas kUled. Yet the father had a right to believe tha1i he had 
selected the beat course of action, although his belief that the trip would be 
a good thing wu contradicted by events, his wact1cal judgment was the right 
conclusion of a properl,. eODducted deliberation. The judgment turned out to be 
faln, it wu at variance With facta and was not in contormiV with the real, 
not certain. yet it was what 1t was npposed to be, the product of love and 
devotion. its agreement with the demanda of a good wUl was certain. The 
conclusion 18 that the "conformity ot a practical proposition with the real 
cannot be perfectly established. but such conformity is absolute truth, 
theoretical truth, it is not the truth that belongs to the practical proposi-
tion qua pmctical. Practical truth is a relation of conformity between a 
j~t or a proposi t1.on and the requirements of an honest will • ..3° 
28lbid., p. 21. ~1mon refers to Aristotle, Ethica, 6 and st. Thomas, 
~.!., I-I~, 4-6} 56,~-5J 6;, 2, II-II, 41-56!i BOte 29. 
29Ibid• 
-
JOn,id., p. 22. Simon cites Aristotle, Ethica, 6, 2, 11.39a21 am 
st. Thomai;"!.T., I-II, 57, S ad. 3, he alao says that Cajetan t s commentary i8 
ver,y enllghtinrng. 
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Simon states that so far as its cause is concerned, the practical judg-
ment possessed with practical certainty is an eDJ!!ple of artectiye knowledp. 
In rational knowledge .. do nat. tind the answer to a theoretical question by 
being docile to the inclinations ot the heart. But practical knowledge is 
different: 
On the com.rary, when I am concerned with the question ""'bat do I 
baTe to do, here and now, in the midst of thie 'lmique, unpreced-
ented aDd 1I!l1"eD8wa'ble cougeriee of c1rCUJl18tanoea, in order to make 
a good use of my freedom, in order to preserve tbe good of 
v1rt.1:le'. I know that no deduction, no induction, no argtIIJltmtation, 
can supply the final 8'lswr. The scienee of ethica, i.e., the 
rational knowledge of morality, would supply an initial a.nner but 
not the final one. Between tbe last rationally established 
conclusion and the entire17 concrete l'Ul.a that action demaJJ1a, 
there is a gap that no argumentation can bridge. Doubt cripples 
action, or 8I'l uncertain rule i8 isneci, unless the will a.Di the 
heart. are so dedicated to the good of virtue that their inolina-
Ucms Cd be relied upon • • •• Unlike 8cientific judgmem,. 
practical judpant, for the wry reason that it is ultimatel7 
de'tenniD!Ki by the oo8oure forces of the appetite, doe. not admit 
of rational communication. It is, as it were, a secret.Jl 
Tlms the practical judgment depends upon the inclinations of the 
appetite. More than that, says S1mont the virtue llhose act is certain 
knowledge of practical truth preeuppoees all moral virtues, am that virtue is 
practical. wi8dOlll, or prudence, the virtue 'Which arrives at deedsione uu.ttain-
able b7 scd.ence &10118)2 
In Nature !!!! Functions !! Authorttr Simon points out that in the 
31Ibid., p. 2h. On affective knowledge he cite8 st. Thomas, S.T., I,l, 
6, ad 3, t:!r, 6S, 1, 2) 9S, 2, ad 1" II-II, 4$, 2. John of st. rhoiai and 
Mal"i tain are also cited. 
practical .1'\111g:rreut, the prudential deoision, there i8 a twofold truth. bre 
is 80me theoretical consideration refer.ring to the reality of thing.. in tbe 
example of the man planning the trip the theoretical oonaideration was that the 
trip was to be a good thing. This prC'.)'ftd to be untrue J events t:;:},owed that it 
was not in oonformity with fact. 'l'h18 theoretical consideration implied in the 
practical judgment -cannot be established with an entire certainty' because we 
are unable to overcOJI!8 the Jq8teri.s of contingency J because we are unable to 
see the future with certainty • .,33 But there is another truth in the practical 
judgment: ita conformity with right appetite-not the truth of Ii oognition, 
but the truth of a direotion. 'h'hatever the factual consequences of a decision 
ma;f be, there can be in tbat decision III steady prinCiple of indefectible 
truth. nO't theoretical but praotical truth. That pr.i.nciple is prudence.14 
Simon goes on to sa,. that t:lere is thus III possible d:iscrepanq between 
the pract.1cal Talidity of the prudential .1udgmant and that of ita theoretical 
implications. No _tter how careful the deliberation preoedil'll the prudential 
judgmeat, it cannot demenatrate it8tbeoret1oal oonolusions. Continpnq 
at W&JS leaves room for possible 1aokof oontormi ty with reall't7. If it were 
possible to demonatrate the theoretical conaidera:tions dari vad. f:rom tbe 
deliberation. then the practical or prudential judgment would foUow 
34 Ibid.. pp. 25-26. 
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necessarily am ahare their erldence.3$ 
As a result of this train of reasoning, SimOD. concluded in Nature and _ .............. -
Functions .2!. J.utbori:t?z that the prudential judgment is never communicable, or, 
to use the tern he then mnplored, 1ntersubjectivable. Bince the theoretical 
conclusions upon which it is baaed carmot be demonatrated, it can never be 
shown that this or that practical judgment, to be taken as a rule tor COIIIIlOn 
action, is the 'best poasible 0JIe. Therefore Slt'J member of the cOlmllUnity could 
object that another course of action 18 better. Therefore all members must 
submit themselves to one prudential decis1on--..,hich is to obey authoritY" 
Authority is always necessary, if CCDmOZl actioD is to be agreed upon. 'I'his is 
an essemial function of authority band. upon the nature or the prudential 
judgment..36 
In a review of Nature !!!! Functions 2!.. J.uthor1:2, Prof.ssor J acquea 
Maritain praised Simon's work in general, but took issue with h.1.m on the 
qUestion of the communioabUity of the prudent1al. judgment. He SUlftS up 
Simonis positiQl1 as follows: even in a COIlIlfttnity of pertectl;y intelligent and 
virtu0'U.8 men the necessity of a ruling authority .1.s required by the nature of 
things, since in the order of prudential. judgment no agreement is certainl:.r 
and !!. ~ure to be expected even trom such 1Affl1:J1 Then be 8878 I 
3>Ibid., pp. Zl-28. 
-
.'36n,id. ... pp. 28-30, Thie paragraph is a SUJlma17 o! the argument and is 
not comple""ii:' !be argument vUl .. however, be ginn in greater detail, ld.th 
qualifications, in the following chapter. 
37Review ot Politica, III (April 1941), 2$2 • 
....... ---
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Now this seems to be certainly true even of perfectl;, intelligent 
and perfectly well-informed _n. But it they are at the same time 
fifrteotlL virtuous, what must .. say? Prudence as such is 
iiilIIb J therefore, it ,. suppose two na11 pertecUy intelligent, 
well-informed and v1rtu~.t placed in the same circumstanou, will 
not the prudeniril. 3uClgment; or these two men necessarily b. the same .. 
since in both of them it is taken in conformity with an appetite that 
perfect v1.:rtues cause to be right toward. the em? If such is the 
ease, we should say that in a eCllll'llUmt)r made up of perf'eotl.7 
inten.~p,ent, well-informed and Tirtuous huDls.n beings, there will 
surely be agreenent _ong t1iiii !ii the prudential judgments concern-
ing the good of this cOl'llllUnity ,-an agreement which ie not due to 
~ demonstration, but to the common rightneu of their appetite for 
the end.l8 
Simon ac1c:nowled.gea the val ue or this en ticism in Philos!!'hjt !!! 
Democratic Govel'lDnt. He s~, "In an earlier writing on the subject of 
, 
authOrity I stated that, on account ot the incOJtlllmlicability ot the prudential 
judgment, unanimity in practical matters is always precarious or casual. I 
wish to criticize this view, in which I nOW' recognize a serious error • .,39 He 
adds in the footnote, "! was assuming that rational C01'I'IDlUnication alone can 
assure unity of judgment. For the correction ot this error, as _11 as tor 
countless greater blessings, I am indebted to Professor Maritain.~O 
H01iItI'V'er, Simon qualifies Marl ta1n f" criticism when he adds, "The problem 
of the plurality of the means is not coD81dered here. Plain17, 'the CCImllOll 
rightness of their appetite tor the end, t which causes unity tdth regard t.o the 
end al'¥i the 'necessar;r means, does not cause unity with regard to a particular 
39DamocratiC Government, p. 25. 
40Ib1d., p. 2$, note 15. 
-
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means in no necessary connection with the end. n41 Simon then giyU the example 
of a nation attacked or threatened by another,. when fighting alone can presene 
the common good. Yet it is never possible to demonstrate that whceftr 1ewea 
the common good mu.st support a poliq of war. war is risky, al'¥i abstention mq 
not bring about the supposed mls. .A single policy is imperati'ft, howewr. 
Now even if all the citissens of the nation _re rlrtuOUB and enlightened, unity 
could not be acbieved. by ratiODal cammunication, b.T demonstrating a proot. But 
there is another possible cause of 'lD'WI1mity, for "the analysi8 of practical 
judgment, which rules out rational cODIllum.eation as a stead7 cause of wwdDd:t7 
in these "'litera, shows also that a steadJ cauee of unanimity is found in the 
inclination of the appe'liite, whenever the means to the common good i8 uniquely 
detemiDed. If, and only if, there is only one . means to the co.mmon good 18 the 
proposition enunciating this means the only one that adldte of practical truth. 
It is the only one that conforms to the requirements of a properly disposed 
appetite, a.nd a properly d1aposed appetite cannot make aD7 other proposition 
42 
win assent. fit In the example giTen, the nation whose common good de.ms a 
policy of 'War, wwd.m1ty can be caused h1 the Tirtuous inclination of the 
appetites of tbe c:I. tisens. What of those who might refuse to fight, even 
though the common good demands it? Simon says that they might do so because 
they lack intelligence, information, or Yirtue--but that in any case "their 
error is det1n1te and traceable to a deficiency, l!lh1ch mayor m.ay not in'V01ve 
41Ibid., p. 26, note 15 continued fran p. 25. 
-
42 ~ Ibid ... pp. ~27. 
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bJ guilt." Unan:1m11;y must tollow if all the citizens are virtuous. 
fhis happens not rarely, sqe Simon, 'When the means to the cammon good 
is un1que~ determined. In the da11,. life of small cGlllllUnitiea unanimity pia,.. 
a great part as a factor of un1t:l.ed action. In larger societiea such as the 
nation, the surpr1a1ng thing i8 not that complete una.nim1ty is never realised, 
but. that sit.uations closely resembling it frequantl7 arise when them is a 
seriGUs threat to the COItIIlOn good. In such 08S88, unanimi tr' _eng the 
substmtial major! t7 of those interested-mo are perhaps only a minority to 
the nat.1.on in themeelvea-sutfioes. It mq be doubted wether a Heiny withou" 
this ability to achieft unan1:trdty in the hour 9f peril still retains the 
character of a cOl'lllllUn1ty, tor disintegration has gone so tar. Its hopeless 
plight bears wi 'brutss to the nomalit;r ot unanimou assent by _au of affective 
community to the uniqueq determined _ana of cCIIImOn salvation. Authority, 
then, i8 normalJ.y required. in such cases only inaotar as w1Us are weak and 
intellects ignorant or blinded. Ita function remains nbatltutlonal.1,,4 
In a later work, however, Simon adds something to his consideration of 
this substitutional function ot authority. He s478 that in most cues there 
ex1et mare than one means to the common goodJ in tact, if one takes into 
account all the particularities and modalities of the meana avdlable, this 
uniquel.J detexmined _ana to the common good in never fOUnd.45 1'0 apply this 
43Ib1d., pp. re-29. 
-
44lbid., pp. 29 ... 30. 
-4S "!'he Doctrinal Issue Between the Church and Democrac;y, It in !he 
Ca.tholic Church in World Affairs, ad. Waldemar Gurian and M. A. F1ts'il'imnona (Mm ~ame, !9S4j, p. 10'. 
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statel'lBnt to the example given above, aDd derift the conclusions which follow, 
Simon 'WOuld ~ that while a policy of war was the uniquely determined means 
in general-a _ana which would obtain unanimous support through affective 
communi V am.ong virtuous and enlightened men-this policy would neTer be 
uniquely determined in all of ita JIWI1 details: how m~ troops should be 
employed, what strategy should be followed, etc. !here is alwa)"S room for 
disagreement on the detaUs of any mums, even 1£ the means as a whole be 
uniquely determined. 1'biB possibility of lack ~ unanimity points the way to 
the funet10n of authority which ie required in such cases, a tumUon 'Which 1s 
essential. 
CHAPl"RR IV 
THE ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS OF AUTHORITY 
After determining that authority bas substitutional functions, Simon 
qs in Nature !!! FI1nctions 2! Authoritll "The question is now whether 
uthoriW has any essential tlmctionJ whetber the necessiv at authority alwqs 
sults from some deficiency, whether author! t71 when necessary, is necessaJ7 
olel7 on the ground of SOIlle defect in the one who is subjected to it.,;t He 
, 
n begins bis malysis of the prudential judgment and finds the ueential 
unction of anthonv in the unification of action tor the common good. In 
1-----...... of Democratic GoYermnen, on the other hand, hie theory has deYeloped 
o the ~ where he couiders authority as a cause ot united actio1'l in two 
: tint, when the _ans to the common good is uniquel1 determined, a 
tion which he shows to be substitutionalJ _conti (1)7 ... extension of the 
sae argument), when the _ana is not unique17 determined, a function which be 
hows to be e8sent:tal.2 The latter function is concerned here. 
In this demoutrat1on, all that has been said of t.be prudential judgment 
1 applies. Simon says that if there is mont than one JJW98llS ot procuring the 
cammon good, there 119 no to'llDdatlO1l tor unardmit;y; arl)"01le 'If1If1 disagree and 
lNature and Functions, p. 14. 1\ ....... ___ _ 
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preter another means, and this 18 true eYen in a small societ;,y. He gives the 
example of whether tratfie should drive on the right or the lett side of the 
road. The common good demams that one course ot action direct everyone r S 
driving habits, but it does not, prior to a decision, demand that a particular 
side of the road be chosen) itdemalJds onl7 that one mean. be decided upon, but 
turnishes no help in the decision. Since both pe.sibUitlu are practicable, 
there is no foundation for unan~m1ty in the matter, Sftd the question must be 
decided by """'&'¥ of authori t7. 3 
Let it be asked, continues Simon, whether this function ot authority is 
substitutional or es.ential. But this invol"., a more basic question: since 
the plurality ot the IB8.ll8 is really the caue of the need tor authority, the 
real question is whether this plurality is itself caued by a deficiency or by 
the good nature of things. 0nJ..y- in the latter case will this tunction be 
.... nUal." 
The SaJJII queation was asked. and answered, he decla.rea, by various 
schools or scientific anarchism, which de.cribed the 1ndeterrdnation of the 
means as but an appearance, due to our inabUity to identif)' the proper meana, 
if we knew more, it our lnfornmtion about these possible means were complete, 
we should reaJ.ise that only one mean. wu really the appropriate one, was 
really uniquely" determined. As 1t is, authority has to substitute for thi. 
determinate knowledge of the situation. Its role remains substitut1onal.5 
3Ibtd., p. JO. 
-
4Ib1d., pp. 30-31. 
-
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Simon presents a similar argument f or the de.t1cienCT theory in Nature 
!!!! Functions 2! AuthorlW, where he discueses the argmnent of P:roudhon that 11' 
we knew all the laws of social. science the7 alone would suffice to operate 
society md authority would CODMqUen't~ be unneceuary. Simon writes. 
I want DOW to consider the fiction of a society ruled by laws 0Dl7 
and which, on the basis of ita being per£'ectly ruled by laws, 
should be able to do without .,. authority. This fiction, familiar 
to may liberal. IUd to some anarchist., il most clearly' described 
in the earliest wri tinge o£ P. J. Proudhon. There, we find the 
idea that there are objective laws of social behaTior which are as 
determined and neCU88l"7 as pb¥8ical lava, and are :t~ 111 the 
COl.1rH of social events just as pb;fsical lava. previous to m.v 
consideration by the humaa understanding, are 1mma:rlent in the 
course of phpical events. For the la ck of a sufficient knowledge 
of the social Nature, for the lack o£ a: reuon .uffic1entl7 aware 
of the objective laws of society, we seek a precarious salvation 
in our J"8liance on the vi_om of a kiag, or, what lJIIounts to the 
same re8\llt, on the wisd.cmt of popular soverelgnty.6 
Not only the objective laws of the real are truly reliable, but continue. 
Proudhon, and therefore the true SO'Dl'09 of sO'Uereign1;y 18 not a human will, 
whether it be that of the king or of the people, it is reason alone, as an 
impersonal i1'lterpreter of laws deri'V1ng from the nature of' social things and 
finally identical with it. The progress of social sciences will graduall,. 
establish the rule of laws and do a'WIIT with authority altogether: the reign 
7 
of reason wUl be the realization of anarctGr. 
Simon retu:tes this contention in Nature .!!!!! FanatioDS 2!. Author!;tl when 
he shows that the contingency of existential occurrences prevents the precise 
confonn1ty of the prudential judgment in its theoretical aspects 'With reality 
~ture and J'Wlctions. pp • .30-)1. Simon introduces this discussion by 
referring to his preYloua comparilon of authority to law} cf. !!Era. p. 17. 
7Nature and ~tionsJ pp. )<>-)2. 
-
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as it turns out to be. The laws of the social world, insOfar as tbey' are to be 
discovered in things rather than made, express only the universal am necesaa17 
aspects of social beings J they do not and cannot take into account contingent 
events. Even it we were to kntJv thaae laws periectly, they would not proride 
us with any demonstrable rule o£ conduct regarding our behavior aid the 
contingencies of existential positions.8 
In tel'mB of S:lmon's theory as presented in his later work, this 
anarehist· theol)'" has alread7 been refuted. in the consideration of the pruden-
tial jurlgment., which baa been explained: 9 !'he laws of social sciences, being 
scientific propositions, would be truly co~cable and would thus furnish II. 
baais for unanimity, but they would never furnish the baais for unanimit)r in 
practical mat ten UDl .. s the mellDll under OO!l8ideraticm were tmlquel.y deter-
mined-and trren then affective community liIOuld be neoeesary to supply tbe 
essential foundatlon for urtan1m.ou asaent, since the practical judgment is 
simply net the same as a scientifio judpent, it has a double truth.10 
Bu.t the more re1'1ned theory 'Which Simon pre.ents in PhU08!p& !! 
Democratic Goyenmant, whUe etfeotiru7 refuting his earlier statement of the 
6Ibid., pp, 32-33. 
901'. !!Era, pp. 38-42. 
lOSimon shows that Prou.dhon came to realize the impossibility of un-
reatr10ted liberty when be realized that social science would never admit of 
infallible applications. In Du Prine!E! 1'~ratif (1863), Proudhon 
acknowledged the permanent neCiss!\7 oraUUiOi'i£y as a prinCiple ot arbitration 
in particular cases, due to conting.nq.-.. Na .... t ... Ul'e ....... .!!!!. Functi~1 p. 69. 
argument. of anarchism, i tseli' suggests the further 00 jection \fhi ch Simon haa 
brought up for coneideration: perhaps the greater knowledge of social soience 
envisioned by anarchism would lead to complete knowledge of the means to the 
common good and thus make eYeJ7 means uniquely deterrdnedJ authOrity would then 
be unnecessal7 11' the virtue of the citi.eu provided. affective oommunity. 
Consequently, Simon takes up the quest.ion of the cause of the plurality of 
means. 
Simon giTeS the example of a fam11,. deliberating about its 8U1!I!ler 
Tacation: SOlIe would like to stq home, SODe would like to go to the hills, 
and SOlIe to the seuhore. Here is a pluraUty:of .au. Wbat CtI1U8&S it? ODe 
reason for staying at hCDIJ is the high coat of going elsewhere J thus pOYerty 
makes for aique determination. II\-Jealth, on the contrary, makes fm' cho1.ce, 
this is what man of property know 'Very well, and poor people still better.,.u 
A reason tor not staying at hale might be tbe health of one member of t.he 
family J t his would rule out the pOHibil1 ty of stay1ng home becane. that 
person needs a change and a rest. '1'be choice between the hills aDd the 
seashore might be dictated by the restlessness of S011e members, since the 
seashore tends to 1ncruae reetl.s .. s.. It nd.gbt also happen that a fud17 
feels obliged to go away for its vacation in spite of financial strain because 
e. young man is going through a period of moral uncertainty and needs a change 
in enrlro.nment. If all the family, on the other hand, are robust characters, 
then it makes no difference where the,. gOI they haTe a larger choice. In 
short, "sIeal th, heal til and strength are factors th~t cause independence from 
llDemocratic Government, p. ,32. 
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particular courses of action. • •• Destitution, Ul health, uncertainty, 
wealmi.ls8, are factors that cause dependence upon deteminate means. Plenitude 
causes cholce, poverty leaYes no choice • .,12 
iilrthermore, although a deficienq such 88 lack of knowledge might make 
the genuiDe means undi8tlngu1ahable and cann an apparent plurality were there 
W8JJ nOlle, a society of enlightened persona wood, other things being equal, 
enJoy much more choice than a. society of the ignorant. An enlightened society 
would not need authority to rule out 11111$0%'7 means, but it would need author1t. 
more tbal .... 1' to procure united action, for, thanks to more knowledge and 
better lights, tlB plurality of the genuine _ .. s would have increeaed aoneid-
erab17.1.3 
Thus, ••• Simon, the function of authority 1ib1ch procures united aotion 
when the means to the C01IIIlOn good Ill"e eeveral, does not disappear but grows, a8 
deficiencies are made up, "1t orlg1lultee not. in the detects of men and. 
societies but in the nature of society, It . i8 an essential function • .,14 
Simon ellPlains that this 18811e is otten beclouded by a confuaion ot 
freedom and indet.e1"JBinatlont 
In tact, freedom is indifference, and there are two !orta of 1DdU-
terence. There 1s the passive indij"j"erence of the Imleteminate 
·14lb1d• 
-
subject 'Whim. can receive 81y ot several determinations precisely 
because it is indeterminate. The highest degree ot such 1nd1f-
terence is reillze4 in pr.lme m.atter • • • • Not.hing is turther 
removed from treedom. than the indetennination of matter, for 
freedom is maste17 and. proceeds not from. a lack of determination 
but fran a particularly full and hard kim. or determination. A 
free cause is a superdeterminate cause. The trouble comes freD 
the fact that theae two opposite realities-the indifference of 
indeteminatiOft, passivity, inachievement, and the :1nd1tference of 
auperdetem1nation which 18 freedom-have in comm~ the property of 
being distinct fran sheer determinate causali t,-.1;) 
Be goes on to explain that there is in the human wlll a oombination of acti'Ye 
and passive iId1fference, i.e., of freedom and irresolution, so that psycholo-
gists, when they do not altogether del'\Y freedom of ohoice, generally trace it 
to an uncertainty or imperfection of the will.~ In the same way, social 
thinkers, confronted by a seeming plurality of means, trace it to lack of 
knowledge--not seeing that plurality can be caused by excellence of knowledge 
and power. In both cases the lIliInmderstancl1D1 of ind1tference results from an 
insufficientl, elaborate notion of cauality.16 
In conolusion, it i8 interesting to note toot Simon gives credit to 
Taparelli d'J.zeg110, wbo as early a8 1840 emphasized the function of authority 
as a cause of united action. However. he did not to Simon's knOwledge distin-
guish the substitutional funetion of authori t,. when the meaDS i8 uniquel7 
jdetemirad. Taparelli wrote: 
In short, being endowed 1dt11 intellect and free-wU1, the membera 
ot a society JI'ltlSt tend by serveral means toward a common end J they 
lSIb1d., p. 3L.. Simon refers to st. 'l'bomas, C.G., I, 82 arr.i John ot 
st. Thoma.s~t18 philosoph1cus, IV, q. 12, a. 2J C'Ursua theo1op.CWS, I, diap. 
24 .. a. 4, I-tt, d'iap. " a. 2. 
l~atic Government, pp. 34-)$. 
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can choose between those meana. Since diverse and opposite means 
'WOuld abolish social unity and d.estroy the essence of society" it 
is necesea.r.y to baTe an intelligent principle regu.l4te the mind8 and 
impress the sarile tendencies Oft all the wills. Now.. call 
authori V this power which bind8 all members . of societ7. Thus 
authority is an essential elemnt of soc1ety.17 
The problem of united action just considered has to do with meane to the 
common good. '!'here is, howeyer, a more basic operation upon which this depends 
the volition and intention at the eul.18 Eridentlyt there would be no action 
to be unified if man had not prev1ousl7 agreed upon a good to be pareued 
through this common action-a cammon good. It i8 with this more basic opera-
tion that the HcoDri essential function of author!. ty is concerned. The ques-
, 
tion is whether the proper intention or the eoimnon good requires the operation 
of authority. 
At first glance, it would seem that if all the members of a soc:1et,. were 
enlightened aJIl vil"tuou.s, the.Y would spontaneousl1 1nt.end the common good. 
Authority would be wm.ecess8l.'7. Simon remi11ds us of the words of 81#. Thomas. 
"But a man's will 18 not right in ldl11ng a pa.rt1cular good, unleea he reters 
it to the CGIJIIWn good as an end, since ..,..n the natural appetite of eaeh part 
is ordained. to the common good of the whole.,.l? Of course, if there were 
17Lu1g1 TapareUi d' A_glia, Baggio teoretico d.i drl tto naturale 
(Palermo, 1840) .. il, 67-68, quoted i'ii""l5iii'OCrailc l1overnment, p. ~. 
l~cratic GoVal"lltllent, p. 36. Simon says that vo11tion is concerned 
'W1 tb the eii3' co.asl1.red absoiutely and intention ld th the ana considered as 
term of msana or .. t of mans. I 
19s•r., I-II, 19, 10, quoted in Democratic Government, p. 37, note 19, 
from Basii triti!!is ot st. Thomas, ad. Knton o. 'eils (Nev York, 1945), II, 
348. --
ss 
stupid or vicious members in the society, they would. have to b. directed or 
compelled toward the common good, but good people, by the "Very operation of 
their virtue, 88 st. Thomas 8qs, aim at the common good and subordinate to it 
their priva1ie advantages. 'l'bua all conceivable .tunction of authority with 
regard. to tne "I'Olit10n at the commcn gO<Xi would seem to be subatttutional. 
At thie point Simon warns againn the possible contusion of tw ques-
tionsr 'Whether soc1eV need. to be governed am whether 1t aeede a distinct 
goyerning r»r8onnel.2O For purpose. of the irlYestigation, he say., it is 
helpful to keep in mind Itp1cturea of gOYermneut. without distinct gOYerning 
personnel, as in the ua. of a New England towr), a SWisa canton, or a nation 
dec:lding aft 1s .. by wq of pleb1acita. !he entirely ditterent problem of the 
neceas1ty of a distinct gOYerrd.lJa personnel will be diecussed in another part 
of this book • ..n' 
How it is entirel7 true, continues Simon, that virtuous people love the 
common good and subordinate their choiou to itl 
Thus, in a certain val at 1east, the w11t1on and intention of the 
ocmmongo'&i aN gua~rtue itself', independently of all 
author! t,.. or this !'.!Z we do not knew # 8.8 181$ al\Y'thing, except 
that it is esaential aM bUie • • •• The problal, acoordinal7, 
18 to de'termine whether the virtue of the private person regards 
the whole of the OO8on good or merely some fundamental aspect of 
it. If, am onl11t, the latter 1s true, authOrity may haft an 
e88e1ltial part to pl.,. in the volition and intention of the eamtlOIl 
gocd.22 
2Oot. !'1W!' p. 9. 
2lDemocratic Government, p. 39. 
To find the answer to the question of the way in which the virtue of the 
private citizen regards the common good, Simon .elects a few tJpical instance •• 
fhe first i. from st. Thoma., and the question ),B whether the human will, in 
order to be good, ought to agree w1:t.b. the divine will.!! '9Olito, in other words j 
whether it ought to desire the 'Y81"1 thing which is desired or pe:naitted 'by the 
divine will.23 st. Thomes s8,7s that wh_ a thing ia good in one respect and bac 
in another respect, there 18 nothing wrong about ita being desired by one and 
hated by another, under thoee two aspects respectivel,... Thus the judge has a 
good will in willing a t..h.1ef" to be put to death, because this ls just, while 
the will of another (l.e., the thief's w:U"e) ~o wishea him not to be put to 
death, ina8mueh as killing is a natural evil, i8 also good. 
Simon commenta on this e:x:snple u follcws. 
Thus the w1te of a murderer bates the prospect of her lmaband' s 
being put to death} sbe is normally and virt.uousl1 oonaemed with 
the good of her £-1l7, and, from the standpoint which i8 mxi 
ought to be hera, the death of the murderer ia an evil. On the 
other aide, tbe jtadge, who artands for society, ... a in the death 
of the murderer.lamenta of the common good J justice uw:l 
d.eterment .tram or:t.me. The common. good, of course, shall prevail, 
but, .1gn1ticantlr, Aquinas considers altogether sound and honest 
the oppOGi tion _de to the requirement. of the common goad by the 
person in charge of the particular good.24 
Here is the :1mportant point which Simon l'rl..hes to draw from the d1seue-
siona ~ Jaarticular loads ~ Jarop!rlz defended ~ erticular ~rsons 
matters matlZ !!! ~ common .i.!S! i tsel! •• 2S In otbar word., by .fighting for 
23s.T., I-II, 19, 10. 
--
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the lite of the man whom the common good wants put to death, his wU'e does what 
the common good wants her to do. "It is in a merely material fuhion," aqa 
Simon, "that sbe d.iaagrees with the requirements of the common good I by doing 
what the common good wants her to do, she tolW:l1ly desires the common good. 
The eanmon good. formally understood is the concern of e'f'e17 genuine 'Y1rtue, but. 
it is the proper coneern of the public person to procure the COIImOD good 
materially Ul'Jderstood.. wh1dl the private person m&7 v1rtuoua17 oppose.tt26 
'When Sbson uses the terms material!l and formally here, be 1s using them 
in the 8eD88 emplO78d by st. Thomas in the article of the SUmma'l'beolopca 
concerning the agree1I8nt of tbe hurIan wln wi'ttl the diviDe will !! _v_ol_i_~_o., 
which 18 the chief source of SiJaon's demollStrat10n. Although Simon does net. 
define the terms uplic1t1:r, the example. which be giftS are sutficient to make 
their meaning clear. This is important, beeause thq are the k87 teme in the 
exposition of the moat 88 .. nt1al :t'1me1;icm of author1t:r.27 
Since St. Tho .. 1s d18CUaing the agre~ of tbe humul will 'With the 
divine, Silfton gI. ves a practical. illustration ot the solution in this order 1dliel 
is taken from John of st. fht.llll.a8. 28 SUppose that God told me by means of an 
26n>id., p. 42. 
-
21Simon quotes the body of the article (I-il, 19, 10) in DemocratiC 
Go'ftrnment. pp. 40-41, note 20, trom }>egis, II, .347-349, and note. :'£bi'£ John ot 
M. 'l'fi(i;is explains these views with great thoroughness in Curna tMologicua, 
I-II, disp. 11, a. 4 (Viv •• , VI, 4l-5S). 
28Cul"SUll tbeoloATheus, I-II, disp. 11, a. 4 (Vives, VI, p. 48b), cited in 
Democratic'rravern;;nt, p. 42. 
S8 
absolutely certain special revelation that He wanted rq father to die tomon"OW 
at noon. despite the fact that it was the definite will of God that be should 
die at that time, it would also be the will of God that I should struggle 
against the death of my father untU it bad become an accomplished fact. Simon 
explains that Aquinas states that the only cont'ormity required between the 
human vill and the diT1ne 1d.ll !!! .... vo1 __ i;,,;;;to ... is formal oonfomity, which mIQ" wll 
be COD1patible nth material disagreement or even dalBand such disagreement. 
tfGod, who takes care of the cODllCIn good of the universe, holda .. responsible 
for some particula1" goods and wants .. to diacbarp IV respcmaibllit7. God mq 
VUlt rq father to die tomorrow I but he certa.1.nf1.7 wants me to do all I can to 
prolong the life of ., father • • • ..29 
Simon gt ..... zother 8X8.lIple ot his own. drawn trOll lIIilitary lite. A 
camman:d1ng officer ie ordered to hold. a position at all C08ta. He i8 an 
intelligent am virtuous II8B who intends the CCJJImOn gOod of the a.rm.r and the 
nation, na.mely Tl0t017. Coneequent.ly he a1u at this particular good, holding 
the poaitiOD, becaun of the OOIIImon goOd, on the ground. of the COIInOD good, 
under a dete:rmi:ns.tion supplied by the cammon good. There is here, as an et.tect 
of virtue, volition and intention of the CCRIlO1'l goed foraallJ understood. Nov 
whether or not the orders are ablNJ'd in the situation :is a question that does 
not concern the otl'icer, but rather tbe over-all strategy board. This material 
--
1uue concerns the stratea board, which 18 in charge of detend.n1ng .. t
operations over-all strategy demaJtda. The officer ie supposed to refer hie 
29DeIlOCratic GoYernment, p. 42. , 
act.ione to Victory, but, so far as rMterlal. c;bjects of intention are concerned, 
the gOt'Xl .1ioll he 18 to intend 1s the holding or the position end nothing 
e1 ... 30 
Simml goes on to explain that if the high ecrm.rotmd fails in its taek and 
sends no further orders as the situation deteriorates, then the officer 1. in 
an ~ng position. ~ing ordere \dlll.ad to armihiliat1on, but there 1s 
no new tt'O'm abOV'e. those Wh088 job 1t is to C&l"8 tcr the CO'IM'lOn good 
__ riall,.. com1dered have vanished. He becomes increaaingly dubious that hi. 
ordtU"S are rull.,- what the COllII'.on good demand., until he then baa to do tvo 
thing a.. 1) deGide what is better tor the ~on good, to hold, "tack 01' with-
~hl.oh 1ft taking care ot the common good _t.eriallr considered, and 2) 
~0'I1te the decUion-which 1s taking care ot the 1!rt1oulq good materially 
considered. It is a ditficult th1nB. "When the private 1'81'8on has to eerp 
ab ... hi. capacity and substitute tor l'lOneldstent publio pereo., an awe-
inap1r1!J1 solitude .. ae him realile that the structure ot soc18ty hu broken 
. )l 
cmm. • 
.Ant7tber exlPp1e, where there ia no distinct 100000mlnc personnel, i. that 
of a group of piOllMl'8 who 10Yern theaelwa b7 majority rule. 'fhey meet at 
111wrv&1. to dec1de _ttere of common interest, but w!'en they are prevented 1'raII 
coming together eaeh private person baa to tak.. care of both h1a O'NR businen 
and the public busine.s until the group oan again oonvene. "'!'he same perscme. 
in tact, labored in 1sol.tttioo yesterday ard today act as one public character •. 
,,, 
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But, in isola Uon, the:r &l"$ noxmal17 que11fled ror the punsult of part1eul8J" 
goode alone, in aenmbly tbe1 are the m1nd and will to ..mieb 1t pertains to 
~ 8Jld tnt.em1 the ~ goocll thitJ dUterence of capuit:r 18 all that 
es88n'b1ally metten • .J2 
00ns14er a Latin teamer, ..,. Simon, who 1. abeolutel7 ded10ated to h'1e 
subject, 1Qbo bu a. .ue or the tuncti.cm that be bee to tultiU in socie", *0 
never tel.ievu that be overdOlNl the import,arl. of clue1 •• C~ aueh a man 
'W'1t.b an~ Latin t.eaeer who is &1\11118 ~ftll to refroain hom uq"th:Lng that 
m:lJht. lo* like t_tical Hal tor J.atla. 'Who does not 1'eCOIIIt8Dd Lat1n _pt, 
as pan or a baluoect procraa, who taela that ~i t 1e hi&I dut7 to keep hi. 
subject. well It'1Wn the li1I1te of ita l'Ul 1Ilportance. other ttdnp beirls 
eqUll, t.he eObool will be better .. lWd by the fOl"meI", d)rnerdo ~ ·tiban b)" 
the latter, colorleaa Uldl"f1cb1al, *0 v11l l'I8¥'el" aeoompllah great thinga, aince 
he baa ooftheecl b1e 0lIl tur&et1Ol'l wi tb tbat of the over-all ~lon of the 
achool. Sifwm ooncludee, 
No part of the LmI will be th~ tilled unle .. each labO'J."eJ' 
baa .. d1et1nct t1el4 to plow. And no tunat10n wUl be exerc18ed 
with ~ unl_.,. .t"uaet1«»-e.,., tAlat of teachi .. 
l..stln-018 d1at1net. fIooa ., othlel" f'uact.1on end thenItrJ' parU ... 
l.ar:lIed.. But U IV ~ 18 a p8l"t1cular one, if. in other 
.nida, the good 111\11 which I _ ~ 18 but a pctfticular 
upeet of the 0QIII'!20D pod., then 11; 18 ---817 that t.here .,., 
.... _, 8 pinson or a gJ'01JP ot peftONJ 'Properq concerned, not. 
0Dl7 t~ but alISO ateriall,.. "."1 th the ..mole of the CCl!lll1Oft 
good.)' 
• r 
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Simon notes here as well that a distinct governing personnel is not 
thereby required. The School might be governed by a board ot teachers, each 
of "Whom in the classroom is concerned ldth his own subject, but who, IfSating 
as a governing body, are all concerned with the whole good of the school. 
Since shifting tram a particular function to an over-all concern is possible 
but difficult, authority over experts is usually in the hands of nonexperts, 
that is to say men who are experts in the good which is not speCial.34 
The theOl7 emerging trom these examples and their analysis is then 
summarized b}I Simon in a set ot propositions. Under the assumption that the 
society in question is aiming at a common go¢, it is statech 
1. That 'Virtue implies ICl'le for the COllm1OD good) willingness 
to sacrifice one's own advantage to its requirements. 
2. That the common good ma.r be intended formally withou1; being 
intended ma terial17. 
). That tt. 'Virtue of the private penon guarantees the 
intention of the cammon good fomally considered, not the intention 
of the common good materially considered. 
4. That 80ciety would be har!led if evel7'one intended the 
cODITl.on good. not only formal17 but alao materiall;n that, in a 
material sense, particular persons and groups ought to intend 
particular goods. 
S. That the intention of the comnon good, materially c0n-
sidered, is the business of a public reason and a public w:1ll. 
6. That the intention of the common good by the public reason 
am will necessarily develops into a direction of society I by the 
publio reason and will, toward the ccmmon good considere4 not onl7 
formally but al80 materiallYJ which is the same as to aq that the 
intention of the CCllROft ~ood, materially considered, demands the 
operation of authoriV.)5 
Simon then cClllIl18l1ts upon these propositiOns, remarking first on the 
preliminary assumption that the society aims at a COJDJllon good. He says that 
34Ibid., p. 47. 
-
)SIbid., p. 48. 
-
62 
although Man)' theori:sts take it for granted that without a common good there 
no 8oo1etq, yet. the_ wol'tl 80cieN: 18 otten uaed of a partnership such as that 0 
a bamicrattaan and a lftOneylendezo--a society ld thin which there is 1'.10 
authOl"i't7_ But, he argues, there ia no CODlllOn good in such a aooiety, there is 
.36 onl.7 what. he calla a p!!udo-CCIJIIlOD SO«!,. It each partner take a percentage 
ot the return., then the total amount 1. nat a common good, but a sum of 
prl:9'ate goods. It looks ille a common good, but it is not. "It lackaJ one of 
the defining features ot the common good, vis., the intelligible aspect. by 
which 'the oommon good call.8 tor cOIIInunion in desire and common action.)7 
It does not suffice, a8;Ys Simon, that a~ good. concern several persona, in 
order that it be common; it mllst can .. among thoH who pursue it, aJ1d iDeotar 
as they pursue it, a camnon lite of desire and action. At least it must be o~ 
such nature as to cause such common life it it is to be cClIIIImOn. And it it is 
a CCD'I.O!l good it renderJII authority T8C8SSar,y, am does nat adlnit of purel:7 
contractual relatione. Just as the a:preas1ons "the greatest good of the 
greatest number" and "the general interest" prevailed in the age of 1!IdlYidu-
alism, so the thought of that age cherished, in varying degrees, a contractual 
interpretation of the state or a contractll8l ideal of sOciety. This was ve1'7 
logical, for 1£ tie ground of SOciety 18 the attainment of interdependent 
private goods, then no authority is necessary and contract su:rfices.38 
Commenting upon his first concluding prinoiple, Simon remarks that "the 
.36:rbid., p. 49. The italios are Simon's. 
-
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principle of the prima.cl' of the C<IIDlOn good, often misunderstood or denied by 
the theorists of ethios, has, in tact, an extraordinarily powerful hold on the 
oonsciences of men, so that even people of debased conduct find it natural to 
die for their country, or for some substitute for their country, such as a 
gang. And despite the theories of individualism men still recogniaed and 
served the common good under suGb improper names 8S "the greatest good ot the 
greatest nuaber. ,,39 
Regarding the second statement, Simon mere1;y says that examples have been 
given and repeata two of the. the army officer obe;ying orders may not 
actually be doing what is best for the COIIImo~ good, and the son of a murderer 
may want his father to live even though the common goad demanda exeeu.t1on. In 
both cases the common good is intended formally but not materia1l.y.40 
The third statement _rely indicates that failure to intend the OOllmlon 
good materially considered is not due to lack of moral excellence. "If what 
vioto17 demands is evacuation and withdrawal, it is up to the bigh command to 
issue new ordersJ and it is up to the courts to see that SOCiety is protected 
by adequate punishment of crime. Any particular difficulty raised by this 
statement :resolves into the difficulties pertaining to state_nt No.4 ('that, 
in a mterial sense, particular persons am groupe ought to intend particular 
39:rbid., p. ,0. Simon avoids entering into the highly disputed question 
of the ~ c4 the common good. 
4O:rbid., pp. 50-,1. It is hoped that by this time Simon's identification 
of the "COiiiion good materially considered with that Which is actuall,. required 
by it, and the formal intention of the common good with the reference of an 
intention to the common good, has become clear. 
goode'), W11ch i8 tbe keystone of the 1i1ole tbeo17.,.Ll 
The tourth st,ate.nt does ra1se apparent dUficult1ee. It BeemtII that 
eve170ne should int&M the commongocd bot.h materially and formally} at least 
that should be the ideal. Simon adnits that bis statement seems to put a 
restriction on love tor tbe oaamon good, u if too much of it might hann. Ellt 
it is indeed barmt'tal, he continue., to i,,..nore the laws of the one and tile 
many, 1_ lIhich transoencl hlaIum det101eneiea and human aftain because they 
are _taphysica1. He uplairuu 
GoodnN8 1mpl.lea uni __ , but the notion of unif,y, as div1decl iIM 
SUnity of the individual" and rtun1t). of tbe multitude, If irlY01'¥'U 
an order of uterlority and posteriority. The unity of a proper17 
umtied multltude i8 1... or a unit.y than the unity ot an 
1IId1v1dual. 'rbe decree of unity 'that. a aulttt.ude admits o£ 18 the 
same thing sa the ld.J¥l of unity than 1 t calla tor. /iii[ Although 
unitor 18 1m abaolute periect.ion, there can be t.oo muCh Of it. 1naa-
much as, beyond. a certain measure, the inappropriate kind forcibly 
displaoea the proper one aDd destruction ruulta. Such ls the 
meaning,ot Aristotle's celebrated objections to the comrnuniam of 
PlatoJa 
stmoa quotes at length from Plato'. Reeablic and the reply ot Aristotle 
the Pol1t1o. where the latter attack:a tthe preMile of Socrates that the greater 
• 
the uni't1 of the nate the better it aut beJ Aristotle'. point is that ODOI 
the state at,'taine tbe degree of unity of 8. f~ or indiridual, it 18 no 
longer a stat.. ....aiTe unity (te~ tbe state by cleat.:roy1nc the plurali 
bllb1d., p- Sl. 
-
42lb1d. The error in the text; quoted deprlvea the third sentence of 
~~ context would se_ to call for either of two possible correa-
tic_n either "fbe decree of unitq that 8 multitude admits of is not tbe s_ 
th1.Dg ae the kind of unit7 that it oalls tor," or perhaps "'l'he dell- ••• 
18 ot.bend. .. than the kind '01"tin1ty 1t cella for. rt 
................. ----
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which is natural to it. 43 Simon develops this argument by showing how uni-
formity can do violence to the nature of multitude and thereby cause waste: 
The systematic extinction of qualitative diversity impairs the verr 
ldnd of plenitude that it i8 the metaphysical function ot the many 
to achieve J and it the purpose is to affect the highest degree of 
unity, a multitude, no _tter how thoroughly uniformized, is bound 
to remain second to individuality, that is, one un would be nearer 
to the goal than any CO!IInonwealth, even though it be made of puppets 
all carved and dressed after the same pattern. Wi 
Imagine, he continues, a multitude in which all intend the common good 
materially as well as formally, and refrain from intending any particular 
good-a society which has achieved radical uniformity by extinguishing all 
qualitative diversity to the extent t~,1'It the JX)lmIlOn good haa a mODOpol,. on all 
pe nna.nent grounds for love and devotion. Permanent grounds for the love of 
the particular are destroyed. no 'HOman is more of a wife to me than atJ7 other, 
no man more a father, etc. In tiB order of final causality the co_on good 
alone stands, and the causal power of· the particular has disappeared into that 
of the whole. And since the end is the form of the will, when the .018 alone 
remains as an end, only one form is left tor all wills. 
Such a construct, Simon says, results hen the unwarranted. exaltation of 
the subordinating cause to the detriment or the subordinated causes. In some 
systems of metaphysics or theoloa God alone is the genuine efficient, cause, 
43Simon quotes from R8tj!;liC v. 462a-L.63c (trans. Jowett) and Politice 2. 
2. 1261810-15 {trana. JoWet~ Aristotle is also referring to iv. liM!,' md 
'I. 4S7 c. Cf. Democratic Government, pp. 52-53, note 22 • 
.. 
44Democratic Government, p. 53. 
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His sovereign power confronts a universe deprived of causality, life, liberty, 
and perhaps of reality. ~ontrast1ng with this picture of a waste land, the 
God of the living, who does nat need to lay things waste in order to assert 
his power, is powerful enough to cause .... ery thing am eve1'7 act and every 
modality or every act in a world whose law is one of plenitude and superabun-
dance, in a world tu1l of reality, of autonomy, of actbdty, of life, and of 
l1berty • ..45 
SUch a society, "Where none intema a particular good 8ftn materially, is 
like a dead world, in Simon-s opiniOft. The COJIRlOn good, moreover, has beC0D8 
a mre appearance. "Common good cannot ex18~ unless it does ex1at as the good 
of a multitudeJ but there is no good tot a multitude' tmle88 parUcmlar goods 
4 
are intemed by particular appeti tea and taken care of by particular agents." 
On the other hand, says Simon, Plato did percei". the need for distinc-
tion in soulet,.. For Simon a good. can be particular in two wqs. either a. a 
~ood whose subject is but a part; of society, or as • good whiGh i. but a part 
or an aspect of the common good. The welfare of • tud.17 is an exanple ot the 
first, the public health of the whole society an example or the secom. 81moB 
calls the tirst private, the seccmd. sE!c1al1 and uses the tem homestead and 
fUnction to stand for these two prinoiples of distinction. The homestead of a 
farmer i. particular as pri".t8J the !unction exerci.ed. by a public .ervant is 
particular as 'recial. ~hile Plato opposed the former, be emphasized the 
45 Ibid., pp. 54 .. 5S. 
-
46zb1d., p. 5S • 
. -
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latter strongly; though most societies use both principles, he preferred to 
rely exclusively on the division at social labor 1n'to functions, as if the 
first principle were dangerous.47 
If the fourth statement is established, oontinues Simon, then the fifth 
am sixth statements hardly call for elaboration. It the oommon good should 
not be intended naterial.ly by particular persons, then a nonpartlcular reason 
and will should intel¥l it, it is obT.l.ous that it has to be intended material-
ly by someone, and thia person or group should be obeyed, according to the 
principle of the pr1mae;y of tJle eommon good, whether it be a distinct gwern-
ing person or group, or the ..mol. multitucle ~onst1tuted as the public reason 
aD! 1411, 88 in a tom meeting. ''It is, in the last anal78is, as simple .s 
that.,.48 
Simon then ooncludes with an explanat10n of the two ld.Dda of particulari 
.gnd their relat10n to author.1t7. Bach kind suffices to make authorit7 neoes-
8&17, tor even it the part1cular"!:t)r of the hamesteacl were abo118hed-aa in a 
thor~ Cc3aumm1st state-the ptrticular1ty of the funotion would still 
render authority indispensable. In Platots R!JPUbll0 authorit7 is overwhelming 
Even in a cabinet made up of enlightened and virtuous functionaries, each 
intending his awn aspect ot the common goal, "the sheer ta.ct that each adminis 
tration bas a !p!cial tuk to fulfil makes 1t necesss.ry that there be, on top 
of all departments, a nondepartmental agent ••• an agent specialized in 
47 Ibid., pp. 5S-56. 
-
having the point of view of the entire cOJllMon good prevailing over .. epecial 
49 
angle." 
And. so the proposition that authority i8 necessary to the intention of 
the camnon good haa a double maning. "It means, first, that authority i. 
necessary in order for prl.:vate persons to be directed toward the common goodJ 
it rreans, secom, that autbor1t,. is neeess817 in order for functional 
processe., each of which regal'ds some aspect of the common good, to be 
directed toward the whole of the oommon good."sO 
This funct1on, sqs Simon. deserves to be called "most essential" because 
it concerns the most f\mdamental act of social Ufe. In a society of virtuous 
enlightened, and full,. 1!Ilture persons, authority would have no paternal duties 
it 'WOuld have to un1.f)' action only when the means was not uniqael,. determined, 
b1.l't it U)uld first am above all have to intend the common good.S1 
Thus authority is essential. to man. 8iaon concludes that 88 such -au-
--
thorttr is neither a necessary e~ nor a lesser good nor a lesser eVil nor 
the consequence of atV' evil or detic1enq--i t is, like nature and society .. 
unqualitiecn,. good."s2 
49Ib1d., p. 58. The italics are in the original. 
-
50J:bid., p. 59. 
-
5lIbid. 
-
52Ib1d• On the existence of essential functions J S1m.on here quotes at 
length rra; st. Thomas, S.T., I, 96, 4 (authority in the state ot innocence) 
and De Re~ Pr1n~ I, 1 (the need tor a ruler). In both texts the two 
tuncU'ons are cons1d8 p!Lirr wus. Simon also quotea Leo .xIII, who u" 
the argument at the latter n ~rtale Dei, and here give. the complete 
schema of .functions alre~ Jll.:esent.N Pi? an p. 2.3). Both the coDlll1ltJ'.d; of 
st. Thomas and the function Of perfect ve att4i t7 will be taken up in the 
tollOld.ng chapter at this theaia, however. 
I 
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In reply to the assertion of Paine and others of the deficiency theor.Y 
tba. t gove:m.ment arises because of our wickedness, Simon can now state fiaU,. 
that authority. in its essential functions, is as natural as the association 
of nen for a common good. It ill not produced by our wickedness (i.e., defi-
ciencies), but by our wants (i.e., the tendencies of our nature). Yet the 
ad'¥"ersaries nay hold that a 'Common good is not the object of any c1Yil associ 
tion, that ciYU society has no cODIlon good fer ita objeot. "'1'be question 
beUs down to this: Is it possible to oonceive civil society after tbe fub-
ion ot a mere partnership, involving no OamJlOn existence, no cOlIInon 111'e, no 
common lewe, and no oommon action,.,3 
Simon begins his reply by def1m.ng civil society as "the society wi thin 
which all the tendenc:l..es of man, so rar as temporal life 18 concerned, can 
normally find satid'action • ..su He calls the society which bas a common good 
communitz, and the societywhicb does not, !!!!!. partnersh1,e. examples of the 
former are a team md an army and of tbe latter the handiorattaman and the 
lIOD8Yle:nder. His method i8 to diaengage typical features of a community and 
then see if they are recognizable in c1 v1l so01eV. 
First of all, Sitrlon tims that in true communities there are SOll8 transi-
tive actions perfOJ'lTil8d by the ooB1lJlUD1ty as a unit. there is oollective ca.uaali 
ty. In a partnership, hC»l'EM!Ir, eacb aotion is traceable to some partner, none 
is perforned by the partnership itself. Secondl.y, the transitive aotions of 
the eo.arnunity are conditioned by immanent actions of knowledge and desire in 
S~cratic Government, p. 63. 
S4Ibid. 
-
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which the members commune} each person knows and desires the common objective, 
and is aware that the others do, too. "OoramunioDl in immanent actions make up 
the most profound part of social reality • • • there alone the individual is 
freed from solitude and anxiet;y. Mere partnership, on the other hand, does n 
do a'lythi1'lg to put an end to the 80li tude or the partners • .$> Lastly, this 
commUftion is caused by oammunications which m.ake the members _tull, aware of 
their common striv1~. Presiding over theae communications 18 one of the 
principal tasks of leadership, it must insure the proper now of _sages at 
all levels. 
But thue criteria of a OOJRmUn1ty are e&fi17 recogniuble in civil 
SOciety. Collective causality is wident in seeurit;y &gainat enemies, 
treaties, over-all status ot ownership, of education, of temporal l1!e in its 
relation to the spiritual; comnmion is certainly recognizable in patriotism, 
cCllmltlUdom.-C4using communications can be seen in parades and the raia1ng of 
the flag. Although some of these features would not be necessa17 in a 8001...". 
free from evil (e.g., security against internal enemies), most of them would 
assume a more int.enee significance in a society made up of ideally perfect 
people. Simon concludes, therefore, that it is not lecws. of evil in men but 
in spite of all evil and deficiencies that civil societ! .. have the character 
of comrmmiti.s.S6 
5SIbid., p. 65. 
-
56n,id., p. 67. Simon exPlains that the term civil SOOime should be 
taken iilibroad sense, to include paller un1 ta of reaeral sys me as well as 
nation-states. strietJ.r speaking, he says, perhaps only the world is a civil 
sooiet,.. 
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The d81!lonstration of the most essential function or authority is t1m8 
complete, but Simon concludes his first chapter of Philosophy !!! Democratic 
Government with a final warning against the tempting illusion that the good 
will of eaoh person, if it "''ere complete anel enlightened, would suffice to 
guarantee the intention of the common good I 
Tb1a UIU8ion is stubborn beoause it is hard to muter the operation 
of the principles lihioh, at the bottom of the question, seem to con-
flict but actually oondition and supplement each other. The common 
good demands that particular persons should do full justice to the 
goodnesa of the particular good} but, if suoh is the case, an over-
all. direction towar4 the oommon good i8 neoe8sar,y. Thus the most. 
essential function of authority springs, in the last anal,-s1., from 
the autonordc goodness of t.be particular g0c4. The autonom.y ot the 
homestead ana that of the function matter highly tor the common 
good, but, without over-all goYermtant, the .. autonomies would __ 
the dia1ntegration of soeiet,-. Thus autonOll1 renders authoritr 
necessary and authoriV remere autonomy possible-this is what we 
find at the core of the most essential function ot gO'V'ernment.57 
57lbid., pp. 70-71. '!'he latter part ot the quotation reflects the notion 
of oomP!_ntarity between authority and liberty with which Simon began Nature 
~ Functions 2! Authoritz. 
CHAPl'RR V 
AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY 
The essential elementa of Simon' a theory of the nature and £uncti 0!l8 of 
authority have now been presented, but not the general conclusions which be 
drawe ~m them.. There also remain for disoussion sorne related notiona which 
should be included to give completeness to the theory. Consequently, it 'Will 
be the task of this chapter to draw together the loose ends of the presenta-
, 
tion, as it were, ana. to give the general principles for the right combination 
of liberty and authority which Simon, at the opening of his .Marquette lecture, 
declared to be the goal of his il'lV'est1gation. 
Reference has been made to the correspondence between the investigation 
of Simon and the reply of st. Thomas to the question of whether authority 
would have eJdsted in the state of innocence.l This article of the SUl'tItIl& 
Tbeologica makes 8 good point of departure for the consideration of authority 
and liberty because it not only co:neidera authority as exercised in its two 
basic dominions and containa in germinal fom the theor.r of functions already 
presented, but also adds a description of perfective authority, and points the 
wq towam general conc1uslcma. 
st. Thomas says that in the state of innocence the dominion of servitude, 
in which a man is governed tor the private welfare of another man, would have 
12 
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been unknown. 2 Simon develope tg'1is point by explaining that tor St. Tbomaa 
sen'itooe is defined by the alienation of human effort-an alienation which 
does not take place when one works for the caramon good, but which does take 
place men a man, no matter .free he may be to chauge his muter or his trade, 
works for the private good of arother, and thUIJ remains an unfree man, a slave 
On the other hand, St. Thomas holds that the dominion of freedom, in wMc 
Ii man is gO'¥'emed tor his own or for the COJml'lOD good, would have existed in t 
state of innocence, md that such a man i8 tree because, unlike the slave, he 
3 has di8p08al of h1:msel.t (IDer est causa aNi). Simon points out that the dis 
'----- -
tinction ~ these two forma of authorit7. is based. upon final causality I 
it is the emi of the action which makes the difference, i.e_, whether or not 
there is alienation of act1'riv.4 
The distinction is important, sqa Simon, because this set of opposite 
notions haa otten been contused with two other sets of opposite notional the 
political versus the dupotic regime, and the substitutional 'Versus the 
essential functions of authority.S 
2S•T., I, 96, 41 "And since enry manta proper good is desirable to bill-
self, md consequently it is a gritn'Ous matter to anyone to yield to another 
what ought to be om'. own, therefore such dominion implies of nec8as!t7 a 
pain inflicted on the subject, and consequently in the state of innocence such 
Ii maate1"8hlp would not ha'ft existed between man end man ...... Pegie, I, 922, 
quoted in Democratic Government, p. S9. note 23. 
3Ibid• 
-
SIb1d., pp. 34 ... 3S. This distinction haa already been mentioned under the 
nature-or-author1t7. Cf. sppra, p. 2$. 
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Regarding the two regims, political am despotic, from the point or view 
of efficient causality I a free man i8 one who has some power to resist the 
orders he receives (regimen politioum or political regime), while a slave--in 
another aense of the word fran that used abOV"e--doea nat enjoy this right 
(ree-n derm0ticum or despotio regime). But this set of notions does not 
correspond to that of the two dominions either in comprehension or extension: 
an entirel.y clitterent causali t,. underlies them, and it does not follow that 
one who enjoys no right of resistance must thereby serve the private good of 
his muter. Take the classio example of the despotic regime, s.,.s Simon--the 
dominion exercised by the father over his children. Although the child bas no 
right of resistance, the father must still rule for the child's own good and 
the common good of the fami1.7. 6 
Nor do the definitions of the two dominions correspond to those of 
substitutional and essential functions of authorit7. It does not follow, stOlt 
Simon, that if one 18 incapable of selt-government and need8 to be ruled b,y 
anotmr (substitutional function), he JlU8t thereby serve the private good of 
his master (despotic regine). 7 
6wature and Functions, p. 36. Simon ucknowledges that he is using the 
terms l!!iF ana a~c in a sense sGnewhat different trom Aristotle's. 
The 1a I' D1 is us;! '67 ll"istotle to COYer both the dcmd.nion of servitude 
and the despoti. regime, while the former, usually- rendered constitutional by 
most translators, implies in Aristotle a degree or democracy, which It does n 
in Simone cr. Democratic aove~nt, p. 73, note 1. 
7lbtd., p. 37. He explains that the essential :functions can be aercised 
in eitlier'regime and the substitutional functions in either dominion, but make 
no further distinctions. 
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Both of these diatincti.ons are significant, since "the expediencies which 
1'!JBV justity the despotic regime or the subst1tutlonal internmtions of author! 
ty are sometimea wrongly taken as a justification for the dominion of eerri.-
tude • • • the dominion of ser9'i tude cannot be justified by the principles 
which justify the substitutional lnte1"Yentlon of authOrity or the noutat1lto17 
regime. It it is justifiable at all, it must be just1.t'ied by principles 
8 proper to it.· 
Simon is not willing to exclude the dominion of servitude _ entirely 
unjustifiable. It Might conceivabl;y serYe the common good indirectl;y, it the 
good of society demanded a leisure clue 8npport.ed by the exploitation of 
others. Indeed, he says, the legitima07 of this dominion-l1m1ted and reape 
ing ina] ienable human rights-is reducible to whether or not this demand :must 
be satWied by explo1 tation, and. he suggests that with the growth of m.odern 
industry it no longer must-a fitting fulfilment to the statement of .Arietotle 
9 that society could do without slaves it the shuttle could weave by i tsell' • 
Now st. Thomas, having rejected the dominion of servitude, clear17 holds 
that the state of innocence would baTe seen the exercise of authority: 
But a man is the master of a free subject by directing him 
either towards his proper weltare, or to the common good. Such 
a mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between 
lIIIID. and un, for two reuons. First, because man is nat.ural17 a 
soe.ta1 being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led 
a social life. Now a social life cannot exist 8JllOl'!g a number of 
people unlesB under the governance of one to look after the common 
good, for l\W'l7, as such, seek many things, whereas one attends 
8Ibid• 
-
9 Ibid., pp. 39-40. The source of the statement 18 not given. 
-
16 
only1n one. Hence the Philosopher says, in the beginning of the 
Politica, that wherever marr;y things are directed to one, we shall 
aIWayB lind one at the head directing them. Second17, if' one man 
sUl'pa8sed another in knowledge and justice, this wuld not have 10 
been fitting unless these gif'ta conduced to tba benefit of others. 
Simon explains that chilc:lnm are not considered here, since they would 
certainly have needed piternal guidance cmtn in the state at innocence, and 
than goes on to relate this puage to his mm theoJ71 
Considering a community of adults free frcu eTil., Aquinas ahC'rHS that 
government is needed (a) for the direction of the community toward 
ita common ~cd-thi8 "Contra the two functions which we described as 
essentialJ (b) in order that men who are free from evil, in other 
wonia, ~ good, should benefit by the excellence of the best 
among them. This refers to a functi on of authori t7 not incl uied in 
our analysis, a function which 18 neither substitutional, since the 
governed is supposed to be free from eTil and even from deficienc,y, 
nor essential, sinoe the COIDOn good is taken care of by another 
function) let, it be called the "perfective" function of author1t,..l1 
The grounds for this perfective function, previously nentioned but not 
explained, lie in the inequalities of reason, 'Will pOWl!r, and T1rtue which are 
80 natural to men that tbq wmld have existed. even in the state of inno-
cence.12 It is fitting that those leS8 endowed. with these qualities be guided 
ill" the more gifted, saye Si.."liOD, not because this guidance is indispensable to 
the esse o£ the personal or common good, but because it 1s necessary to its 
-
bene es.. Furthermore, the ps:ycholoQ' of those W10 are proud. of their leader 
--
aM love h:i.m shows that he is appreciated not only for his ability, but also 
10S.1'., I, 96, 4, quoted in Democratic Gove~nt, p. 60, note 2J 
(COl'1tinieG £rom p. 59), from PegiS, 1, 922. 
1ln.mocrat1o Govemme., p. 60, note 2.3 (continued !rem p. 59. 
12Ibid• st. Thomas proves t.be e:x:istence of inequalities in S.T., I, 96, 
3, and menlions them in I, 92, 1, ad 2. - -
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for the inspiration which he givu his subjects to lead nobler lives.l ) 
A case of perfective authOrity, says Simon, is seen by st. ThOllas in the 
subjection of wonan to man in the state at innocence, 'When he states, "For the 
good of order liOuld haw been vanting in the human multitude if SODle were not 
governed by other Lii!,7 wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of sub-
jection woman 18 natural17 subject to man, because in man the dUcer:nment of 
reason predominates • .,l.4 And this 18 independent of deficiencies and the 
eS8el'ltia1. need tor d1rectd.on toward the common good of the fami17. It i8 a 
perfective .f'unction.1S 
The investigation into the tunet1.Oll8 of ~authority is now complete, at 
least as far a8 its huic, philosophical element. are concerned. This study, 
together with the prel.im1nary a:nal:1sis of the nature of authori. ty and certain 
important statemnta about ita instrwnents and tOl"ll8, should prcn1d.e adequate 
material for the desired conclusi0D81 the general principles tor the right 
combination of authority and liberty in any giTen situation. But before the .. 
conclusions can be dra1m, .. Siaon near the end ot Nature end Funatione of 
I ............... 
Authori.!z, it is necessary to re*," some equivocatiOl18 by ezpla1rd.nl brletl;y 
the notion of liberty which 11 bad in "11 ... 16 
13Ibid• Simon is currently working out a theor,y ot perfective authority, 
w.hich be now prefers to call "the communication of excellen(8. n--Infonnation 
from an intemew with Prof. Simon on July 11, 1959. 
14S.T., I, 92, 1, ad 2. The translation quoted by Simon has been slight-
ly mod1l'ii'd by him from that of Pegia (I, 880), where f~ is toum for 
:rmil.titude and othen tor other. It is quoted in Democracoovernment, p. 61, 
now 23. . 
15Democratic Gavernment, p. 60 • 
• 
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In h1a Marquette lecture, Simon refers to the philoeophica1 theory of 
liberty developed by Jacques 'Hari tain in the first chapter of _F're_ed_om_ !!! ~ 
Modem world.!7 Among the variO'WJ meanings of the notion of liberty, Simon, 
following Maritain, sees a fundamental distinction between an initial liberV 
and a terminal liberty. Initial. liberty is the sheer power of chOO8ing good 
or evU, freedom of choice in our eff'orte to improve ouneIT .. ) it now-a from 
our rational nature and bas the value of a Mans rather than an end) it is a 
miJlBd ~rteot,ion, a ertectio 1Id.x:ta, because it inYOlves imperfection, tNt 
power of choosing evil. Tenninalliberiq, on the other halrd, is the power of 
choosing the good alone and thus appears at ~the term of our endeavor, when the 
virtuOWl man has 80 interiorized the law that ita prescriptions are identical 
with the ~iea of his virtuous nature, it i8 an absolute perfectiOD, a 
e,erfectio s!mPliciter 8!9>lex, which can be attributed to God in a formal 
senseJ it means not ohl)" treed.OIIl of choice but also auwllOlllT.18 
Every being en.1018 a certain autonOll\f, sq8 SiMon, becawse every being 18 
Ir1OY'ed to ita eDd. b:y the law of its ft&ture. And the higher a being is in the 
hierarcb;y of thing., the more all'to11om;r it possesses. AutonOlDT both springs 
fram the pertectiom of being and makes those perfections evident ani admira-
ble; it 18 the eplendor and glory of being. And terminal liberty, since it is 
both freedom or choice and autonomy, is the kim of' autonomy which properly 
1!Ib1d., p. 42. This English translation of E! Res~ !!!pore! !! 2!!! 
LibeI'te was first published in London, 193$. 
l8nid., pp. 42-43. Cf. Freedan in the Modern World, pp. 29-46, for 
Marita.1li's development of these conCipti, ref'e:x;:;J to li Simon. 
19 
fits the rational nature as such. Terminal liberty is the glory of the 
rational. nature.19 
In another work, Simon develope this notion of freedom more extensivelr. 
After disengaging the true concept of liberty as mastery and superdeterm1na-
tian t'rom the false concept of irresolution and indeterminatLon with which it 
is often associated, he goes on to show that freedom of choice 18 not 
destro,yed but exalted when there i. no longer a possibility of choosing 
wrongl.;y_ Sime freedom is a power of choosing the means to the end, aDJ"th1ng 
which jeopardises the end itself conflicts with the '"17 es.ence of freedom. 
There may be no fomal freedom in the act b1 whicb the bluaeti in he8."f'8n .ee 
God, bnt there i8 an eminent 1'l'eed0Dl, the act of beatific love is not below 
freedom, but is above it, since the !!!! _fi_n1 ........ s is perfectly assured by the 
vision 'hhieh ellmi..nates possibility of deviation fraa the end. Here below, 
th1a irJief'ect.1billty cannot be attained, but the ideal. term of moral and 
spiritual progress i8 a state r1 sanot1ty in which the freedom of mald.Dg 
wrong choices is remored as tar as possible while the freedom of choosing 
rema1ne tm.1.mpa1red.. The law has become interior to the will .. so that freedom 
of choice and autonaq combine to produce te:mdnal llbert7. 20 
SimOn points out that, mutatis mutandis, what holds for the individual 
holds also for the group I 
20WLiberty and Author! ty, If Prooeedi5s of the American catholic Philo-
s!.2hical Association, XVI (1940), Bg:~B. - -
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JlI8t as the personal freedom. of choice is exalted bY' the remOV'al of 
the indifference of potentiality, so the freedom of the group is 
ual'Eild 'by tEe suppression of the disorderl,. forces that tend to 
make impossible a resolute course in camnon action. Finally, it is 
per£eoUy evident that the freedom of the group is not any more 
bound up ~ th the possib:tll ty of making wrong choices than the free-
dOJll of the individual. there is such a thing as an interioriu.tion 
of the law by the social bod;y. Just as an individual person, through 
virtue, protects himself against the risk of making wrong choices, 
so a group, a society, a political body, mq effectively strengthen 
its loyalty to the C<'ImI\OD good by the incorporation into it. legal 
structure, its customs I uses and collect! ve beliefs I tendencies 
spontaneouaJ:r agreeing with the camnon good. Such a 800iety baa 
achieved the highest ldnd of common liberty. It has reached a 
condition of genuine autonOlQ'".21. 
From these matapby8ical considerations, concludes Simon, it is clear that 
the prOgre8S of man and society implie8 the progress of liberty, provided that 
termi.:n.a1 liberty is meant. As to whether this progress of liberty implies in 
'turn the decsq of authority, he says that "this ia a question that we shall 
try- to answer by considering the foms, functions and instruments of authority 
in reference to the idea of liber\y u meaning auto!lO.lll7. ,,22 
In Nature !!!! Functions !! AuthoriV. Simon now make. f'our prel1m1nat'7 
conclusions, before arriv.ing at hi. cardinal prinCiples. The first is that 
the dOJll1nion ot .. nit. i. opposecI to the requirements of AUt.on...,- and 
should be done aW&7 with. Thu, be 8aye, that ~ progress !! liMN 
Hl41ea thgt deN !!:. authorig insofar !! authoriV takes ~ !2!!! .2! ! 
daminicm of 88m tude. ,,2,) 
........ ;;;;;o;;;,;;~_ , 
2lIbid., pp. 98-99. 
22N ..a: ... t.:t1re;;;;.;;. !!!! FunetioDS, pp. 4L.-4S. 
23lbid., p. 4.S. Simon sqs that this is true even it the aploitation be 
legitima""'" All italica in the orig1nal. 
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Secondl,., :regarding the instruments of autborl tw, a leadership exercised 
through persuasion agrees better with autonOl\Y than one exercised through 
coercion. Thus, "!!!! ESP"sS 2!. Uberty; implies !!!! substitution 2! 2!1'8Ua-
!!2!!!2! coercion wherever ~ aubstitutlon ~ !?! reasonably re8111ed." 24 
Third, he says that since the substitutional 1Unctions of authe1"1t7 are 
justified onl,. on tb! basis of some det1c1enq in the subject, ".!!!!. prgrot88 
!!! llbem iptplies !!:!. de!!l .2! author!;t.z insofar !! authori tz USU111Et8 
subst1 tuti. onal functions ... 2$ 
Fourth, he 8818 that since the .uetial functions contribute posit1vel,. 
. to the perfection, happiMS8, and treedca ot!a soa1ety by uniting it in its 
(I)_on action, "!!!. 2roE!!s S! l1bertl 22!! !2! 1!T!l !!!! cle!& 2! authOr1sr 
iDsotar !!. !!! .. aent181 tunction 2!. author!. V .!!. conoemed ... 26 
Autonomy also influences the relationship between l:!l>erty and perfective 
autborit7 .. Simon declares. The innuenee of a nser superior is supposed to 
liberate the treedCIB of the interior trom possible irresolution and the danger 
of choosing incorreotlYJ however, this il'lt1uence will not be tl"lily perfective, 
but will rather impair the progress or liberty, it the superior prw1des his 
24Ibid. Simon says elsewhere that coercion fail. to achieve its most 
~1evateTiiil1t it taUs to foster the virtuous dispositions lihich finally 
!:!;llte it \lM8cus817--"L1bert)" and Authority, If p_ Ul. 
2SIbid., pp_ 45-46. This means that as deficiencies are made up they can 
no long'ir7erve as groUllda for authortv. 
26nid., p. 46. In this earlier work Simon had not yet distinguished the 
moat es'ier.tlal funct10nJ consequently he uses the singular_ The same 
reasoning applies to both functions, however. 
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subject with ready""lUlde dec1i lio!)8 atXl thus deprives him of the ability to 
axerei .. hi. own judgment. For this rueon, perfective authorl.t7 ~ 
gino ita p~ntl in the torm of advice rather than bindiDl preoepta.27 
l<'1th regard to the relation of liberiy and authorl.ty in the order of 
iiheoretica.l truth, Simon hold. that jut .. e evIl can prevail in economic 
relations 11 Clh8'loe occurrenou and ino:roinate clri .... 8 are left unocmt1"011ed, 
80 error can and dees take bold in the minds of men if truth 11 not prO'fided 
wi til some kind ot proteotion and pr.h1.1ege. The libenal theory <it the W11'egt;l-
lated _ rite-tplace hae tailecl in both epheree. New.... kind of protection of 
truth, pruden~ cboaen alii established b7 soc1eV, doe. not oonf')ict with 
liberty. since l1bert.7 1. a power or ohooaina the proper _ana to the right 
end, .. tm4 wh1ch mut ti.J"n be lmo\m proper17 before it can be intended. 
A:n:f theol'eUcal enor concerning t.he great _taph)rllcal and moral truths 
radicall)t 002'2'Upte the source from Which right action aprl.n~8. And. it th1a 
arg'llnns hold. tor truths ... i1,. capable ot eric.nee, it holds a foniori tor 
-
thOi. whieb are either dU't1oul t to attain (such .s Hcomal"Y pre_pt.. of the 
natva'l law) or wll1 ch ean never be eY1clant in tbi. lite (such u the truths o£ 
nwelation).28 
From the.. conol uiona, ~. Simon, it become. clear that the antinaq 
be\'ween autbor1ty and liberty i. not abaolute. Bet.ween authority and libertJ 
27 "L1baX"tq and Authority," p_ 101. Here again penruaalon appesl"I aa more 
consonant with autonomy than ooend.on can be. 
~Ibid., pp. loa-nO. 
-
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there exist two relations: in the aubstitutional domain there is opposi tiOD, 
in the essential there is supplementariness. But the aspect which ultimately 
prenUa and predominates is tha.t of supplementariness, since the essential is 
primar.r. This essential relation ie clear: "Viewed in the purity of their 
_tapbyeical goodnese, authority and libert7 fully agree with one another, and 
their canplem.enta17 character de.tinitely prevails OY'er their opposition. ,,29 
It now becomes possible tor Simon to state thoee general principles for 
the right, combination of authority and liberty which were the initial goal of 
the investigation. Tb.e7 are the prinCiples of authority and the principle of 
autoDoslTt 
They can be fomulated as tollows: Principle of Authority. '«,ber-
ever the welfare of Q. cOJI'II1Uni'!f rerree a cc:manon action, the ~tl 
'OYtba.T common acll'oii" must Se au~~ §: thi hillier 9MB-or 
c~;tl. 'fInclji!e OTlUtOiiomy. l'!herever a 'tasli can tie siEislac-
, J aohieved by the initiative of the individual or that of 
Sliitl socm uni ta, ""lIie l\i11D1iiient onhai iiik tmls'£"'bi lettto 
m; !J1tUa'Elve ol thi"'i'xiHilChiS! or to lli'it or-ami!r""sOiiar-unfis.30 _____ ....... .......... __________ ...... r 
It must be noticed that Simon laid down these principles in his earlier 
work, Nature !.!!! Functions 2! Authoritl. B.Y the time he had ccapleted his 
development of the theory of authority in Pbilos9P!V 2! Democratic Government, 
tHo other essential functions of authority had appeared: the function of 
unification of common action had to be limited to the cases where the means 
was not uniquely detel'fldned (the function beiJ.lt substitutional. where they were 
determined), and the function of the volition of the common goad appeared as a 
29Nature and Functions, p. 46. ct. also Democratic Goyernment, p. 141, 
where tt; terms!emeiiGnness 1$ used. 
30 Ibid.., pp. 46-47. Italics in the original. 
-
new function entirely, although it was foreshadowed by the principle of auton-
omy itself. Simon could have revised his principle of authority to include 
these t1lO functions, but he did not. Instead, be gives three conclusions 
which rougbly correspond to two substitutional functions and the most es.ential 
function, although, in a Benae, the third include. the other two, and all 
three make up a principle of autonoJltr. He also states something like a 
principle of authorlty at the end of his conclusions, but does not digni.t) it 
with a maher. Thi. is in keeping witb the whole tone and trend of his later 
book. th:1a work is less theoretical, le •• erstematic in ~ ways, more con-
cerned with the practical order, and written tor a DlUch wider aDd le •• 
Scholastic an audience than the members ot the Aristoteliall Society of 
Marquette University. Furthemore, these conclusioDS in the later book do not 
appear in the chapter on the general tbeOl"¥ of gOYe:rmnent (vb!re most of the 
material. on authority i. to be l'ound), but. from a later chapter on democratic 
tNedom. Consequent17, it must be concluded that Simon point.adly omitted 
repeating, reviSing, or in a:D1 way reterring to his earlier twin prinCiples. 
What he does 887 is this: 
heR the previous analysis of the functions of authority 
(chap. i) it results that there is opposition bet'W8en authorlv 
and liberty men the function of authority is substitutional, 
not men t he function of authOrity is essential. This basic 
proposition can be dewloped as follows: 
1. The progress of society and liberty makes for the decline 
ot au1#hority so far as the paternal function of authority is con-
cerned. Thus, for a com.unity eubjected to colonial rule, .freedaa 
meaNI such a state of affairs that the foreign %Ulers can dieappear 
'Without damage to the cc:anra.nity, and do di8appear. 
2. A community is capable of greater freedom 1.t it i8 capable 
ot unanimity whenever the means to the common good is uniquely 
determined; it is more primitive or decadent and le8s capable of 
libertJ', if eTen when the meana to the common good 1s uniquel;y 
a, 
determin!ci, it rails to achieve unanimity and needs to achieve unit)" 
by way of authority. 
3. The progress of society and of liberty requires that at 
every given moment in the evolution of a oommunity the greatest 
possible number of tasks should be directly managed by individuals 
and amaller unita, the smallest mmt>er by the greater units. 
But, 'With regard to the essential runctions or authority, there 
is no contlict wbaUJoever between authon ty and libert,.. The more 
defini tel,. a COlIm'IUl"li ty i8 directed toward ita common good and 
protected from disuni~ in its common action, the more perfect am 
tha IIlOre tree it 1 •• 31 
It can be 8een that the seoODd conclusion is entirely mw, based as it 1s 
upon the hitherto undeveloped substitutional function previously mentioned. 
The third coneluaion 18, of course, the former principle ot autononw itself, 
and wuld seem to be, in Simon's theory, intimately connected ldth the most 
essential function. Imeed., Simon says that the same metapl'l7sical law which 
demands that a 'Pirticularization at actiTities should be produced by the 
function and the hOllBl.lltead, also demand. that no task which can be fulfilled 
bf a lower unit should be fulfilled by a higher. Thus, he says, the principle 
of autonomy is implicitly assumed in the argument for the principle of 
authority.32 
From. the usociation of the principles of authority and autonomy, sqa 
32lbid., pp. 129 ... 130. The principle of authority Ileans the most assenti 
f'anct1on:--He qu.otee Leo XIII in substantiatioDI "Let the State watch O't'er 
these societies of citisens united together in the exercise of their right, 
but let it not thrust itself into their peculiar concerns and their organiza-
tion, for things 1I1ove and live by the soul wi thin them, and they mq be kil1e 
by the grasp of a hand from wi thou~. "-Rerum Novarum (the source is not 
given). 
, 
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Simon in his earlier work, there should result a hierarchical order in which 
the autonomy of the lower social unit supplements arxi balances that of the 
higher.,),) In his later book he considers some practical d1ff1Cllties inY'olTed 
in thia balane1ng of foroes. Management by the smaller unit may not alwqs be 
the lllOI!Jt effiCient, and the question m. arlse as to how much au~ the 
lower units should sacrifice in order to reap the beneti ta of greater produc-
tion. Not much, aqs Siaon. He considers the abundance of life in all parts 
of the communit.)r such m important phase of the common good that direct man-
agement by the whole is preterable only when the advantages are very great. A 
slight increase of mil! terial ,,' .. l:t.h or etfie~cy does not. balance the loss of 
. dignit7 which results when choice, initiative, and reaponsibil1t7 are taken 
aW&7- ".ArJ:r institution designed to centralize deliberation, deciSion, and 
oommand tenda to bring subordinate persona down to the level of the slave, u 
described by Aristotle: he is an int4tlligent instruaent, but his power at 
UDierst.andi1'll hardly e.xceeda what is needed to grasp an order and to execute 
it • .34 
v!hUe Simon does not. sq tbat POWI' corrupts, he does say that fIVer:! 
power is exposed to the ~t .. tion to extend ita rule over things which might 
well be left some degree o! autonom,y end life. The organization of autonOll'l7 
is difficult because it demands the etten aimed at nondestructive simplicity 
"It 18 • • • oomparatively easy to simplU'y things by destroying a good part 
of their reality. But it is dUficul t to effe ct the ldnd of simplification 
33wature am Functions, p. 47. 
-_ .... _--_ .... 
.34n.ocratio Government. pp. l)().]Jl. 
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'Which, under more ratiollal, loftier forms, preserves everything and tosters a 
tendency toward plenitude J by virtue ot such simplicity, authorit.y is tully 
true to its usence and &ssociates itaelt with autonomy in entirely normal 
fashion • .,35 
st. Thomas also holds that the better government rules in such a way as 
to advance the perfection of its subjects. Simon quoties from the article of 
the SUmma '1'beologica dealing with the question of whether all things are 
immediately governed by God. * 
But since things which are governed should be brought to per-
fection by gOTel"fltQent, this govem.Jllent will be so much the better 
in the degree that the things gcwemed are brought to pertection. 
Now it is a greater perfection tf.'lr a thing to be good. in itself 
and also the cause of goodness in others, than to be only good in 
i tsell. Therefore God so gOVerns things that He makes some at 
them to be causes of others in government J 8S in the case of a 
teacher, mo not only impar'ts knowledge to his p~i18. but also 
makes some of them to be the teachers of others • .30 
In conclusion, it would seem i::bat the theOl'f at Simon can really be SUJmned 
up in the t'NO principles. enunciated in his Marquette lecture, provided that 
the prlncip1e of authority be revised to include the essential functions 
developed 1a ter. In Philos2P& !! Democratic Government Simon comes V817 
close to stating these principles at one point, ..men he says that "autonom;y 
3SIbid., p. 131. For a concrete ilaage of social happiness founded on 
author1~autonomy, and hierarchy, of. the selection from Jefferson's writ-
ings quoted by Sil1lOl'l in Natu:re !!!! ... Ftmct ____i_ons __ , p. 48. 
36S•'1'., I, 103, 6, cpoted in Democratic Government, p. 131, from Pegis, 
I, 958.--
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renders authority necessary aOO authority renders autonOl'q possible. ,,,37 This 
is perhaps the most concise yet comprehensive statement of his theory which 
could be made • 
.37peooratio Government, p. 71. 
CHAPrBR VI 
A CRITIC.A.L EVALUATION OF Sn'fON'S THEORY OF AUTHORITY 
Professor Simon's theory of the nature and functions of authority is, 
without doubt, an excellent contribution to political philosoph;y. Its 
timeliness in an age when authority, libert7 and progress are so misunder-
stood and misused , its solid grounding in the perennial philosophy of moder 
realia, ita deep insights into the probl.. of autonomy, contingenC)", and 
, 
the one am tt. lII8.D1', as they affect man in a world of material. progl"ess-
of these are marks of value. The writer i8 convinced, morecwer, that Simon' 
theo1'7 is fundamentally sound, that it COITesporxls with the is of ex:Latential 
-
tact and the opjht of ethical. finality, because it is derived from true 
metaphysical. principles. And because it 18 sound, it has relewance todayJ 
this application of scholastic principles to the modern context 18 Simon' 8 
significant contribution. 
Theories, however, are never perfect. There i8 always rOCll for deeper 
probing into problems, improved statuant of. conc1uions, and further inclu-
sion or related questions within a stead1J.y widening ambit of investigation. 
Simon's theory is not tru17 complete in 8'1Y of these senses. revision and 
extelI8ion, and in both, aPErofcmdisae:rreut-tbese are what he himself 18 
engaged in at the present time. Consequently, it is in a spirt:' of construc-
tiTe criticism as well u prai,.. for a s1gn1fieant contribution that .. 
cri. tiesl eval nation of Simon r s wrk on the nature and !unctions of authority 
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18 preaented. here. 
Beside the tact that Protessor Simon is still conducting his investiga-
tion, there is another consideration to be kept in mimI. This tact is the 
manner in which be himself has chosen t.o conduct. it, especiall,. in his more 
recent book, Pbilosopl'g !!!. Democratic Government. ,,'11ereas his Marquette 
Lecture of 1940 is a philosophical work in the scholastic trad1 tioo, a first 
step toward an integrated theory of authorJ. ty and liberty, this latter book 
is out in a d1tterent molcl. In it, the nature of authority (as an object of 
investigation) is subOl'rlinated to ita role in a political pbilosopq of 
democrac:r. This book mq be called a "se~" wO!'k in a double s8Me I aa 
intended more for readers ou.taide the tradit.ion of ~am., and as written 
more from t11e empirical riewpoiDt of the social. scientist. than the speou1a-
tin approach of t._. _tapb7B1cian. Here Simon does not elaborate upon the 
nature of. authority as ncb, he does not go more deepl,- into its usenee. 
'1b18 was not his purpose. OOlllMqu.ently, to expect such an elaborated 
development of hi. earlier analyaie would be unfair to hill. True, be does 
revise, extend J am d8'Yelop hie theolJ' of the fuaotions J but the whole pres. 
tation 1s geare4 te practical end.e-so much so that his earlier prcwisional 
definition, his comments upon the relation of authority and law, and hi. twi 
principles of author! t)' and liberty do not reappear. This shift from the 
8P8cu1ative to the practical, a8 it were, must be kept in mind u hav.f.na 
influenced the whole course of Simon's investigation. 
"'!hat can and should. be done, therefore, in a critical evaluation, is to 
examine Simon's -.,rk f·Qr truth, clarity, and consistency u it stands, point-
ing out the difficulties it mar be expected to encounter, and suggest.ina 
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possible revisions and extie1'l8ions ef the theory to related areas of investi-
gation. 
First ot all, it should be noted that Simon t 8 two boolal receiTed tavora 
ble comments in almost all the periodicals in lI'hich they were rev1fMJd.l 
lrhe tollowing reviews and short notices ot The Nntul'8 and Functions of 
Author1~ were read! K~ D. Denne, Journal at Phi!iiopli, iXfftlf (J'anuar,y-
11>, 1S14~r '. 54. J David DalJ1l'llpl.e, CommODlleA"I:, "'f1ftff (Uoiember _~, 1940), 85 J 
Jacques Marlta1n, Re"r1e'W ot Po11Rcs:S4 ttl (April 1941), 25O-~J F. de Viana, 
La C1encia TomJ.sta, at (~" Ji~- lJ anon. rev. Cathol1o ;Jorld, CLIII 
'(I'pH! r,tiJ.:), 19. anon. reT. DiYU ~'ham.'ls, mIl (1m" 5l3-5XliJ aaon. reT. 
'l'be ThomistJd.. III (.1 atllW7 19h!), 1'13'. ' Unavailable to the writer was the 
renew in clctrial'f, m (Deoember 1940), 716-n 1. . 
Rev1ewe 8ii3 alcea read of Phil08~ of Democratic Ooverraent: RudOlf' 
Allers, Books on Trial, I (Ootobe:r l~T6j"'lt. ~!.!;u:;;t it RihOSO-~ xtlX Qltli17":t'1, 1952), 16-48. John H. Hallowell, ncan POIf 
!Crenae ltm.ew, XLIV (June 19S2). ,52-55,. FerditWld. A. lfirmena, '1!Cnswor 
Pm9:ea !!'V. (October 19S2) 5S6-5S8, Louis Januene~ Rene ~~e 
ere ~. LI (19S3). 6S3-6S4, J. w. II......" 0-_&1., LV tee:.: Z; §.. 
D51), M~J Arthur E. Murphy, Pbi1g h1oa1 Redew, W (April 1952), 19 211, Kurt 'Yon Schuchn1gg, SoCIa! & n (J'anU817 1952), 29-36. Kurt "lOll 
Sch'w!lclm1gg, Modern Scboolmiii, lli ( 1953), 242-2h4J Leo Stra:wJs, New 
~ !!f! (JU!i 1~2), 319-383" .. U.navdlable were tbe rev:tews'"'li' J. 
, ose&h;[ and PbeJlO1'fte!loloecal Research, ill (1951 .. 52), 456-457, and 
by PI! niiIe17,· -!1~!era, n (~pteifber 1~, 19;1), 106-101. 
These rev:l$W8 aiii notice. were generally ve~ fayorable, 'With the 
exception ot R1! Cumming'. reriew of Democratic Go'Ye:l"!1Mnt., wr.ich was critical 
ot attempt,8 to apply principles of st. tiiomas to aeMar probl8DIS of modem 
gcwemnant,.. Leo strauss, :reviewing the sane book, raised .&Yew criticisms, 
but said, "Particularly valuable i8 what he sqs about the tnnct.iona of 
authorlty ...... " (p. '79). Arthur t1urpb;yt a artiole concemed what he 
called an ambiguity in Simon's treatment of obligation to obe7, but was 
generally tavorable. (Ct. E). F. Hersens also praised the book, smng 
what criticisms be had tor . as social scientist rather than as a 
philosopher. Concerning Maritaints important critique ot Nature. and 
Functiona, I. !,!Rra, pp. 42-43. -
!!:!. Nature !!2. Functions ~ Authorl'!1: received high praise from Jacques 
MaritailU "Here we have a perfe~ clear and valid demonstration which showe 
both the veq nature and the nece88ity of the essential function of authorit7 
in every political aolll'm1l11ty_,,2 Tribute i8 paid to Pbi1OSOJ?bf ~Democratle 
Goverrml8Dt. by John H. Hs11c:well of Duke UniTersit7 in th.se words: 
Thia is an important oo:r.ttribution to the eurrent 11 terature 
011 democracy • • •• It is epeculative political theory in the 
beat sensa of the lIfOl'd. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Ii; is :impceJ81b18 to do justice to the suJ:rtlety and detail at 
Profea8or Simon's argument within the limitations ot a review. 
H. re1'era to tbt central problem of authOrity throughout hi. book, 
and it is this concern which gives unity to !rl.a mal,-si ••••• 
The wealeness ot the book 11e. in the use of terminology whioh 
SOIfeti..'IlleS obscures rsther than ela.rifies the author's meaning • • • 
• Despite theae oocuional. ")"l1nio obnaole. to clarity, the 
book deeerYes a careful reading by all students of goverrment.3 
Since, therefore, most of the :reviewa and notices eDIllineci have raised. 
no serious Objections to the philosophical theory of authority presented b.Y 
Simon, and none has suggested a possible point of departure for a critical 
evaluation, the present writer will otter SCi118 ideas of hiB 0Wl'1 by way of 
critique. One other Bouree will also be 'USed, however. In a doctoral disser-
tation, James R. Fl.ynn of the University of Chicago has criticised Simon 
seTere1y concerning his theOl'7 of the "VOlition of the camnon good!~ Flyrmta 
arguments will be presented and diBcusSed later, since they can oontribute to a 
2t.taritain, p. 2$1. 
-'Hallowell, 552, 554-555. 
4J an .. Robert~, "Modern Thom.i..sm and Democraq," Unpublished. 
Doctoral Duaertation (University of Chicago, Chicago, 1958). 
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deeper understanding of that theory. 
It seems to the writer that Simon I s theory is vulnerable to the charge 
of lack or clarity in the use of certain terma. r~cb of Simon's terminology is 
original, and consequently a real contribution, yet he avoids explaining his net 
terms in the light of others more traditional in ethics and political science. 
Sometimes he uses traditional terru in a new wq, a1 though there are more Which 
be dCllts nat use at. all. 'l'hus he MYel" speaks of p!!cee, dominative or 
damest.1o J?!!!t1 for eXlllple, and aYoidll tor the most part the uaual categori •• 
of ethics and moral science. Thia is in atrildng contrast to hi. treqwmt use 
of the eoholaetic concepts of _tapbyai88, ep¥temology, and psy<ilology. Cer-
tainly Professor Simona8 own intellectual backgroum ia abowing ita int.l.uence 
here, and this, plus the temenoy to nl"ike out afresh in et.hical &reU .. otten 
evckea a reaction of surpr1ete and cunOlity in the read.r.S 
Not that Simon fails to attach content. to h1e terms, new and old. On 
the contrar,y, th8T are pregnant with meaning. But one teels that the focus 
fails at tine. to be sharp, that the broad st.roke, otten ot genius, haa omitted 
details which. WL7 be of COD8equarJ.Gf1. lb:act detW tion and clear-out use of 
terms are not alwqa to be found here. While it i8 true that preliminary in-
vestigation bene1'ite troll the employmen1l. of broad concepts which can be refined 
and ch1seled out later on, and the phenaDIDOlog1oal method and traditional 
scholastic insistence upon definition of t.erma can be used to exces., nevertbI .... 
1e.,. Simon is much more prone to neglect these useful _thode than to O'f'erwork 
SSee Hallm...u'8 comment just quoted on the previous page. 
them. Tbe result is that Jl'Il!17 questions remain to be answered, much work of 
integration remains to be done. Perbapa a fn exanples will help to substanti-
ate this critiai_. 
Fiat of all, regarding the nature of authorlt,.: in The Nature am 
- -
:FilnCtione 2! Authorl tz Simon speaks of authority in such a w~ that the reader 
mq very well conclude upon re1'lection that be is speaking exelusiYel,. of l:maan 
au~ortty. Yet Simon nowhere esplieitl.¥ limits the term to such a meaning. 
Thia gives r.1.8e to H'f'eral problema. Thus, when he s~ that the HJ.aw of 
--6 
nati0D8 ill abwe authority, the ciTil law is issued by it,1f he atSt mean that 
I 1 
the law of nations is above civil, not d.1"f'1ne autborl:t7--tor be aeknowledgea 
God as the author of the natural law, from which the law of natiODll 18 
derived.? Ju¥1 when he sap that authority Cae opposed to law) require. an 
~ature !!!! Functions, p. 72, n. 10. It&1i. in the original. 
1S1mon holds that the law ot 118tiO'I18 (ius tentiUll) is that bod7 of 
positive laws lthich are deduotJ.'feiL connecteclnt the natural law, a8 auoh, 
t.heJ pertain to mcral soJaioe, ra r tban to author! tr. On the other hand, 
civil law tor Simon is elaborated b7 ~al reaaoning, am thus pertai_ to 
author1t7, Which 18 ident1.t1ed with go;:;;mng Prudence (Nature and Fu.nctiona, 
p.71). -
.Aa a matter of faot, the relation of the law of nations to natural law 
is diaputecls the olcler natural law doctrine eubaUJled iU8c!nti- UDder huaan 
positive law, whel"NtJ 80D8 JIlOdern writers prefer to chUa riae it as natural 
law 1n a wider senNe st. Thoaaa etas.U1es ~ ~ under positive (human) 
law. but de~area~ etonll what is urged man by bia natu:re 
belongs to Datural law 1n itlt etri~ sena, whitt i. urged upon all people. by 
human nature u requireDants of sooial. order and utUity through the applica-
tion of reason constitutes 1., entia (S_ theol., IIa lIn, q. 57, a.2,.3).-
-J. Me •• ner, Social Et.b1cai;""trana. :3. J. Dohert.7 (st. Lout8, 1949), pp. 20.3-
2Ob, n. S2. SriiOn 18 liiItIi.f.'1Jl. to st. !homes here. But the point of the 
criticism here i8 not this, it i8 rather Simon' 8 l1mitation of authorlt7 (aa 
governing prudence) to ciTil law. which eeems to exclude the role of divine 
authority in pr-.ulgation of natural law. 
8 i.lmned1ate reterence to a personal intellect ani will. he must likewise exempt 
divine authority from thia requirement, 'because he aeeu to saT elsewhere that 
human reason can refer to divine authority onl7 :raedia'!llJ by !Deana ot the 
naturall ...... first disoonred by reason in a state of impersonality and onl,7 
later rerernd. to its personal author.9 
The same question aris_ with natural law itself, when Simon insiate 
against Rousseau, Proudhon, and the school of Saint-Simon that the infl.exible 
laws of nature would be. inadequate for the direction of aoc1eV. Authority, be 
10 
says, can never take the tOJ'm of an impersonal MONsity. This raises a 
problem. God is the author of natural law, noh, Simon seems to say, is 1m 
8lfature and Ftmctions, p. 8. II ••• yet the law can be conceived in a 
state at liJii;rsOiia.llty. Ss is the war we speak of natural law immanent in 
the im}:ersonal course at pb¥8ical events. On the eontra17, an immediate 
refenmoe to a personal intellect and a personal will 1s ~parentl7 es.ntial 
to the notion of authority." 
9Ibid., p. 51, n. 2. "Thus" the natural law exists in human nature 
betore eiGi1ng in b._an. reason. This is _,.. it is ne .... ary to ge a step 
further, ,and to acknowledge that the natural law participates in the '.ternal 
law, which is identioal with the reason of God. Should .... not make this step, 
the supreme law 'W01il.d appear to be the t which exists within nature • • • the 
implication being t~t the rational universe would be ultimatel,. dominated by 
irrational nature" (Ibid.). "In the di"lfine rauon, the nat,ural law, as an 
aepect. ot the eternaI""!iw, enJoy. a state of personality, in nature, a state ot 
~rsonalitYJ finall,." in the human reason, it enjoy. again a state of person.-
ality· (Ibid., p. 52, n. 2). Simon .. ems to be describing a psychological 
prooess:""""'iYn aiscoyers the law and then reasons to its diTine authorship •. 
This process can hardl;y be called an immea1aG r.reNiiCe to a personal 
intellect and will, if S1m.on is using the term in the scholastic sense at 
Ifatta.iald without a reaeol'J1ng ~_ fJ <=0 ~ • If he is using it in SC11t8 
other sense, tl'2n the criticiam. depends he sense intended. But the poin'h 
cO!'lC8ming the law t:4 nations as ftabcml authorit,." still holds, and thus tends 
to reinforce the above interpretation of immediate. 
10:rb1d., p. 7, and pp. 49-50. De 1. Simon is here attae1d.ng Rousseau's 
statenBnt"tbat the child must be taught to 008)' thipgs rather than men, thua 
elim1nating .!&. referenee to a person. 
\ 
first in an impersonal state, i.e., it prcrldes no 1mm.ecllate reference to a 
personal intellect and will. "'hen man obeys 1me natural law, therefore, doee 
he ooe)" divine authority? It seems to the writer that Simon 18 oonceiving 
divine authority as 80l78thinl outlide his definition, as an "authority" not 
-
requiring this immediate ref'erenae~ For him, to obe)t authority 18 nothing else 
than to obe7 a person 1mmedia~ whereas obedience to nature, even 1n the 
Rousaeauvian .. nae, would somehow be a mediate obedience to authority (in this 
case to dlT.tne authoriv)-whiob Sim«'1 will not admit. lfaman authority 18 the 
only kind which fIts h1sdetIn1t1on, because only there does one find the 
requinld imm.ediaq. (It must be _ntiODeCl tba" God could g«ern the world 
through reYelatlon alone, in whioh can divine authorlt,' 'Would ful1'111 Simon's 
definition, provided the reference to God's intellect and. will were immediate 
enough. Bu:t this 1s not the philoeopbical problem considered here.) 
The questiOM an.. naturally, the :reader is surprised that God t S 
author.l V does nn sat1si7 the definition. ....!hat is divine authorlt7? Is the 
promulgation of the natural law thn>ugh Datural revelation in al\Y sense an 
exercise of authon ty' Siace Simon identiti.. author! ty vi th govemiErg 
prudence, oertainlT a virtue posse.sed by God to an eminent degree. il not 
divirs providence therefore the exercise of auth~r1ty par excellenee,ll 
The answers to these queetiol'lS. it deduced from prami"8 proT.l.ded else-
where by Simon, all seem to be in the affirmative. It is hardly conceivable 
that Simon would deny real authori. to God. Thus, in his later work, he 
llst. Thomas holds that pru<1ence is a divine perfection. See S.T., I, 
--22, 1. 
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raters to God's govermoemt; of the world, as explained by St. Thomas in a disCWI' 
12 
slan o£ unity ln the ruler; he indicates that God w111s the common good of 
the universe materially, and even accepte Thomas's comparison of God's Tdll 
with the judge's decision to coo:lam the thief' (in the argument; for the Mat 
essential function) J 13 and he ci tee God' s rule as a model of that non-destruo-
tive .implicity by which authorit,. preserve. autonomy through the use or 
14 
secondary causes. 
Is 1t possible to reconffi1e Simon's implicit attribution of author1t)" to 
God with h1a earller obserYstiona on aut.horiV' 8 1mmed1ate referenoe to a 
person and the law of nations as abfJ'1'8 author.!..' It aeema s1gnificwrt that 
statellB uta from two d:1f'ferent works eleven 788rs apart are bere seemi.ngl;r 
oppes-ad, am the writer believe. that the reconciliation would not be ditficniltj 
it Simon would JIlOdi.ty his distinction between authority and law .. the distinc-
tion whioh lies at the root of the ablgu1t,.. Thi. distinction sees authortV 
as ftrealiz1rw more complete17 the ideal not1on of social prudence when it deals 
with particular and concrete ci1"OU1Utancu (decrees of the a:ecut!'" power) 
than lile it deal. with more general and lasting aituations (oinl 1_> • .,l5 
~ did Simon introduce this distinction? The writer bel1eTe8 that Simon 
12PhUosop!q' 2! DeMocratic Gcmtl'tlB18nt, p. 35, n. 18. 
lJIbid •• p. 40 .. n. 20. 
-
14Ibid •• p. 131, n. 24. 
-
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preferred to emphasise the notion of social prudence in authority and oppose 
authority to law in their most forma.1 senae "just as the concrete and contingen1 
16 
aspects of the real ar. opposed to tmiversal necessities,·' because his whole 
theory in !l!!. Nature ~ Functions 2! Authorltl is built on an epistemological 
bans. In this lrork, Simon has authority arise from the incommunicability of 
the prudential judgment, which is incommutdcable becauae it deals with contin-
gent realities. In his theo17.. the exercise of authority E!! excellence is to 
make a prudential, practical judgment when faced. 'With contingent circumstances. 
Be considers au then ty opposed to law just as the prudential judgment 18 
opposed to science I aa inconmnmicable. al1thon. ty and the prudential judgment 
necessanl,. require _ immediate reterence to a person, whereas law and 
science, as demonstrable, can be known by the independent operation of reason, 
i.e., 14 tbout an immediate reference to a personal intellect aDd will. The 
immediaq of the reference is required because of the iD.cCBlUni.cabillty of the 
judgme:n.t, am this latter follows upon aontingenq. Thus the basic dichot01'll\f i. 
between necessity am com:.ingenq. 
This analysis is what the writer understands Simon to be s4\V'ing about the 
notions of authority and law in tbeir formal sense. Eut such It tbeor,y really 
exe1ud .. aIV'divine authority, since for God (epistemologically speald.ng) there 
are no contingencies J God knows the future perfectly-and He deals with both 
16 Ibid., p. 70, n. 10. Simon must be referring to necessities in the 
present orair, not metaphysical neoesaiti... In addition, human law il 
invariably contingent. More clarity i8 needed here. 
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particular and lasting situations with the ssme author! ty. The theol'3" of 
. 
Simon, a8 the writer understands it, seems to introduce an alteration in the 
notion of prudence, making ita eDrc1se depend so much on the confrontation of 
contingent situations that it cannot be a divine perfection. So much tor the 
theory of law am authority in !!!! Nature !!!! Fanctions 2! Authority. 
A change is noticeable in Philos0p& 2! Democratie Government, however. 
Simon seems to have extended his concept of prudence. With the introduation ot 
the argument for the most essential function, the volition of the eOlllmon goccl, . 
he has turned to that other aspect of prudence, the ordering of things to their 
end, which st. Thomas uses to show that God hal prudence, against the objection 
that God does not need prudence because He baa DO doubta, i.e., fa •• no 
11 conti~ent situatiolUf. Simon's -301" argument for authoriiiy in thiS later 
work no longer rest. on incommunicabil1 t,.. alone, but upon: the need tor tbe 
volition of the common goOO. And 1n this theory he has included in hi. notion 
of prudence, implicitl7. a tunotion lhich God certainl7 tultUls, namel7 the 
prudential direction of the universe to 1ts end, \hiGh is called providence. 
And so he is now saying, 1mpl101 t17, that autho:r1 ty is ex.erued by Qed Ear 
excellenoe. 
thue the dl.fference between the two books. It would. SHIt that the 
earlier statements oonceming authority as oppoaed to law and its :requiring an 
11,e.!., I, 22, 1. st. Thomas discusses the question ... 'hether prOvidence, 
part of prUdence, is exerc:tsed by God. There is a parallel between the first 
objection am the position ltilich Simon seems to take concerning prudence in GGCl 
in his earlier book. st. Thomas pl'C'1V88 that prandence is part of prudence in 
S.T., II-II, 49, 6. 
--
100 
immediate reference to a personal intellect and will should be revised. The 
immediate reference should be dropped, and the distinction between law and 
authority should be revised so that authority can be said to deal with lasting 
situation&, even in the ideal order. 
To the writer, a better way to express the relation of In to authori't1' 
would be the following: law is the instrument, the tool, of authority) 
Eternal Law is tbe instrument by which the Personal Authority, God, orders the 
universe) natural law is the instrument by which He governs its free, rational 
creatures 1d. th respect to tbe Eternal. Law. Nature i tseU baa no authority (as 
against ROUBseau) J only the connection of natUre with authorit7 (the attribute 
of a penron) can place obligation. But this connection doe, not have to be an 
inmediate reference to a personal intellect and will, it can be mediante !!I!.. 
Ftrrthermore, there 18 no reaaon for seeing any difference between the authority 
that COIIII1aJlCla a precept or particular decree, and the authority that Cc.'ImIl&MS a 
1m,. the one orden tor a concrete and speoific cue, the other for tba 
generality ot cases. 
The existence of this prdllem means that Simon has not yet worked out a 
theory of authority lbich explicitly includes that of God, something similar to 
his elaboration of the supremaq of the eternal law (diyine reason) as the 
primary analogate S!oad .!!. of all law" 'While the civil law is the primary 
analogat.e S!oacl !!!! ~ 18 He 8 __ to recognize the parallel implicl tly in hie 
later work, but does not bring it out clearly, due to the les8 specm.latiTe 
l~ature .!!lE. .... Fun ......... o .... ti .... o .... nB .... , p. $2, n .. 2. 
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nature of that part; of his theoxy_ SUch a devel~nt 'WOuld fit very vell with 
his later use of the t:r8mmd.ssion theory, which holds that all authority comes 
from God. For God cannot transmit what He does not possess, or, more correctly. 
man cannot participate in governing prudence if God does not. possess it. And th 
governing prudence so evident in the task of speoification of natural law vrl. U 
then be SMn to be a participation in the providence of God. This tuk of 
integration is, then, one which Simon might take up in future investigations. 
It is also OM which will help to bridge the gap between the two separate but 
related questlons of the necessity of authority in general and the deteminetio! 
of the person who should .. rei .. authorl ty itl a particular cue. 
Fu.rther wolk ot precision also remains to be done in the area of obliga-
tion, an area in which Simon is somewhat 1M.finite. To date he hu been 
content merely to indicate that an obligation to obey authority exists. He s&J1l 
that the commands of authority ant etto be taken as a rule of conduct, n and. 
consisterrtly speaks in a manner which .. SUJIl88 that authority demands a correla-
19 
tift Qbed1e'l1oe. Indeed, since he holds that men are obliged to attain their 
end, and that author.L ty is essential in the process, he must hold that authoritJ 
obligea. The vhole tenor of Simon's thought is quite clesr on this point. But 
it 1s not so clear on how this obligation is to be COnceiYed in dU'f'erent cases. 
Political autboriV, ~qs Simon, obliges to the axtent that laws issued ~ 
it bind in. coucienee. Thus he speaks ot the oQlmOn oonYietion of nen that laWl 
must be obeyed, and prooeeds to resolve the ptlradox of legal obligation (how O!14! 
man can biDl the conscience of another) by showing that it is really God 'Who 
19:rbid., p. 7 and pp. 11-12. 
-
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binds men in conscience t.o obey other men, by means of the natural la.w.20 He 
does not distinguish bet_en civil law properly 80 called and statutes, ordi-
nances, and acree., except to say, u has been noted, that authority realizea 
1ts 1deal notion of goveming prudence in decrees of the executive power. ene 
has the feeling that the focus ia not sharp here, that all these species of 
commands are being treated !!! glebe without any attention being paid to possi-
ble d1atinctions between them. Simon has nothing to say about the 1'81a\1 .... 
biming force of each, thus alao aY01d.ing the problem of wh.ther there exists or 
can exist a purely penal law. In ahart, those who are looking tor a theol'7 of 
political ob11gation in Sint.on will be disappointed, 8ince he simply dees not 
treat the question. 
The b1nding force ot parental commands is alao passed over, although it 
.... eate to 888'U118 that Simon holds theae \0 bind in cOMcience. A d1f'ticult1 
arise., hOW"8Ver, when he goee be:y0Dd the state and the family I using examples 
of voluntBl7' ... ociatiolUl in hie arg\lJ'l8nts for the neoess1'by of authortt1'. 
These SOCieties, neither pertect nor natural (in the technical 8ense), dUfer 
.from state and tam117 in tha.t they can be quit at wUl. Simon thus cite. the 
football team Ed the crew of lIOrkera u examples of societies having a common 
21 
good as their object. True, he is not in this con'teJtt talld.ng about the 
exercise of authority d.1reotly, but is rather attempting to prove by means ot 
t188e examples that oivil 8ocie"Y baa a genuine common good as its objeC't. Yet 
2Onemocrat1c Government, pp. l44-154. 
21 Ibid., p. 64. 
-
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be seems to have them in mind as associations in which authority is exercised , 
thus extending such eDrcise to the broadest possible dimensions. 
Furthermore, SimOn also speaks of the adminiatrationof a school in 
connection with the problem of the volition of the common good, indicating here 
a situation analogous to that of the gaverrmant of political society.22 On. 
might. ask whether in his theory the analoQ may be carried to the point where 
the heads of such volUlltu,- associations exercise true authority and whethel' 
their COMmands consequently bind in conscience or entail some other kind at 
obligation. 'W'hat about the binding force of compa1l7 regulations in 1oou8t1'1 .. 
of the rules of religious orders, of the bylaws of a club, to cite on17 a ,_ 
examples' A11d what of the kind ot authority which thrusts a vigerous, talented 
person 'Without an)" title to authol"lty i~o the leadership of a group which 
neeU direction and implicitly recognizee hi. ability to lead? It should be 
said, in fairness to Simon, that these are ql'llI.tioftS related to that seeolld. 
and distinct question re,ard.iDg authority, one which he professedly did not 
atteDpt to treat in full, namely the problem of who sball rule-a question 
distinct t'raa that of whether authority is necessary at all. But a complete 
theory will have to take them up eventuall)r, and their solution m. cut light 
on the primar,y question atI ...ell. 
Simonts theol)' emphasizes the need tor authority as a means to tbs attun. ~ 
_nt of _ end, a good ...... either individual or common. The failure to obq 
author! ty, in hi. system, ie not 80 ncb an evil because of the moral taul t ot 
disobedience, but because without effective author! ty the very function in 
22Ibid., p. 47. 
-
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question is frustrated: the child i8 nat; educated, the camnon life of the 
fa.m1l.y breaks down, the common good of the society is not aChieved. This 
orientation is the logical result ot his llBtaP~8ioal, rather than legal and 
moral approach to the probleDl. Just as he is not concerned. with the question 
of who shell rule (by any particular title to authority), but rather with the 
question at the basic need tor authority, so he is not concerned 'With the 
obligation to obey this or that authority" (and the degree ot obligation in-
volved), but rather with the fundamental reasons my authority in general 
should be o~. 
In this area at obligation, a certain amount of vagueness has its advan-
tages, particularly \!hen it is not the main issue. The question of the nat1U'8 
of law as primarily a product of reuon or of will, end the consequent problem 
of whether tmre ex1sta a purely penal law, contain difficulties which Simon 
did wll to a"f'0:1d.. 23 H1a task being to ~ust1fy authOrity in general, there was 
no need to enter into peripheral controversies. For the sane reason, he could 
avoid deliJdting sharply the dittenmcu between the exercise of authority in 
the state and in other societies, ani the consequent species of obligation. 
Nevertheless, he did begin a sketch of the nature and. funct1Ol'18 of 
authority 'Which calls for ultimate completion and retinement as to deWl, and 
such a project must eventuall,. reach out from the field of metaphysics into 
that of all the soci.u sciences where the hitherto uae.tul indeterminacy can be 
r8so1Ted. Actually, the tuk Will be more one of integration than of a new 
2lThe llterature on these questions is enormous. See ThOlnas E. Davitt, 
S.J ., The Nature of Law (3t. louis, 1951). 
- --
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1nlreatigation, tor ethical theolY baa long been operating Oft 'What Simon hq 
cot'Wincingly proved-the necessity of authority tor the aohi ...... nt of goat. 
The two preoeding pointe at critic1_ have oouoemed the need tor pred, .. 
8ioo in Simon's theory of the nature or authoritT. the relation ot huJum 
authorit)' to d:1'Y1ne, indicating a possible area of investigation in the so1enoe 
of ethic •• a related \0 natural theoloo. and the obligation to CIbe7 authority, 
indicatiJJC anotmr such area in the field of legal cd aoral stdence. 'hue 
point. ant not, however, of ~nmount interest or importance 1n Simon'. 't.beol7J 
they are peri.pharal, euageet1ng fUture extensions or the tbeOr1. !here NIII&1ft 
eome tundanetal point. of cr1tlc1s1t regarding the 1'unotiona, bonwr, whioh 
reaob to t. wry beart. Qf the theo17'. fhe first oenceme the prec1ae -anini 
of UlO terIu Which are 1nterTelated.. da.fJ1cie!!!Z; and ~bst1t_loul. Tbe taek 
will be to detera1ne lIb.ther S1mon's Wle of these teme 111 8ut1'101eatl.7 olear 
and exact, and llhether he baa drawn from them sll of the conclusione wtlich 
att", hi. theOl7 to a s1gn1.t1cant degree. 
"''l'Nn Simon speake of the authort ty r4 God and tne Church u .. at1 tutirC 
tor the nidence of the diY.l.ne trut,h which w111 beati1)' our inte1lecta in the 
beat1t1o v1a1on, be 18 clear17 speaking of a dat1c1ener in the 1anporal. super-
natural. order alone. a.. The "t'1sion OIUmat be called satething due to hvIum 
-
nature, henee the laek or it 18 Dot & privation 1n the Mturel order. heao1Dd· 
1ng tn. the oontrovertecl qttelltion of a natural appetite for the beat1t14 viaiOl" 
it can be Hid that taith 1a eubetitutional here below in the !,t1i!matural ....... ~ 
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when 1t 1a a quest10n of strict .ter1ea, i.e., trut.ha absolutely impervious 
to human l'688Ol'1. In the natural (end thus the poll tical) order, such authorl tt 
i8 str1otl.,. e.sential. rus 18 the one cue in wh1ch authority in the order 01 
theoreUca1 truth 18 not subst1tutional. 
The authoritj c4 God and t.he Church can be aubatitut1cmal, however, in tl: It 
net.ural arde:r-t.o the extent that it supplies tor the defic1eDC7 which reuOD 
aperience. in the knowledge of natural t.rutba not impemoue to r_011, bu\ 
which are d1U1cult to 1eam without din. nmtlation. And it iIJ Mn that 
this authoJ'1ty 1. truly ped.agog1call the Church foners and guidea tblt dwelO}l ~ 
ment of philOflOJ1bT for the better underetenr:11Ag of theM trutha. Sblon doea ftC tt 
nmtioft this aspect of the Churob's authorit7 tor it is not:. v.i.tal to h1a proof. 
b1l\ it doea point out a limitation upon that indateotib1e propua of ~ 
poe1ted by tbe det101encJ 1Ib8or'T. !beology etep8 int.o the pictu.:re to point out 
the _ral naeeaa1t7 of revelation it men aft to know adequatelf 8"f'8n thea. 
natural religious and 1IlOl"a1 tru1;be wh1eh the7 .. t know to aohi.,. the1r final 
end. The autbcrlt7 of God and \he Chureh is thus pel\l1l\!l8ntl7 8Ubat.itut,icmal it 
this ill., GftD in the ftIltural oMer atl! desp1te the future prCrgJ'UII of m-ft1n l'll! 
The __ need tor nbst1t\$ional authol"1iiy due to def10itmeia w.Ul alao 
:raa1ll 1ft tbe other oategor1ea of theoretical tl'ltth, aocording to S:l.moD. rhua 
be 8&)'8 ~ tbare vill al~ be cbUcll"8D to educate, and it will alWllJ'S 'be 
~ for .,. de futo to .....,. tba authority of experte in other fielda, 
due t,e the sheer iJIIpQJsib11i V of JIlutering fmn')'th11'11 t.here 111 to know.2S 
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The 8MODd clause of this statement of Simon has 1apo:rtant Connquenou once it 
is relat.ecl to the concept or progn.8 t a concept important to hill theory o£ 
de1'1e1encd.ea. But SiDOn does not make the illation, perilape because of the 
1.nfluence ot h1a adYeraari.. 1'be writer analyHa the situat:l.on in the follow-
ing manner. Simon oppose. Proudhon's a1'gl.lllente for anarehi$m by examining the 
posllible eftHta of prograu almost ualueive17 in the practical order. AD-
udl18Ja auppoeee t.be e11mination or all iDtel1eotual deticlenctea and hence all 
lIutbor1ty _eng ad.ult. tl'lJ"ough progreu of 1moT4edge, 1t eeek8 sal:va'tion in tlw 
theont.1eal order, neglecting the pn.ctical al1'lloet entirel7. It overlooks the 
tact th...~ contingency will atill render authoritJ neoeaaary in the making of 
practical ~udpent.. Simon naturel17 attaeka Proudhon here, at 1'..18 weakeat 
point' the practical OM.... And he doe. 80 brilliantl.T. But 1t would alao 
haft bMl'l pose:1ble to do battle 011 the ...,'e own grouJda, the theoretical 
onIer. 
Simon d:l.d not elMt to co this. In reacting againat Prrouclhon's concept 
of a .oe1et7 ruled eoleq by the objeett .. laws of 800141 behm.or .. 1moMn bJ 
all adult c1tiaene, Simon ..... to brmt iapl1c1tl7 .accepted. P:rowlbon's 
uaUlllpt.1on that ifttellec\ual. prog:rus _ana tbe decreue of c.ief101enc1ea 1n the 
theoretical order, unt.U acme irradicable 1Il1nhwm is reached. At fint eight, 
th1a .... a reasonable uaumptiOlu a. knowledge in each individua1irlereaMa, 
the commoa tad. 01.' knoWledge alao illC2"euee, and therefore the lntelleotual 
datic1eno1es of men will deere.... But the conclusion of the assumption provo 
to be tal .. upon a more thoro'oah imreet1lat1on ot the concept of detic1etlCT u 
:l"8l4ted to p:rogrue in the theoretical order. 
The point which Simon rd,ght have made 18 that as the ~ fund of 
108 
knowledge increases, the defic1enciu in each indiv1dual will also increase, du 
to ha own de taoto but 1neacapable lack of ability to comprehend the ..... 1"1-
.... 11 •• 
inereuing 'Whole. As technology inoreaae8 and the education necun.rr to umet"o 
stand ao1ent1!ic judgmente b900ma greater, the number of !!!. .fa.,.oW ... · .. ~ca­
ble j~ aleo increases. It b.C01 •• 1ncreas1nc17 ditfioult. 8'NIl 1mpoui-
ble, to educate eYe170JW in every field, wen in those f1elde which pertain 
direotly to tbe phen<:I'IIfmA of social bebaY1w. Onl.y a few speo1a1iats b.aft t.he 
ev1denoe tor soUmtitic judgmenw in their respective branches of kncMledpJ al ~ 
others are det101erlt in th1a categOl7. Thu with progress !!!..facto,;;;,,;;;,,;;;.;;;. detic1tm-
cd.aII, Nlatt'f'8 to the quantit,. of matte to b. lmoIm, actua1l7 immtue in 
ind1vtduala. It 18, of course, true tbat tbe.7 deere_ in aoc1ev taktm •• a 
'Whole, bltth1s argues in favor ot s081.1 a.1oft to ezploit truth, .. againn 
the aDal"GbUt dream of int.lleotualq CllJld.CClI1Q)etent ind1viduale. 
Such an -al7sie of the etteota of increased knowledge .... reasonable :1J 
the light of present .wente. Certa1nl7 modem science 18 developing toter thai 
the capacity of any single h1maD intellect to compraherd it.. Micbael PolarJ7i 
states, "!'he Ol"gm1ution cC the .~ent,1tio process 18 detem1nad, in tt. t1.rst 
plaoe, b7 the tact that lItXlem ac1enoe 1e so van that any single person ce 
properly UDdenrt.and. cml1 • ..:1.1 Motion of it • • •• It 18 a ~ aatheIIIati-
o1.aD-w. are told-who .t'ull7 unde1"Standa mON than halt .. clOUD out of t'1ft7 
papel'8 preaented. to a mathematical congreaa •• 26 Tbe universal an of the 
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Rena1.eflN!mCe is no longer possible. !Ten t..'1th increased le1nre tor education, 
it doea not. .eem that the gap 1411 eYer be bridged, although th&xe 1'81JIine • 
theol"8\1cal pouibU1ty that knot4edge might stop 1ncreaa1ng longenougb tor 
edu_tion to catch up-obU't this 1a contra,.,. to p1"Og1'88S •• known in the world 
of 'bor:iq, .ui even posits an ... ntial change in h'uman natUl"fh It rema1ne in-
conceivable that in the oOll'lplex society of the tuture e<.'JJI\e point might be 
reaebed at which all adult. would know enc• to make ..,.n pu.relr speculat1 .... 
authority auper.t'luou. 
fhu the buio aaaumption of anarchism i. shown to be false beOause it 
doee not take into account the soe1al nature ¥It: kncwleclge, because it oontuse. 
d i.Dereue of knowledge in aoeiety .. a whole ,11th the removal of deficiencies 
in the indiVidual. IrJdeed, tbe buio oontwdon .... to be in t.be oeaoept of 
deftcl.., ltHlt, 1'10 ciistinction be1qr made bet.ween that, of the indiv:Sdual and 
that of eoe1eiW-two de:t1c1enciM 1Ihioh do not co1no1de, and which must conti. 
to tiift • ..,. mora, due to apeotaliaUon. 
It fellow that this pawth of deficiencie. in indlYiduala vl11 lead to 
n~ere aubat1tutioD8l aut.hOr1t.7 in the order c:£ theoretical truth.. !h1a ..... 
elusion in itMlf does not. direft17 contradict ~ in Simon'" theOl'Y_ Ria 
fwlJ:iaaumtal ooeel_ion that p~ 1apl1ea the decq of nbet1t.uUOMl. au-
thori:. appli .. to t.he ardel" of Enetioal; truth, .. 18 clAal1l" frau the contA!lt\. 
HI dees not -.v that authority in theoretioal uttera vUl cteoli. with pro-
gl'$88. Aai yet be .... to apw thet it will, since be I'l8'V'8r oballenges the 
, 1 
---
no 
~Oft. and ann 'builds upon it later on, in his lQ'pothea1a of a society or 
per.teoUyenlightenaci individual •• The uaumpticm alao .... to nave intluencec 
Simon to ~aa1ze the dichotom,y 'between law and autnoJ'iV, ODe whieh for bia 
reate upon another yet more fundamental-the d1chot<:a1' between the tbeofttttcal 
tmd the practical order. In thl. vq be oould adtdt that law 8l.ona Dd.gltt 
ntn. for en1.1ghtened lndlv1dul.a in the theoretical order and dill hold 
n~ for lmIrdJld.ty in the practical, where oontingenq holde 1IJW87. Th18 i. t. palma:ry U'p!1ent of !!!! NatUl'e !!!! hnct10ns 2! AuthorJ.;t.z. Simoa 18 1;hu 
w111ing to conoede the pon1b11ity of Ii quul-ccaplete eUm.:S.na.tion of det101fm-
cie. in one O1'Cler because the other crder ia .uffio1ed to gua.ratee t.be 
l'l8C8Ul. of author1t1y. 
'l'hia implicit oonceeaion of the anarobiat ... UIllpt1on of intenenual. p .... -
:reae sbOWS 1tMlt in tbe way in which SiMon ..... the \em ¥ioia!!l in the 
tbeoret1cal order. On the one had. 8'QOb a clet101ftOJ i8 for hila tfIff1 de ta. 
-
inab111~ to undel"8ta!d the demonstration of a scientifio judgment, tor nob 
j'tl1gmente are a..1!!!. OOIIIWUdca'ble wi tbout l1rdta.26 t'h1. lI'IQ8t mean, therefore, 
tbat a puwoa .. \le det101ent in a certain t1ald of knowledge Emm though he 
appa~ h. no obligation to aster tlut.\ field. net1~ here .... to 
bne no .weal oormo'taUoJUJ J 1\ ia simply an intellectual lack of perfeotion 
(oUlpa'ble 01' not) ar1aing from the tact that the theol'e'tlca1 j11Ciglllmt 1. not 
pertect u.n1ese the intellect 18 tb.oroug~ determined b)t ita objeft. Its objllc1 
is, of oour .. , 8Yiden __ far whiCh authority 18 only a 8ubetitute in the 
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apeculative CIrCler. 
On the other hand, significantly, Simon does net seem total17 satiatieci 
w:1th tfd.a ~ _~ioal natue of theoretical det1c1enciee. The V8l"1 wore 
augguts abnormality. Thue he emphasises ~ jure communicability. and po1'Jl't. 
out that in science, "lack of unan1m1ty al~. has the character ot an •• c1dent~ 
BDd tJ.lere 18 ecmething ecandalou about it • • • ._29 He,,8 that the Nla-
tift i.nearaun1cab1l1\y ot some tully demODBtrated philosophio propositicna 18 
purely tactual, it is ~ accident" that; 0liI.7 a tew people can umerstand. the 
terma or tmd follow the demonetraticm.'O It 'Would ... tb&t be oonsiders de 
-
t ... tbllont1cel dAttio1lmtd.ee ao.mewhat abno1'bBl--aaaeth1ng to be ~ !?l 
progreea, net ita logical result. , 
~ leav .. the reader i_Ill a c1Ue!rna. It these intellMbual. detioien-
aie:a ant true det1c1eno1ea, ttan progz ... abould el1m1rllte them. But lIlOdern 
progren aO'tual.l7 ttn_ to increase them. Therefore the7 are not true c!et1c1en-, 
'the solution d...med. .... to be as tollows, in the w1ter'. opinion: 
p~ of la10KLedge dcea eliminate theo.retical. c1eficienctu. bit by bit, and. 
yet. it .... te. more IJIJV ones than 1t ~.. BecaUS8 of the natwe of Jl'IlU1's 
intellect, wherebr the proper objeot of hie intellect ill t. ~1ddiU, .!!.!!. 
.... 1b1l1,31 1t 1. 1mpoea1ble tor h1a in th18 lUe to oomprebard tbe 89'1denee 
I f 
29n.oorat1o Govenaent. p. 20. 
JOn,id., p. 21. 
-
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tor all speoulat1ve judgment.. Thent is simpl,. not eJ'1Ough t1me, tor one thi •• 
And " man must depend upon other ... , relying on their find1ne.rs in a social 
effort to muter all trutb-tlae object ot the speeulative onler. He mot accept 
tl'l!dr aubstitutional ·authority aa an intrinsic xequirement of this social 
effort. The world in which be 11v •• and hi. ow finitude PlWVent each indiv1d ... 
ual man from attaining to the knowledge of eU being, the adeqtUlte object of 
tda b'ltellMt.l2 The V81"7 way in which man knowe in this life, t.be very nature 
of his intellect as part c€ the AUlUUl co:mpoe1te, tJiua prevents him trom acb1w-
:f.Dg the seal tor which hi. intellect ",88 r:\8de. Tbis oaft be acoClllplished onl)r it 
the next 11fe, in the Tision of Oed.. This is; 1n a sense, the tem of "n+.n ... 
tusl progreee here below. 
""bat efteot does thi8 8rgtmIiJ. tor the growth or ~it.ut1onal authority 
1n the theoreticel ord8r due to protreU haYe on Sblonts theory .0£ authority in 
tbe praotica1 crder? It ahould be noted that tor hill autbor1_ in the two 
orden 18 1ft analogmas conoept,.'3 It cannot, theretore, be 1.tmned1ately _urGed 
that ~ftU 1411 bring abou1i a parallel inereue of substitut.ional lmthorit,. 
in the practical order. Neve!'theleaa, once the above mentioned pro ... baa beer:l 
eeta'bl1abed u intrinsic to intellectual progreall, it becomes necessary to re-
examine Simon's theo17 of authority in the practical order in the light of this 
new correl,.ion. It -'1 be pea.ibl. \0 detect a relation between the two omers 
and determine what efted, it 8.'l'q', an increase ot substitutional authority in 
the t.heore'Ucal order mq ba'V'e on authori.tr in the practical order. CertainJ.7 
32S.r., I, 86, 2, III, 10, 3. 
--
33Intomation from an intemew 'rltb Prot. Simon, July 11, 1959. 
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tbere ie Scm8 connection between lpeeuiative knowledge and practical. deOia1<ms, 
between ideas and action. And because Simon t s theory is hued eo largely on 
the nature ot the practical judgment, tliis question has important ramif1eatiOll8 
Fint ~ all, it sbould b. noted that Simon's theol'1 o! the prudential 
juO~nt em practical truth, wt-.ich i.ntluenou a large segment of his thought 
to II great degree, ia baaed on an interpretation at st.. Thoroas not held by all 
Tl'wlldst. tai~. Thu interpretation has been challenged, tar eD~lple, by 
Father Crowe of tbe Jesuit 8elninal)' in Toronto, lila 1s conri.nced th.et Simon'. 
sharp dietinC\ion between speculative and praotical knowledge (and thUs 'between 
the two oftklra ot truth), thCftJgh 1t may be der1'1f'84 from one sene. of text. in 
-
5't. Th01ll88 .w i.e aert.ainlJ taught b)r John ot st. Thomu, is not tru17 
consonant 'Wi ttl another equally important •• r.Le. of tats or \.1.. th the Angelio 
Docter." Oamplete teaohtng on the Dature of \be intlelleot.. Speaking of the 
practical judgment, Father Crowe 1IlIlint.a1ns that intellec$ t... intemal praous.s 
are to be aplail'lJC1 in intellectual tama, and not by recourn to will, that 
though the \hint ud proper act of prudence 1.8 tbe eraeo1p!!J. thi. 18 not a 
atap ~ ~, but a 8tep tCJwarcla action, it 1. not an act at further 
knowing. 
I do not .. that It.D7' other 8OurcII811 or explanation 8ft required for the 
tl"tlth of pract1.eal intellen than tor that of epecu1atlw. Speculative 
1ntelleot att:lraua that aOll8th1na 18 01" 18 euoh, aDd ita truth dependa 
on ~enoe to the ob3eotive t .. , practical intellect a.tt1J.-. 
that ~ing 18 boftUJl, cOJ:Jnniene, rrnmdum, and ita: tru\b 
l.1bw1ae a.pent88 oft cornlpo;r;;:;;;; ~Im O1>3.ot.1veeitwaticn. To 
apeak of to. ,tru1',b' of. paoUoal intellect .. it it we~ in • 
especial clue b':t itself imdt.. the suepia10n that thIt question 18 
no longer ot truth but of Something else altogether.3la. 
The eontroveI'sj" is a tundernenta1 one, obviously, and could euilf provide 
material for a le~ st~ in itself. but the writer has elected to make note 
of it ";1thout prolonged disCU88ion tor two reesons: because it conc&mI 
Simon' S theo17 o£ knmi1edge primar11y t rather than hi. theol'7 ot autborl1:.7 
(although the close oonne<rtion of the tw is by no n1eana denied), md because 
the theo:r1 of authorttl' 18 not seriously underro:1ned in :I. te substar>.ce by tbe 
oritieUma, .~ perhaps 'When the means to an end 18 uniquely deter!n1Md. It 
18 t3"lMt that Cl"OWtS conclusions etteeUft!y refute Simon's theory of the 
, 
judgment to be 1ndemOnatrable (Simon 18 not clear as 'bo bow J1uoh demonstrabil1-
ty he would adJrdt, even of the theoretical considerations invQtved), tor the7 
pJ'OVe that it 1a al~ demonatrable that such a judgment 1. a prudent one, am 
. ~~ ... 
,-' 
it the ~~"'un1q"ly determined, that it. is the onll pnw.tent one. Crowe 
doee n~~1a, ~~r, that it ..,..nl equally valid _am. are II'ft1l.able 1t 
\ ,/' 
un be 4~rated thst one of tMse meana is the 1IOst prudent, 01" the onl.7 
~ choice. ADd 80 he doe. not attack Simon'8 contention tluItt unan1mi'bf 
would be preu.r10U8 in auob •• ~tuatlon, that no single metm8 could be 
deMoutrated u beat. What he doe. attack ia the un whioh Simon 1l18kea of 
aftect1ve knowledp, in whioh the will ... how .... to be .ned in .. a 
auhe\1tute to'¥: tbe 1DteUe"-. Btlt Simon -. theory deee not depelJd UpcIl atteoU 
lmrn4edae tor it. IJUppOl'tJ afte.1ft 1motrledp tor 81aon 18 rather a !ltfNm8 of 
achift'i.ng UJ18Jli1dt7 which goes into action when deft!onatratiol'l of a unique meane 
18 1nconoluiYe, and tor which authority ia a substitute. In Crowe'. argument, 
authority would substitute tor understanding of the demoutratlon lIhea 19nora 
or ill vU.1 PNftnted 1t. Now the undue intluence of an ill will on the 
1.nt$1l.ee't 1. not tar remcwed trom lack of atfeetift knowledge, u far .. 
prt.cti.oal coneeql8D0e8 are oonaerned, thouch the theoretical explanation of tbe 
role of the will in the two cue. ia n~ the 8_. 
b entlque of Fatber C:rowe ia thus important to Simon'a poe1tion on the 
nat1&re of k.no\itedge, but deee not seriously attect his basio ~ tor 
authorl ty as the cauae of united action. 
'1'0 mum to the d1ecu810l'l of the relation between the two ordeN ot 
u6 
truth (and S1Jrlon t s tenninology will o:>ntinue to be used here, despite the pref ... 
erence of the writer for B more unified concept of truth), theoretical knowledge 
certainly attecta the prudential 3udgment, for a MaD who does nat have a firm 
grasp f4 the facts cannot make a prudential judgment concerning them. It 
should be noted that St. Thom. points out that prudence presuppose. specula-
ti .... 1cftO'P'!edge, i.e., knowledge of uniV'f.t1'8ale, and he list. JIIem.Ot'ia, ratio, and 
inteUectua as cognoscitiV'8 integral parte of prudence. Hia analysis ia 
• 
complex, on it is clear that tor st. Thomu, prudence ie detinitel7 dependent 
upon speculative knowledge, 8 conneotion which Simon, in his dea1re to 
distinguish the two orders ot truth, does not. emphasise .e soh 88 he might.)S 
It i8 Dot 118--817, of CO'11'8e, that a pruderJt man have 8#quired OCI!tplete 
knowledge of a subject by hi. CMl ftUonilll in order to uke a prudenUal 
35~.!., II-II, u1 J 1, and 48, 1. The application of this study of 
pruc1eDce to modern situations would enhance a complete theoX7 of authority. 
Simon by no _ana denies this analysie, aad declares that the prudenUal 3ud.s-
ment must be preceded b7 an investigation of the real d1eposi tiona and 
possibilities of the p!rsans and things concerned 't.1.th the decision to be made 
(Nat\U'8 and Functions, p. 27). But be does nat. point out that such an 
ilmtiilgatI" on cannot even 1::-.. begun 'Wi t.hout. a minimal theoretical 'knowledge of 
the mat.ter at band, and apart from this single instance does not deal with the 
relationship of speculative and praotical 1 ntellect. This is most probably due 
to hie theoJr of the practical judgment. just noted. and hie method of arguJD8nta ... 
tion, which is to concede the field of specul.aUve truth to his adversaries 
while concentrating on the practical order to ]ll'OV'e the necessity of authority. 
st. Thoma., on the other hand, mak •• the virtue of prudence the link between 
speculative truth and praotical ju.cgl'llent. For him, prudence, wbUe belonging 
to the practical intellect, is a compoe1te virtue made up of three integral 
partau cO\.del (ebulla), judgment (~Si.)J and commmd (~). Counae1 and 
judgment reside in 'Efii specula tift ifi!e'Ct J only the elemiirE'"Of command 
resides in the practical intellect. .All three operate together to provide 
prudence. (cr. S.T., I-II, S7, 6J 6S, 1f 66, 1.) 
--
, I 
I i 
I. 
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judgment about it. He mq accept the advice am conclusions of others to help 
him decide, tima accepting their subatitutional. theoretical authority. But to 
do 10 intelligently, he must be able to understand enough of the subject to male 
a prudential jucgmemt 88 to the competence ot theee others. In short, he must 
be at lean expert enough to comprehend the practical ..,pllcationa ot specula-
tive trutbe. 
!b1a necessity eeel!I8 to argue for an increase in the authority of experts 
in the practical order, due to the spec1alintion demanded b,- the en1arpd 
bOt.1Diariea at !mowledp. The ir.diridual Il8Il will not. be capable of emm 
part1allf apert lmowledge in all tielda I he Mll have to :rely on othenJ better 
tftlned. to make praotical d •• Ud._ whioh demand thia !!I!rtis. u a prerequ1-
lliile. fbi. dependence will prcmt all the more n ... 88l.7 u goftnJIBrrte are 
faced by preble_ of a corsplex aDd difficult nature, such 8C1entit1c and 
technological problema, lor example,'u ".8t financial operatiOns to control 
inflation, muslear dfJ'Nlopment, and the exploration of outer apace. It does 
not mea that the people !Bed lose their .demooratic cont'l'Ol over the .. aperte J 
nor does it __ t.hat prudent men without specialised skUla cannot be chosen 
to superriee the 'Various project. of the expert functionaries. But it dees 
MIiIn that unanimit7 wJ.11 beooa more difficult, that the c:1rele of tho_ 
~ to make practical deo:l8iom1 in the .. _ttera will neoealll"11y grow 
muller. 
It wmllrl be a mistake, however, to conclude 1mediately that as prudent! 
capacities become JIlOr8 cd more the prerogative of experts, substitutional 
autborl.\)' or the £~temal t.n"* (in Simon's sense) must therefore increase in t 
practical order) that because the ... of l'fttn are S! facto deficient in 
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knowledee and prudence regarding ctftplex decisions, they JlUSt be governed pa-
ternall)", 11lce children. The temptation is great to treat tbe .tate like the 
.tamU)", mere, as Simon sqa, the distinction between individual and c(lI'Jmon 
good is otten blurred • .36 But it mast be NIIItBlbered. that tor Simon, pate1"ft8l 
authority at",.. aims at the l!!'2E!r, the fndividual good of the mil'101", not t_ 
common good of the aoc1.ety to which the miner belong •• )? The onlf' ~ in which 
patemalism 08D enter tbe polit.1ca1 see_ in his theol'1 is 1Iben the m:1mJr i. 
either a p49HOt1. or group unable to rule itaelfs a eolOt17, a au'tmterged olue 
within sGC1ety, or a smaller gonrnmental unit-. OBIt kin:! of individual 'Wd.t or 
oolleotivi\)" which has Ii distinct individual ~good of its 0V1 'Which 1t carmot 
atte1n 1d.\bcNt ext.n_ic, paternal usiatanoe. U this paternal autbori.tJ 18 
unnecaaaaJ'1, not terminal or not pe4agogicel, then the :result i8 ~, 
art1stocracy, or totalitarian central1ut1on in a monolithic state. If, 
howeYer, it i. neceaaaJ7, terminal and pedagogical, then. the paternal eutborlqr 
ie les1timlte, provided it look. to the proper good of the suller urdt.38 
There tore , "'11. though an increuing degree of authority be g1Yen to 
ex:perta, if thia i8 demanded by the CODl'l\on good then it i, not paternalism 1n 
I Ut 
SiaoDt, _stem, but rather a dentlopmem. perta1ning to the "Gonc! great que .. 
tion of authority, the question of who shall rule, or tb! tom ot gov'e:rrll8m. to 
be chaum. Aa such, it does not seem to concern Simon's theory direO'tJ.1 in 
, . 
~atio Government, pp • .302-30). 
37Ib1d.., p. 8. Simon is clear on this point. 
-
)8~., pp. 10-15. 
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ita phU08oph1cal foundations, for ~his deals with the need tor authoriV in 
geMral, not. the problem of loilere 1n 80ctety or the state authority ebould be 
loeateet. 
H~r, to call such authority of uperta substitut10Ml or paternal 
(in the non-Simonian sense) 18 so CO'lmlOnly aocepted.39 and natural--beeauae the 
expert, (or sol'U8 idOMUS, or philosopher king, or velfare state, to use 
• 
diftereftt te:nn1nolog) dou elIBrei_ an ability tor deoisiona in which the 
-
__ a are detlc1ent (prudential knowledge)-that Simon'. theOIy will ve17 
l1kel.7 mn the penmniall"1ak of being m1swrienstocd on this point. Simon is 
using the te:rm !;!temal in a restr1otec1 88tl8V, .. deaoribi.tbat authortv 
'Which ai_ at an individual gocd of • miner person or group, whereas the tem 
can alao ret .. to authori"Yearc1eed. to achieve the CO!!I1lOf) good of a people 
who 8.l'8 minon in that th..,. are not capable of a form of gcnrernment more prcxi-
lUte to pure demean.,. in their un1.ficatlon ot action for the common good. 
Confusion can eu1l)r ari8tJ if one 18 not careful to _ke thi. dl.t1net.ion 
(ftluable in itself) and apply the reetr10ted .enae .en reading Simon. 
who rules tor the common good is exercising paternel. author! ty 11 he is 
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considered ae outside the COlm'lunitj: .. en extrinsic agent, in the 't><q that the 
arl.etocraUc tft in the theory of Alexander Hamilton make up Ii ~1t7 
extrinsic to the mass of men.40 Tbia se .. to the writer to be a very tine 
distinction, even hanier to make tben that between an ind! vidual and a ccamon 
good in the family. 112deed, it seems rather a manner of 'V'1ev1ng the situation, 
without my .... fund ............. 8!l'l. ...  e:t1 ......... t.. um .... !!!!!* It __ that Simon should aay that the 
... pu"". author.1:ty is alway. paternal, 8hou1d alwaya be terminal, pedagogical, 
etc.. aim:i.r.tg at 1 te own disappearance when the maea at _1'1 are ree.d7 for 
part;j.c1pation in dM1s1ona-eTen it that dq JJII'Ver arri"IM. 'this mener ot 
uaiftg the tem 'tIlOuld make it apply to the q~on or tome of gwemlllllnt u 
vell as to the functions of authori. \7, and extend I!ternal to include a COMmOn 
goa1 as ita cbject. At one point in b1a section on paternal authority, Simon 
speake this war h1mselt. He i8 dieeusa1n,g demccraay, and. atate. I "'!here are 
e1:reumetan .. in which pstenutlist1c govemrmmt alone can rar.ove both anareh')' 
and. ~mvJ 8uch .... to be the cue, inevitably, liheNftJ" iporence i8 8'0 
pl'e'Y'alent .. to render election by universal. suffrage nonsensical.,.4l In the 
40 ~!9r8tiHc G~rmant, pp. 1$-16. 
4lIbici., p. 16. The role of substitutional authority in suab a e1tWl:t1onJ 
and Simtiits d:>acurity on the point, are noted by Mortimer Adler and 't-!alwr 
Farl"ell, C.P., in one of tbeir article. on democracy. They make use of S1mon' s 
tema eubetituUonal 8I'ld .... nt1al, but remark tb&t "he is not at all clear 011 
the question 'WIieGr, in a aM ~tr, the authority of a royal regime 
(which he call. tdeapotdc' but dou not tNireb)r Man 'unjust') iI rmbatituticm-
al in the $ •• senee •• that ot penmt.al gofttftIIlent. ft They then point out that 
11'1 tba former situation royal gOftftRtnt ia primar.i.ly for the cc:mJmtm .good, 
eubjeet8 are adult l'8Iard.ing their private aflu"" but politi call,. ilmllature 
regard1ng the ccmaon good. "Hence to this extent, the rOf&l author! ty resides 
in the superior virtue of one or a In man. 'fo thi.s extent it i. 'substituMono 
Gl. author! ty,' but :1. t 1.8 not entirei!!!1 because wherever the cortnOn good is 
thep-:lma17 end ( .. Ii iWt""l.1i8 cue n t.he relation of parent and Child), there 
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oontex.t, this uee of ewrnaliat.ic 11 bewildering indeed, oonei(lering t18 
previous restriction placed upon the term. One begins to suspect that E!-
ternal CtI1 Nter to a common good, and that the principles laid down prev1oU$ly 
l1ndting this funation 1ltUSt flow directly into a theory ot democracy as the 
best ton of goverD'l8nt-in *'hioh cue the distinction between the t., great 
questions of author.lty is not 80 bard ala fast after all. '!'be suspicion 18 
reinforced when it is nt'1bGd tbet tbe _re questLon ot whether the expert 18 co 
e1dered .. inside or outside the 1Ol'a'W11t.y determines whether the particular 
situation is to be viewed as • problem of tonus alone or a probl_ of paternal 
tunc:rtlon ae such. Ce~ olarit1oat1on in ~hie area would be a great 
adt'antage to the theory .. a whole, and it ia to be bop_ that Simon will take 
up the quest.ion in future 1nvestigat1ona. 
It 11 thua not clear that more substitutional autbor1't7 1n the tbaoretl 
0ftIer 1d.11 result 1n more paternal authority in the practical order, u tar ae 
S1mon's system 18 concarned, it the pod aimed. at is a CKlS'IImOft good and nat the 
proper, ind1v1dual good of an ind1 'f1dual or collective group achieved by an 
edrirud.o agent. But if thi. good is indiv1dul, then modem pn>greu arid 
gcmn-n.meDt by apert. can af'tect Simon's theory e1gni.f1oantl.7. An u:aMple 18 
that of a central goft:l'l1lt8nt mo_ aperta ant now exercising authority C'\fW 
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individuals amemeller politieal units to attain goode formerly achieved bJ 
theee 1ndi'Y1duals and smaller unita, the geod is individual (at least it w .. 
f01"1l1er17) and the authority is aercised ~. an extrinsic agent, an agent on 
another level of the hierarchy ot author! ty. 
This a1tuation results from maiem progress. Advances in learning lead 
to spec1al1sation am the need. for eJlperW. These do not exist in auft1cient 
supply to be .fu:rn1ahed. to all leYe18 of goYe~nt J tnUOh len to eaob individu-
al. Technological progrees, in addition, baa increasec1 the ~ty of life, 
drau:I. pl'errious17 ~ted areu together through imprond oommunioatio!lCS, 
extended mar.te, promoted r.1ObUit,. of all t,pea-.... o that problems ·exist at til 
}-\j.gher lwel than formerl),_ Thi. result Me been a tendency townnl 08fttrali ... 
tion 8I'1d general inoreue in love~al activity. Individuals am emall_ 
units haw beCOJl1e defic1tmt in many taSks once vithin their powers, henae "b1c 
govel"nll'!ent" has bad to inte:t"MDlt. 
!h$ question for Simon's theol"Y is this: 18 not !':odern progt'8fJs 1~ 
ing the c1eticilmcie. of individuals and ..:1.181'" units and thus i~tbe 
eubatit;utional. prltemal authority of a clearly extrinsic authority? Is thia 
DOt an increue of paternal anthon toy in the guise o£ a shift or author! ty to 
ever higher level.a,42 
42simon establishes .. c:r1tericn far paternal authority with his tw1D 
principle. of aut~ and authority. Then prO'dde tor a bierarcl.'i)' of author-
iV and ~_~ to the principle or sube1die.r1 ty function. J. t1euner 
deHri'bea this pnnOiple as tollowe. "No social. authority ••• hu .. rl.abt to 
1ntert"eft 'Wit.h actiTitiea tor individual and soolal 8.,,4. so long u thee. . 
~ble ter theM e!lda aT8 abllJ am willing to cope with them • • •• The 
principle of eub81diarity tunation sareprdlr the indind.ual in hi. relation to 
socieiV, ard tba leQ8:r ~tie. in their T8at1on to the great aoo!ety •• 
•• It proteote the right ot ~t!e. to selt-government or autOflOllf\V, 1I<"hiob 
bel,cmga \0 local co=:u.',utiee m! oceu'Plr~1onal groups aa vell as the fam1lJ."-
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Simon answers the question, for it is really the same dilemma which he 
describes in the first page. at PhUosopby ~ Democratic Gaverr:unent: the 
proponel1ts of the deficiency theor,y, the modern liberals, find themselves 
trapped into a demand for more government. Simon • s answer is that though "we 
feel that some things have become 'WOrse, and we have developed 1m ability to 
see ~ shortComings that used to pass almost unnoticed • • • there are not a 
few circumstances in which the call tor more gove:rnment activity seems to 
43 
result from unqualified progress." Be then shows, in his first chapter, that 
it is a growth of the essential functions of authority Which is call.ad for by 
true progress, l10t a growth of substitutional; functions. 
Thus Simon answers the question; but not tully, for he does not treat of 
the deficiencies brought about by progress. He is certainly correct concerning 
pl'Ogr888 in the abstract and the growth of essential functiOns, but it seems to 
the wr1 tel' that in te:ms of Simon·s own theory and especially considering his 
views on dembcraey in subsequent ehapters of Philo80R 2! Democratic Gov'ern-
ment, his position ooncerning progress in the concrete and the growtb of 
apparel1tly paternal functions in modern soolety needs additional development. 
Simon d08S nab seem to take into his theory the facts of centralization and 
Social Ethi.~, pp_ 196-197. MesslWr then gives three criteria for determining 
;&;\lier a soCiety conforms to the right order demanded by sUbsidiarity: whether 
individuals serve the common good while aerving their own interests, the extent 
of decentraiization, and the principle of ad much liberty as possible with as 
much state interference as necesBU"'T (Ibid., pp. 197-198). Simon is in perfect 
accord with this doctrine, so th8t'wha~being discussed here is rea1l7 the 
relAtion of subsidiarity to modern progress, as connected with Simon t s concept 
of defic1enoy. 
4lnemocra:tic Qovernment .. p. 6. Sim.onts point is that an inorease or 
better awareness C€ evll is not the only ground for more governmental activity. 
12h 
il'lClWaaed aot.1vity of govern.-nent wh1ch, at first sight, seem evell to contrad1o\ 
h18 apectation of 'What progress should bring. 
To illustrate theBe contentiona, it ll'i:~gbt be noted ttult Simon hi_elf 
• .ems to tenc1 toward a Jeftersonian vi_ of gCNermaenii and. authoriV,Wt. and 
W8l"l'US against the ever present temptation experiences by all powers to encroaoh 
u.pon functions better left to smaller unita, a temptation to 'Which state. l'umJ 
cona18tentl7 auecumbed.16 Adm1 tUng that the modem eOOllOl'lO" !II..,. indicate • 
transfer o! tasks to higher levels, he -..YU"n,8 that concentration jeopardi ... the 
most precious valuea, far any inet1~ution \!hi_ 18 designed to eentl"8li. 
deliberation, deo1a1on and command "tend. to bring subordinate p8X'11Ol'lB dmm to 
the level of the slave, as deaor1bed by Ar1atotle.J+6 Because of ~ ~ 
of men for power, he state., '*the state ougbt. to be t:reated .. a ldnd of 
pemanetlt aggressor that cont1nuall7 threa1ilena tbe veJ7 substance of eooiet7.,p'" 
And. of couree, bis 1na1atenoe on the D88Cl for an ab'\D:!8l1ce of &-'1'11.,. at 
l~~r levels ie clearly one of the principal arguments ten: the moa~ .eeential 
tnnction. 48 Simon pointe out. the difficult,. of recognhing the 'beet 10000000ns 
peraonnel, mUng that ,,~ definition oalculat.ed to procure unmiatakable 
recogn:S:t1on of the beet 18 11kely to be at variance l1.ltb the tna .... of 
pol1tioal. ...nence • ..49 He 111818_ thai 1\ 18 desirable that the leaden of • 
F.Lb 
44Ne.ture !!!! ~"iOn8, p. 48, quotation from JeUerson. 
~t~c gove~1 pp. 131 ... 132. 
46n.1d. J pp. 1)0-131. 
-41Ibi4.,Pe 135. 
-h8lbid., pp. 129-130. 
-49Ibu.. p. 2l. o. 
democrllO'y J l10ft of the tb8, should be l'l'lDbere of the lar;;er cl.888, l:~use ttw, 
have intentional ccumunion with it.SO AfWl although he admits that on somlt 
oceaaiona. m<r8 frequent in t.eebne1og1call,' adVanced aocieti_. a leader ~ 
need sene expertness, he boldlJ that in an entireq nonul state of attain, 
leadership belon~", to prudence, net to expertmesa--adding that a8 a result of 
technology, the expert hal 'beCORe an inetrnment 80 hefrVY a8 otten to pi, ou\ ot 
oontrol.Sl And, lastly, Simon d._ exalt the tra41tional raral nnuea al'Id tbeJ 
goai8 obtained on the fad17 tam in his chapter on deJI1ocra81 aDd tnbncd0£7. 
although he 1. certainly no unrealistio proponent ot 1\ general motr .. nt baak to 
the land.sa 
!be quotations and eitations from later obaptere olS1mon', aeconcl book 
are not inten4e4 to give a balanced rep:reaentation ot hi. thought, b7 8lV meana. 
They are taken out of context, tor t'I'Jlit tbing, and could eui.l,. lend ~'V' .. 
to a cario .. :tu:e of hi. truly perceptive and balanced view of modern pelt tical 
and eod.al probletd. The .. citation. aM re:t.her presented here in ot'Cer \0 
Uluatrate one tendency in Simon'. thought, that tendanc;' towanl ~ CJ" 
-
toward wbat mak_ up diatributUm in the OMstertcmian .. nee', a pohrl •• Uon 
towe1'd tbe principle ot~. There 18 the other t~ in. hi. tbcugl'lt. 
towfml authority, oooperatlve efto,"" a:pnreaiation of modern teebnol0O', • 
SOxbid., p. 222. 
-
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polar1~ation towaro the principle at authority_ The writer linda that Sbtt)n t • 
tho~~ht, l1ke authorlty itH1f, cannot be underetood Without the recognition of 
that tension which 18 inherent to ita development. The one tendency hu been 
U1U8trated hen. in order to b.1ghl~ the problem of eent.ra1izat1on 1n modern 
8001 ... 
A l'l'ION developecl answer to t.he ~.a of ciefiaienciea on the pan of 
individuals and smaller units .... to the writer to 11e 1n an expanaion of the 
OOftcepU of de.t1c1em:r,y and eubet1tutlon and of the prinoiples of authority and 
~. U tt. •• oonce-pt. and principles are given sufficient e1utic1ty to 
aeeount for modem progren J then Simon.,. theor;y 18 not ooniiradict.ed b: 
eontemporer.r developments, it they 8N nat" then modern progress, u .. know 1t 
J!'JWri; mean an im:m!laae :1.n paternral. authority. 
But a Bhift of' a:u.tchorl. ty to higher lcwele need not be _n "'«l neeeeaar1l)" 
resulting lroI\ 1ncl'eaaed det1c1.na1es at the lower level4. It the vary nature 
of modem lite no long.,. reDden 1t feasible tor a amaller social un1 t to 
perf01'll'l aatistMtorl.q a tulc hitherto carried out with .... , then it 18 not a 
<iefi •• mJ)" in that un1t. wn1 • ...,.1tatea int,el"t'entt1on from above. Rather the 
task in question baa oeued to be the proper GOncern of the -.ell.r unit, and 
inability 1#0 perform it is no longer a deficiency. ThwI the larger unit 18 not 
tJouly' IJUbet.1tutinl paternally 'b7 adua:i.na the task, Since the nature of \he 
task baa changed.1 it hal beoo_ " ,ood proper to tba't larger unitt a ~on 
goed of the larger unit lIo-1tb reepeei to the _ • .118r. Simon's prineiplea are 
tn, and one of them prcrr1de8 that the larger unit mat function when the 
8'l!'Illler cannot. Th'U hie the0J7 ct authority in ita philosophical foundaticme 
1anot v.101ated by the modem trerd .. long u progrua baa really ehtmged the 
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nature of the tun by making thea J>roper to the larger unite of 8001...".. 
There i8 here a parallel b~ the two ordera of truth. tack of 
.U1ty to perform a function NIJ be celled a det1c1eDC)" in a vide sena, it 
<me coneidens only the ~ and the tuk in abstracto, preseinding ~ any 
.... , I( 
eoc1al ~nt 'Whereb,- take are properl7' ullisnecl to vericrua unite. In 
the same 'W'O'. the le. of ability to untiel"8tand a demonstration in the t.beoret-
teal o.rder ia, !:! abat~,. defio1eD.q. In both cuu the det1cd.ene',y ill 
defined Bimp17 by :reterence to a taoulty and ita object. l3\tt it the JtUl'Stdt ot 
good (1n the practical order) ed of truth (in the theonttical order) aM 
sooial .tf01"t.l, and ethel" JI!lenbera and unite o:t soc1etl are .. signed. to perform. , 
a fune\ion or urlieratand a piece of 89'1d8nce, then it s ... to this 'Writer that 
there :i8 no longer any question of etrict d.ef1c1enc;y as long as HOb JRII!IIlber or 
• •• 
unit ls capable of lta ~ usignad tak, a task which 1.8 pQrt of a common 
good, one in whioh the smaller unit or !TlI!Rber i8 not c!efic1 .... 
-
lrlhat YU onoe a detic1erlq, therefore, may no longer be one) what wu 
once en exeroiM of paternal author1 ty may now be the eseroUe of III es .. ntial 
function. The concepte of de.f'1c181'107 and aubat1 tut10n are \hue more camplex 
than'tibey first appeared, bMw •• they fawtt deal w1th changing .it_tiona in a 
world of oont~, with goode which can move up the 8CIle, U it wre, frc1Il 
being goods proper to smaller units to goode proper to larger onee. !be 
con_pta ther1SlUftS, as formal principles, remain, but the mat1ier ~lich they 
embrace, the mterial .lement) i8 changeable. \>\:1 th such a flexible anel elaat1c 
view, it need not be co~ that modem progress i8 encouraging pateJ'!'l.alia 
beCSUH it 18 encouraging central1sa:t#1on. 
This analysis by the lrriter should not obscure Simon's point concerning 
progreu and the growth of ~~eent1al. .fUnctions. Not only dog walt.h 1no"..._ 
the ohoice of Mana, but the incntUe of specialization reeult1ng tl'<lfl 
th~cal detie1enc1ee (in Simon's sense of the tem) make 1t leu likely 
than ever that a un1q~ determined meana to the C(DMon good should be 
reoopiced u :suoh by all educated men. Here a another parallel with tbe 
t.heoretica1 order. as material w"",alth incre .... the vari,,- of _an. to an 
end, to elim:bmte the unique ... of a mean., eo walth of knowledge t.ncls to 
inc::reue speo1aliut:1oft and make :1 t 1mpou1ble tor 4n7 man to man.er the vilele 
of human learning and thus be qualified to recognize a unique meane. Renee 
unan1m:1. will not inereue, but be made more difficult b7 plen1t.ude of 
lmowl.8clp. 'lbe essential .f'uneticn Will be more necen8l7 than fJ'9'er. 
PU:rthermore, an increase in specializat10n will cause a ~ritu.ca1 
tendency among spec1alin. ... each 1"Utriet8 hie vi_ to at pn:rtioular field. 
Thie ldll make the t"ff81"-all d:1reot.1oft of soo1e't7 bj: the rum-apee1aUsing 
eacut.lft all the more neoeull7. 68peci~ u exerc1aed over the tunotionarie.1 
who abare in authorit)'. 'rhi. i.e pure Simonian theOl'Y of the vcl:U;ion of the 
~n godl.Sl But; 1t should be noted that it 1s an increase in theONt.1oal 
deficiencie. (S1mon t s "nite) wbieb l1e. at the root, of t.he whole proeull more 
!t .. taoto ............. inOORlNDicable judgmeDta, to more tIJlMial1zation. to more ooord1nat1ng 
129 
somewhat. geographical sense and a 8$l'l8e referring to the hiel"$rcby of unite of 
t1llthortty. This usage l.e in teJ"lU8 of \;hat Simon calla the homestead.S4 Fbil. 
It' ( 
mcdem p:mgreas baa increased cerrt.ralisation with respect to the homestead, l' 
baa had. the opposite tendency 'k'ith regard to the f'unet1on, tor it bas tended 1;0 
, .. 
ditfuse autbority anone experts. Just as in the theoretical order knowledge 
waa f O1"'XIm"ly more in the handa of eaoh ind1v1dual (homestead), tut i8 now 
ant·reel by spec1al1sta (functions), 80 authority haa been oent~lu_ in 0.-
regard ami deeentralised in the other. 'lbe l.Titer detects an inverse propot"-
ticn between ht'll'llstead. and function in thia area. Simon d_ft'S'ft8 credit for 
this valuable distinction, 80 neoesaary in 8J'J7 1rrvest1gstion of authority and 
'lbe pul'P08e of this lengthy critique at the concept. of dAtt1e1!!C1 and 
subet1 \ltt1onal bu been to aam1ne tbe relation of tba two orden of truth more 
c1CHl.f and to reoonoile modem trends 'td:tb Simon'a principles of authority and 
a~. In conolwdon, attention ebould be called to .. key 'Word. in the phra-
sing of thee. pr.Lno1p1es as given in ph112!<J?!J::!!! Democrat1~ ~~. SimoI 
sa;ya that tI'U8 pro~ of soo1ety Ind l1be1"'tor &mande that "at every given 
momerl't in the evolution of a ~t7 the greatest poaa1ble m:art'ber of task. 
should be direotJ.y Mnaged b)' individuals and smaller units, the smallest 
~ t.erme borIIHteadand ,funetion first appear on p. 56 of Demoo.rat1;o 
G~. There, §Gon explAins that the finlt deals '$~i ttl a pllrtlcUIar gOod 
as' 2nra~. tbe second with a particular go«i as s~al. 
1)0 
possible :m:tlIber by the greater wttta ... gS The kq word is, of course, the VON 
22!a1~~. It 'WOuld seelll that the nature of knoWledge as a social e1'for\, end 
the nature of technological progresS with all ita conaequenoe., do plaJ' a 
signU'icant role in determ1n1ng just wat this posaibillV in arq gi.,.n 81tua-
tion J1tIIJ:/f pl"O'VG to be. 
Another instance of lack of clarity in Sunon'. theOl7 occurs in his de-
ecription of 1'b.e ideal socieV vhicll. he pos1 ts in order to shOW' tna" authon ty 
baa essential tunc\1ona. In his first. book, he state. that the ben..,. of 
determining whether author! t7 hal an essential 1\mct.1on is to oonaideJl ft. 
cowmn1vof adults, 1ntel.ligen\ and of perfect good vUlt and to inqu1ft into 
the :equi~ of the comaon life of that ~ty.pS6 In his later work, 
he aeke tb.e :reader to bear in mind "the picture of a aoc1e14Y made a.clllSiftl¥ 
of cl.evel" and 'rirtuou8 persona." &ddine that. web a picture is not un:real 11 
reatr1cted to Wl7 ..u 1IOO16tl8l, aucb as a man and his wite. he them 
restates the quaRton as toll.ow8& "The question 18 whether unanimity can ba 
established in better Wn casual. fashion amo:ng the pertectl3 clever and .n-
intentioned mf8bera of a society wh10b ill, b7 ~.i., tree f100lIl det1e1en-
ciee.ttS7 Later in the same book, be po31ta a group of persona 1110 are all 
v1J:'tuows and enligb toned, no ignorance or illusion interfering w.t tn t.l1e1l" 
•• J 
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S8 
&billi:,' to detemne the proper ... to the end. At s"111 another point, he 
apeaks of a "cde. composed of Itgood and enlightened people," who spontaneoue-
l¥ intend the COI'IIIlOn {,fOod and men to subordinate their private advantages to 
1t.S9 tast:Qr, he 881'8 1hat two comlnOn mistaku contrlbute to the Mae belief 
that g<WerrJment would be ut'D'l&C8888l'y' "in a society made of perfect people," and 
uses the phrase 'tideal.ly perfect people" twice in the samet part of the 
cbapter.60 
The qu8et1on to be asked 58 \\bat preciae:q Simon means by l!rfe~ E!021e. 
James R. ~ of the Un1:vemty of \1:d.clil€p, in a doctoral. dis:sertation W1:tch 
criticize .• S!mon BItVe~ on thia and ot.ber pGinta, has insistad that Simon 
means that the members of this ideal socie. baft reached absolute moral 
perteot.1on (heroi.c Yirt_) and complete enliFtenment. In Flpn's View, S1mo 
in h1$ desire to refute the classical til80:t"y' that detic1enc1es and lack of 
political. prudence among nol"ll81 mn lUke gover.nment necetJaa17.....cae posited .. 
na:te of perfection in 'Which all men acting in their publ:1e capac!V as JMlIIDbers 
of the goveming perSonnel must be per:tect to the point ot being ccmple1leq 
~91:!!J. in v1rtue and knowledge, reactd.ng ~s dec1aions on e'Ve17 point and. 
baving the same identical view ot the cCIIDOn good.61 This 8stimnte of Simon's 
hypotheaia gives ~ a handle for all sorts of objectiona, of couree, each 
>9lbid., p. 31. 
-
&lzb1d., pp. 69-70, p. 67, p. 69. 
-
leading up to theoonclumon that 1n sudl II; aoo:fst\r of 1d.nti~ pertect men 
there 'WOUld be no need £01" e:uthonty. 62 
To cite a few a£ these objections,. ~ argms that idantioall;y perfect 
xnen would ~8 av..ree una.n1moua~ on the best m.eans to an end, and 1.1' a number 
of ~ valid _ana were available, then they would all consent to a chance 
l'IJOde of decillion, sum .s the .tJ.1p 0.1' a eoi~ich is not (tor ~) obeying 
auth0l"1v.6l Also .. be continu.ea, Simon makes obedience when in the m..tnonty 
the prool of respect tor authorlVJ yet there would be no JTdnor1t~. in a 
soc1etq ot perfect men.64 
But it is to Simon'. t\l'IW:ant bued on tbM '¥Olit1on of the COml!X)n good the 
Y.b'nn d:l.l'ecta his principal attack. Bis contention is 1"Jlat Sblon has po81tec1 
an ideal socia. 1n Vl1dl _1'1 in their er1vate capaciV are merel¥ ~ll 
drtu.ou8 as th8)" intend their own particular goods, but who in their m,.,l1c 
oapai1r as ~ of tbe governing peraonnel must be endowed wi ... buoic 
. a. 65 
virtue. \\ba.t happens, he asks, it the mt. ot a murderer wo ~tes 
in government? She cannot in good conscience defend her private good (the 
liberation of her hueba.nd), s1me in her state of ~te enli~terJ!llmt I'he 
sees that this would barJa the eommon good. She must JIBke an heroic "f.'Jl"1t1ce, 
or be gnU. of moral fault. In the au:lI ~. F~ asks J bOW' can atG" man urge 
M, .HI 
62Ib1d. J p. 65. 
-
63Ib1d., pp. ST, 199. 
-
6$Ibld. j p. 66. 
-
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his mm intarresta ar,ainst the 00_ good if he know. that, as a mmber of t.b.e 
gmrerntng aasembll'. he must join in OPPOSi!'« his own 11€ht 'When the COJmIW\i tu 
reconvene.? For~, this division of capacities wh1cb S1mon1ntrodllcefJ in 
the individual resembles the two w1lls or Roue.au, and asks the normal 
individual (u private c1t:t.n) to make repeated heroic aeor1fices. t!K.IQethins 
~ a sp1.lJi1ous common good would ever 00.66 
According tD ~, S1z';ton shoulA not haw attempted _ COll8tnlct an ideal. 
state using a le'vel of heroic virtue and complete enligb.temnent., for such a 
l.eTel 18 impo8,ibJa of attainm.ent by man and 18 thus "inappropriate to the 
conctuat of an inquU7 into the ... nt.ia1 func1d.on. of authonty.n67 What S:laon 
should haft posited, he declares, 18 an :f.deel 8Oc1 •• in 'IIilich men are -ntlT 
S!1te Virtuous and enligb:tened, in wbich all men are mont t.bAn ~ endowed 
with the virtue of political prudence am fU'e tib.ue abls to rule, yet one in 
wh1.ch men are ~ identical.68 If Simon bad 1"88tr1Cted bis a~ tor the 
neoes.ito" of authority to such a soe1e\v, FlFIm states that hemuld be in 
perfect agxeement, fbr in such a aoe1eV tb.ere wuld be tnequalities (as in the 
.tate of innOcence according to St. 1:h.om9s), and differences of opinion concern-
ing _ens to an end and the demands or 1rheecnmon good could still ari .. d'u8 to 
the different backgrounds, experience, and degrees ot Tirtue and knowledge 1n 
66l.2ii., w. 65..67.. 82. 
67Ib1,d., pp. 93-94. 
68Ibid., p. lJ~O. 
-
oi t1aena. Tht.l8 the w.lfe of the coDd..,. man would truly believe the common 
goal better served by be r lm.aband' 8 lU1eration, because of ber unique relation 
to him, end do 80 without moral fault, nor 'WOuld the 3udge, bolding an 
opposite view, be at faul.t either.69 
SUch, in SU1tIma!'y, are the ligniflcant ob3ections proposed. by F:qnn. 
i'he writer has reproducecl them here not only because thq constitute the single 
lengthy and liwly arltieicm of Simon's tbe0r7 which he has been able to 
dUOO'ftr, but prlM@r:l.ly because they illustrate hew Simon·s 'Il8e of tenntnolog-
C8Jl cause misunderstanding of M. theol"1 in aome mirJie. The writer b:i....u 
re3eetas flynn'. interpretation of Simon aJKl the ob3ections based upon it, tar 
it. is quite 01 •• 1" that Simon did not intend hie pertecrt people to be 6so1\ltel.7 
perfect, mob len identical. For one thing, Simon usee st. Thamaa t • etate-
mente concerning the state ot innocence to develop hie th.o~ of perfect!" 
authori ~', ani in this state Simon Gles:rl,. recogniMe that t.here woul,d haw 
69:rb.td., pp. 166-168. For 1i'l1nn, the witeta action would ariM troa 
defect1 vi""1m01d edge, m:1C1 be interprets st. Thana. to _e that the w1.f'e is 
merely norJlltal, not perfect, in thet she 18 incapable of perfect. apprehension 
or the l\hole matter of the COII'lmon good (p. 70). Thi8 ie opposed to Simon'. 
interpretation, which is that her ... '1.11 i8 good and oontomed to the divine will 
because shl is willing what the canmon good want.8 bel' to nll-the good of the 
ftlll'flilf \i'deh ia her props r c::oncem. It woUld 188m tbst Flynn thinks it 
neceasa%y to posit a deficiency 88 the catse ot the apparent conflict ot willa 
because be doee net understand Simon' 8 araument. and thus maintains thet every 
citizen, to be virtuous, muet will the eom!1on good :r.aterla1l:y at times,. i.e., 1: 
there is ever an)' cantliet w.tth his particular good. Simon adr:\ita tUs .a 
neceaaoxy only when the structure ot soc1e1Q baa broken down, as in the oan of 
the mUitax'!t com.ander who realizes that headquarters is ignorant of the true 
situation or cannot be reached (Democratic GovemJt'lent, p. hL.). ThiI possibili-
ty 'WOnld have to 1)8 eliminated from an ideal soCiety, in the writer." opinion. 
llS 
Ibeen iMqualitiuf tor perfective authority dependa upon tba.70 secondly, 
Simon's intense concern tor the value of spontaneous, individual enerc1- in 
the willing of partioular goods 1a diametrically oppoaed to CO" suob 1nbumtm 
um.tom1ty, nor doee be favor it in the willing of the common good materiany, 
u his oritlo1a of Plato-s ideal etate makea vel"f clear.7l Thirdly, the 
example of a buaband and. wUe COJaunity, cited b)' SiMon 8S an euI!!ple of what 
he meens, 18 hardly a eociet1 male up of abaolutely and identically JB rie'" 
people" Laetl1, Siaon t e ideal soo1ety is obviousl7 a teohn1que devieed tor the 
~ of diacover1n8 what authority would be esnnt1al to mankind in a state 
fl'M Irs deficiencies, a state of nature-fox- Simon sa,. that deticienq 
"alwy8 sign1.fiee the leak of a perfection that. subject ehould. poe .... in 
order to eatia.f)r ful17 the demand. of ita nature, .72 and Simon dces not hold 
that _n are b7 nature iden1iioal. 
'1'he te:r1ptation is strong to .... pect that Simon t s theo17 .... not read. care-
tully by fl7m1. At le.at n,.nn dOH not ... to haft cona1dered it in anita 
aspects, tor hie interpretation borden on a caricature. .And yet it lUJ be 
adm1tted that Simon'. word., if taken literally, open the door to milJU!Jder-
stancl1Dg, the pa.agee alreadJ cited from Simon are nidenoe for th1a. ~~~ 
12n>1d., p. 8. 
-
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the temptation to which Fl)'m1 aucoumbecl 18 strong in the human mind, naMl7 to 
suppose tmt. if ell mn are pertect they must be identical, that perfection is 
Il canplete17 uni't'OOal term for !!!. this- SUlen might -117 have obviated 
thie d1tficulty, but be d1d not, perhape, think it nece •• a17_ 
Another factor which may haft led It"17M <and. pc88ibly other reaN) 
utray, 1s the comment l:>y r·ferit&in in lUIS l"8"riew of Simon's riiarquette lecture, 
c:pot.e4 at length in PhilOBOJ?& 2! DelI'!OOrat.1~ Government. Here Mar1ta1n fNIII8 up 
Simon's position (ev1dentlyld.th the latter t • approval) in then 'WOrds. "Let 
US nppon ••• a CClJITlUnity _de up at 2.erf~lintel1iea and I!rf"ot!z; 
v:l.Mi1I.oUe human beings. ff Ffe then goel on to atld h1a own ~rrt. "P.rudtmoe_ 
I 
noll is 1ntallible. therefore, if .. tJUppOSe tul Ren perfectly intelligent, 
well-informec1 !!E. V~UOWl. placed in the same Cil:'CUYlt8tance8, 1dll not the 
prudent1a1. judpent of thes. two men ne0888arily be the __ • since in bath of 
them it 18 taken in contemit)' wi tb an appetite that p!trfect virtue. cause to b. 
right toward. tt. end?"T' Simon risbtl'y reat.r1ata this sameness at judgment to 
the cue where the _ana 18 uniquely determined al.Joead1, but even at that, by 
sanctioning both Maritain'e uae of the terma E!rfectly intell.ient and 
£!rtectll virt!!!!* as ... 11 as the coDCluaion regarding :identical judpeut.e, 
Simon wnt ~ond the bypatheais ot the atate 01 innocence and posited an 
!9!!tit.Z of virtue. He tbue left the va,. open tt1l' an extreme interpretation by 
not dispelling that illusion from the start. 
In the writer's opinion, theretore, Simon do. not clear17 eatablish what 
• d 
TlMaritain, Review ot Politi., pp. 2$0-2$4, cited in Democratic 
Gov8lT1lltmlf, p. 2S, n. 15. 'ftle i t&llies are in the original. 
j I 1 
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he _e by Eartect i!0Ele in his ideal society. On the OM bend, he .... to 
be using the etate of innocence d1ecuaaed by st. Thomas) where man bad 
supernatural and preternatural gitteJ on the other hand, he seems at times 'to 
be speaking of what theologians call the etate of pu:e nature, a bJpotheUoal 
I'tate ot uan created. wi tbou1f theee gUts, since he us .. the term e8Mt'lt1al 4' n" • 
1'u:nctiona, in l1PI*rent :reterenoa to _n'a euenee or natore. There 18 anotb&r 
anldgui1iy. Sim.on S8J8 that his 1deal society is free tl'OJl detio1envi ••• Tu 
'While in certain other writings apart. trom bia tw _in l-lOM on authority he 
holds that t:reedom itom def1ciencies 1.8 not to be found in a nate of 1'>Ul9 
- . 
nBture.7S And so the question remaine ~red. fl7nnt s solution to tba 
1Scomm.mt. of t.he Free, trana. ":illn'd R. Trask (New York. 1947), pp. 
IQ9-U2. • srrcfiaPter of this book, entitled "PessWsm and the Phil08~ 
of Pr'agreu," 18 an exoellent studJ of various theories of progress and bring. 
out Simonts mm. views very clearly. S1mm\ prefers to oall hi.elf a peaaimi8t 
concem1nc human nature, and .phaa1 ... the tact. that death, di __ , and 
1rksaeM88 of labor would haft existed In the state of pure nature. Thia view 
he cpposes to that at Pascal (Wt088 eal-ted new of uncorrupted nature JUde him 
bl_ 8in tor much that 1s really in nature and thus tom an extrema ut1Jllate 
of man's natural pouibU1t1_), am to the confident optimism of those who 
81.,. .. utopia in the near future. SiMon holds that a realin1c ~
enable. U8 to ... that Juet!ce 1s not absent from. hiStory, that the struggle 
for it is not dOOMd to defeat-it 18 only extremely cl1ft1ou.1t. He develope 
the ".. 1deu further in "Christian HtlmanitnlU A i:i~ to 'World Orcler,· in From 
Disorder to "'orid Order, Papers nellvel'0d at }{~tte University's 1;th -XMtw'diftiY dO'ii!'erence (MUliaukee, l?;6), pp. 185-208. If it 11 true that to 
unierstand a poll tical th1nker one must knew his position on original stn--a.'t1d 
tl» writer 't-eliewl that it is-tben thee. two wrka provide an important 
insight into those theological postulates which influence Simon's political 
philosophy. 
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problem, that such a aoaiety ehould be made up of men more than normally rifted 
in political :prudence but unequa1l1'l talents and virtue, .... a ruaoneble 
~the«iat J provided that det1ct.ncie. in tbe practical order be eliminated. 
It ae_ to the w.r1ter, however, that acme introduction of t~ problema of 
8P'o1aliB:"tim due to theoretical deficiencies diacussed in an earlier part. of 
thie critique l'Idght make the ~heaia leee utopian and give it added ooprlC7 
in the demomtrat1on. Tlw probl_ of vbat constitutes perteotion is c8l"\a1nl;y 
not In easy one to solTe, hence the hypothesi. must be 88 realistic .. pontble 
vithout positing detio1encie., and as ideal .. po8s1ble 'Without dUtorting the 
nature of man. As a meimodolog1eal tool, tlUmtfore, it hal ite I1M1tat1oblf 
a1 ong 'td th i te utU1 ty. 
In conclusion, this lack of elarlty on Simon'. part does n~  hi. 
tbeo", but it does indicate a walcnt&ee Wbieh should be corrected it hi. 
demt'>nstration is to ach1eTe ita em \lith m£dmum 8UOCU8. 
Simon t S Cl'fer-all treatment of the p$renn1al problem. of the relation of 
the OClllllMm ami the ind1rldual gcod 18 mu.eh more implicit thlm explicit. 
Actually t in his 1IIOrke on aut.hor11q· he 18 rather supposing a mooerate vi." ot 
the pt"'bltoy of the OCJI.IIOOn good. 1hi. 11 oo~ by his roYe1w of CharI. De 
Kon1nokt a book, B!!.!. t;r:i.ma11t.e oS!!!!! ~oontre l!.!. 2!raonal18w, in 
'.4hioh he declared that tie Koninok (whose position he neatl)" eW!'lm4rised) bad 
"outl1:r".ed, t4th unusual pro.tund1t;y and .~, the main aspect. of a theory 
of the ~ goed. • • •• ,~. do f1nd in it a moat valuable contrlbu1;ioll to 
13' 
the det'in1tton of the common good. end. to the vindication of ita pnmaoy. ,,76 
~hat Simon might well do 18 tOintet.'1"ate this doctrine on the pr1.Dta.o7 or 
the caranon good 1d.th his own theory of authority, not only tor the sake of 
emp).eteNHNI, but elso eo that no doubt can possibly 1"'el'l&in in the reader's 
mind thnt hi. emphatio statements concerning the need tor volition of parUoula 
looGa are DOt at roundabout way ot minbdrd.ng the demand. of the 00l'fW0n good. 
Th18 writer, at leut, felt wch a suapio1on mounting at times, until be 
retlected. upon the general17 balanced tenor ~ Simon's tbeol'1. A mortt exterxled 
develop!l1&nt of the example provided b)r st. Thomas (the wite ot the thief and 
the judge) auggeats itHlt u a suitabl. _tliod of punruinc the inveatigation, 
tor thia intrigui~ problem rai_ Nl1J more queetiona than Simon hae answered 
in his treatRent of 1t.77 Simon d.uenu credit tor applying the example to 
authority, but it i8 to be hoped that he 1411 lIe able to use it more tully in 
farther inveatigationa. 
16"Ott the COImtlOl'l Good, tt RfW1ev of Polities, VI (October 1944), $30. 
Simon praised the positive aapecw ~ !onLiOkfs book eftn thO'Qlh be realiud 
that much of it could be taken u 1ft attaOk on ll.ar1tain, to wan Simon b .. 
alwa:ya been very close. For the ator;y ot the controw%'87 which De Kon1nok 
et1ned up, see .1 __ I,. Anderson, S.J., "! Recent ControvenI7 on the CQPI1'iOn 
Goal," Unpublisbed Muter's Thesis (Loyola University, ChiCl)gO, 1957). It 1. 
intel"88'tirJl to not. tbat Simon published an artcic1e in the personaliat magaaine 
~r1t. !'Notes aur 1e fed.eraliame proudonient" in 1931, which l1as pra1,ed. l:w 
, tiin in S,dlolaaticl.em !!!!. Politi_. pp. tn-88. The pus. quot.ed by 
Marl.ta.1.n is a oonars. 8\l1r1llal'f Cl m:;o;*. principles of aut.onollt'· and authoriV. 
77For exanple, Wlat ot the objection adumbrated by F1Jnn (p. 65), that it 
the wife were also the judge she 'WOuld. be forced to tdll materially both the 
CQIlI!1OJl and the particular good at t.he .au tirae? "bat~"' the limits to which 
A pe:nton can wln a particular goed without inveatigat:1na tbe pceaibillty of 
bani to the common tJ)od materially eonaidere4' How much does the fom of 
government. influence the situation' !he list could be extended almost 
ind.efin1tely starting from t';18 8ilW1e exI!l'Iple. 
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So much for the criticisms of Simon's theory which the ... Titer has 
intended. to discuss in this thesis. They are far from being complete, in three 
ways. First, only a few problema have been selected for discussion fran among 
a large nunber of thought-provoking statements made b;y Simon. Thi ... made 
necessary by considerations of time and apace, as well as of, the relative in-
trineic connection of each problem with the central argument. of Simon's 
philosophical theory of authority. The writer believes that the most important 
critic1_ have been presented, but admits that O!Itiasiona haft, unfortunately. 
been neoe •• ar.v.78 , 
, 
Seoondly, ,the cri ticisma- offered haw uridoubtedly not been •• accurate and 
profound 88 they should be, end for this the writer takes full responsibllit7. 
Third, the approach has been predominantly negative, and has thus not best01il8d 
sufficient praise upon a theory which so richly deSeI"ftl8 it. Simon's investi ... 
gation, however, is it. own best advertisement, end the brief summa1'7 ot ita 
:merits at the end of this chapter vill, the writer hope., serve to atone in part 
far thi. 1arge~ ofleo!"sidad evaluation. 
What can be said, then, tor the merits of Simon's philosophical theoI7 of 
authority? In a general. way, the theory i. valuable primarily because it 
18SUch, tor example, is the criticiSM of Simon's use of the term d!!Potic 
offered by Mortimer Adler and "'alter Farrell, O.P. in their article, nS 
Tbeo17 of Democracy, IV,- The Tham1et, IV (July 1942), pp. 481-492. In 
summary, they claim that sIiiiOn suGUOtuted de!totiC for r07&l in hie analysis 
of types of regimes, thus departing from both rtstotle ~t. Thomas. Their 
analysis seems solid to the writer, but since the question does not &fleet 
Simon's theory to any great degree, it was omitted from consideration in the 
critical evaluation. 
accomplishes 'RH,t it set out to dOJ it proves that autority is eaentiall7 
good, that it is not opposed to liberty, that it d.oe. not arise solely from 
defiCiencies, but from the nature of man. Second1)" the theOl")" establishes 
principles for the proper emplO1!l8nt. at the functions of authortt)", principles 
which tmeUre tile right cOll'lb:1.nat1on of the foroee of liberty and authority. 
Third, the theory 18 not stati.c, bUt dy.namic, in that it taka. progreea into 
aceoUJ'lt. Fou.!'th .. Simon's theory tdtnenes to the Yital1t,. of the perennial 
philoaophy in deal~nl with modern probleman . Simon can legitimately take hie 
place among thoM present-day E~:rponent8 of ThClll'liam who have not teared to go 
beyond the ~our1l8r1.. _ b,y their precIeoe8eOft" 79 while he yet remains .. 
follower of st. Thamu in the baaiO approach 1Ibioh he takes to the nature of 
~ and the nature of author1 ty • Hi.. theo:r.r deael'Ws to be oelled a Thomistic 
theory or authOrity, despite any reaervationa which one mq haft ooncerning bis 
j.nterpmatton of St. Thomas on the nature ot practical intellect. l,utly (but 
this enumeration t:4 v1rtuu dooe not pretend to be uhall8tive), Simon's woric 18 
. 
a striJdnglJ' orl.g1na1 appr~ch. to the em.gma of author! ty by 'W81 or its £!a!-
tiona, an approach made poesible b)r the distinction between the t1m great. 
questions of 8.11thmty and between authority am!ts inat~nt8 and f'01"Pt8 • 
. This is an approach which baa never (to the writer' 8 knowledge) been attempted 
79The wr1ter is thinking of Har1tain, of course, with whom Simon shares 
e. ~O!1 view of tt"8edon, authority" practical tntellect. anci the volition of 
the cGmIOn gem. '!'be reader of. !·1ar1.ta1nf ,. Scnolutioiam and P,ol1tio,e as Man 
aad tbe State,. tor example, cannot fa:tl to note '£fii atnn!f,y Eet"' ... n \hes.-S;O 
!1i'&Iit pclltic81 thinkers aKi their vlllingness to strike out into fresh areas 
of 1:rN"e8tigation. 
80 before or since. 
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!.1ore in psrticull'.r, the wrlter feels that be owu a debt of gratitude to 
Profanor Simon for certai.'Y1 valuable insights: the utU1ty of a:pprooching 
authority frQ'll the standpoint of conditions for ulUmiJdty. the extreme 
i.rnportsnee ot the virtue of prudence to any discussion of authorit:- and 
government, the disUnct10n between willing the common gexxi romall;: and 
materially, and the l'lMfl tor life and apontaneoua energie. at lower level. as 
a basis far a hierarchy of authority wich make. autonomy possible. 
Pinelly, it should be noted that SiMon'S delightful am readable Ityle 
and h1I talent for apt exaMpleS (part1cular~ in his later book) play 110 small 
part in convincing his reader. And although cr:1tic1em baa been leveled at hiB 
use of terms, a good deal d hi. original nomenclature (such as substitutional, 
, 11 I 
.Nent:1al, deti~en!l theo;g', coacb-drivel" theo:z) des.rres a permanent place :1 
pollt,:1eel theory. 
In short, Simon's work is an extre»ely valuable contribution to the stud,-
of a:uthorltyJ the tbeol") ia not exhaustive or 1mnnme from cr1t1cip and 1mp .. ",.v-
_nt, but tor ita origlD&1.:1t7 aJI1 general exoellenoe 1t due"" high 
COIIr..end.ation • 
• J 
~:orka dealing "Irlith authority in the scholut1c tradition generally 
treat the problem of the transmission ot author1~ or its moral POWI' to 
obligate j.n conscience. !,ton modem work. not in this tradition tend to 
examine authQrity from historical or P8Ychologic8~ persrsctives, or in terma ot 
partioular a.ttlnge. NOQe has adopted Simon's approach. This is the COD-
elusion or tlB wr1 tel' attar exard.n1ng the writs lined. in the b1bl1ogr8};>Dy and 
others as well. S1JIcm's im'e.tiption remains \udque. 
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